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Chapter 1
Introduction
The public sector makes up for an important part of our economy. According to
estimates by the OECD (2008) a large share of the labor force in OECD countries
is employed by the public sector. These public sector workers provide a wide range
of goods and services to the public. Examples of services that are publicly provided
range from education, health care, transport, garbage collection, to public safety.
This large variety in public services suggests that all people, at some point in their
lifetime, will either have to deal with or rely on public service. The performance
of public sector organizations, therefore, receives considerable attention from the
public. Even more so, because public services are paid for by taxes. People expect
good services and value for tax money.
The delivery of public goods and services is highly labor intensive. Key to good
public services are the e¤orts and output of public sector workers. However, incen-
tivizing public sector workers to work hard may prove costly and di¢ cult. Perfor-
mance in the public sector is often hard to measure and verify. This is also reected
in the way performance is assessed in the public sector. Performance assessment in
the public sector is relatively rare and, if present, often tied to weak incentives (see
Burgess and Metcalfe 1999). As a result, public sector performance relies to a great
extent on the intrinsic motivations of the workers employed by the public sector.
Learning about the motivations of public sector workers may therefore contribute to
The OECD estimates that 6 to 29 percent of the labor force in OECD countries is employed
in either government or public organizations.
12_RP_Tinbergen Zoutenbier BW STAND.job
2 Introduction
our understanding of performance in the public sector.
This thesis contributes to the growing literature on motivations of workers in the
public sector. The rst part of this thesis empirically studies di¤erences in motiva-
tions between public sector and private sector workers. In particular, we study two
closely related topics. We investigate how a workers altruism and valuation of the
mission of the public sector jointly a¤ect the likelihood of public sector employment.
Moreover, we examine whether public sector workers rate themselves as more altru-
istic and lazy as compared to private sector workers. Next, chapter 4 studies the
motivations of government workers in particular. It empirically investigates whether
government workers are more satised with their job when their own mission prefer-
ences align with the mission preferences of the politicians in o¢ ce. In the last part
of this thesis we take a somewhat di¤erent approach. We investigate one possible
way to motivate public sector workers. We conducted a eld experiment at a large
Dutch school for intermediate vocational education to study whether the provision
of performance feedback to teachers can improve the performance of teachers.
The remainder of this introduction proceeds as follows. The next section dis-
cusses intrinsic motivation and its consequences for the public sector. Section 1.2
provides a general discussion on feedback and, in particular, the role of feedback as
an incentive. Finally, section 1.3 provides a short overview of the chapters in this
thesis.
1.1 Motivation in the public sector
Learning about peoples motivations is key to understanding any kind of behavior.
Every action that is undertaken is a result of a motivation to do so. These motiva-
tions may stem from a variety of di¤erent sources and occur with di¤erent directions
and intensities. A classic typology of motivation is given by Ryan and Deci (2000),
they make a distinction between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. A
person is considered to be intrinsically motivated when he or she derives pleasure
or satisfaction from performing the action itself. In contrast, extrinsic motivations
stem from separable consequencesof an action such as pressures or rewards. In the
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workplace such pressures and rewards may include nancial incentives, promotion
opportunities, social recognition or praise. The intrinsic motivations of workers are
central to the rst part of this thesis.
Workers intrinsic motivations have been intensively studied in a public sector
setting. In their seminal paper Perry and Wise (1990) describe the concept of pub-
lic service motivation. Public service motivation is dened as a predisposition to
respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and orga-
nizations(p. 368). Perry and Wise propose that people with high public service
motivation are more likely to work in the public sector and perform better in a
public sector job. They classify three sources of public service motivation: a desire
to participate, commitment to a public program, and a desire to serve the public
interest. The desire to participate relates to a workers personal well-being. Ful-
lling ones personal needs for an exciting and challenging job or maybe even from
concerns about self-image or status. On the other hand, commitment to a public
program or a desire to serve the public interest results from a more general care for
the well-being of others. This care for the well-being of others has received most
attention in the literature on public service motivation (see Perry et al. 2010).
In later studies, public service motivation is often equated with more general feel-
ings of altruism (Rainey and Steinbauer 1999). Altruistic motivations are dened as
being motivated mainly out of a consideration of anothers needs rather than ones
own(Piliavin and Charng 1990: p. 30). That is, altruism is a willingness to help
others without direct benets to oneself. Such a willingness to help may originate
from feelings of empathy, sympathy, or compassion. Recent economic theories build
on these ideas and assume that workers intrinsically care about the public inter-
est (see Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2008 for an overview). A common nding in this
rapidly growing literature is that public sector organizations optimally set relatively
low wages so as to promote self-selection of motivated workers to the public sector
(Handy and Katz 1998, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007). In these models workerscare
for the public interest usually stems from altruism; either pure altruism or impure
altruism (see also Andreoni 1990 for a discussion on altruism). Workers motivated
by an impure form of altruism intrinsically care for their own contribution to the
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public interest; these workers enjoy a warm glowof contributing. On the other
hand, workers may also be motivated by a pure form of altruism. Workers moti-
vated by purely altruistic motives care for the public interest per se; these workers
value the total contribution to the public interest. Purely altruistic workers will
take into account that when they do not contribute to the public interest themselves
other workers will step in and take their place.
Another important, and closely related, strand of literature studies mission mo-
tivation of workers. Many organizations have a specic mission. An organizations
mission describes the purpose and the objectives of an organization. For organi-
zations in the public sector, the organizations mission makes clear how the public
organization contributes to the public interest. Besley and Ghatak (2005) develop a
model where workers di¤er in their mission preferences; that is, workers di¤er in their
appreciation of the organizations mission. They show that there is a premium on
the matching of mission preferences between a worker and employer, implying that
workers sort to organizations they share a mission with. A number of studies have
experimentally investigated the role of mission preferences (Tonin and Vlassopou-
los 2010, 2012, Gerhards 2012, Carpenter and Gong 2013, and Fehrler and Kosfeld
2014). A common nding is that participants with matching mission preferences ex-
ert more e¤ort as compared to participants with nonmatching mission preferences.
Moreover, in line with the studies above, sorting of mission motivated workers can
be promoted by o¤ering a relatively low base wage.
1.2 Feedback as an incentive
Many supervisors collect information about the performance of their workers. This
information is used to assess the past performance of employees and also as an
input to improve future performance of employees. Performance information is of-
ten provided to an employee as informal feedback or as formal feedback during a
performance appraisal. The last part of this thesis studies the e¤ect of receiving per-
formance feedback on the performance of workers. Performance feedback is dened
as actions taken by (an) external agent(s) to provide information regarding some
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aspect(s) of ones task performance(Kluger and DeNisi 1996: p. 255). Learning
about past performance may matter for future performance when workers either in-
trinsically or extrinsically care about their performance (e.g. as a result of intrinsic
motivation or incentive schemes). The e¤ectiveness of feedback as a way to improve
performance is heavily debated among psychologists and business administration
scholars. In their overview and meta-analysis of the psychology literature Kluger
and DeNisi (1996) nd that receiving performance feedback has a positive e¤ect on
performance in only two thirds of all surveyed studies. Likewise, Alvero et al. (2001)
nd that studies in business show no uniformly positive e¤ect of receiving feedback
on performance. In an attempt to explain these mixed ndings Alvero et al. (2001)
emphasize the role of the source (e.g. manager or researcher), medium (e.g. verbal
or written), and the content of the provided feedback.
In many organizations feedback is provided as relative performance feedback.
Relative feedback contains information about a workers performance relative to a
preset goal or relative to the performance of peers. Receiving relative performance
information may matter for workersperformance when workers care about their
status or social recognition (Moldavanu et al. 2007, Besley and Ghatak 2008, Auriol
and Renault 2008) or when workers want conform to social norms (Bernheim 1994).
A number of studies experimentally show that relative performance feedback has a
positive e¤ect on performance (Azmat and Iriberri 2010, 2014, Blanes i Vidal and
Nossol 2011, Kuhnen and Tymula 2012, Tran and Zeckhauser 2012, Delfgaauw et
al. 2013, Gerhards and Siemer 2014). However, Barankay (2012) and Bandiera et
al. (2013) nd that receiving relative performance feedback can backre.
1.3 Overview of the thesis
This section provides a short overview of the research in this thesis. The rst part of
this thesis studies di¤erences in motivations between public sector and private sector
workers from di¤erent angles. In chapter 2 my co-author and I study how a workers
altruism and valuation of the public sectors mission jointly a¤ect the likelihood
of public sector employment. First, we construct a simple theoretical framework
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building on the model by Besley and Ghatak (2005). In our model workers di¤er
in their willingness to serve the public interest (altruism) and their valuation of the
mission of the public sector (mission alignment). We predict that a workers altruism
and mission alignment are mutually reinforcing forces. Altruistic workers are more
likely to be employed in the public sector when they feel that the public sectors
mission serves the public interest and less likely when they feel that the public
sectors mission harms the public interest. Likewise, workers with aligned mission
preferences are more likely to be employed in the public sector when altruistic and
less likely when spiteful.
We test our predictions using survey data from the World Values Survey. We
estimate how workersaltruism (as measured by their willingness to help others)
and their mission alignment (as proxied by their condence in political parties)
jointly a¤ect their likelihood of public sector employment. Our data contain a broad
range of countries, ranging from wealthy countries in North America and Europe to
developing countries in Asia, South America, Africa, and the Middle East. This large
range of countries and corresponding public sector missions is particularly well suited
to test our joint predictions on altruism and mission alignment. Our key contribution
is that we treat altruism and mission alignment as distinct characteristics. Wright
(2007) also empirically studies mission motivation of public sector workers, but as a
substitute rather than a complement to altruism. A caveat of our analysis, one that
we share with previous studies, is that we cannot distinguish whether our results
follow from self-selection into the public sector or from adaptation of preferences by
working in the public sector.
Closely related, we study di¤erences in altruism and laziness between public
sector and private sector workers in chapter 3. Theoretical studies have shown that
it can be optimal to provide weak incentives to motivated workers in the public sector
so as to extract rents (Besley and Ghatak 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007, Francois
2007). However, providing weak incentives to public sector workers may also attract
lazy people to the public sector (Delfgaauw and Dur 2008). We contribute to the
literature in two ways. First, we construct a theoretical model of sorting to the
public sector where workers di¤er in their altruism and laziness. Our model predicts
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an interaction between a workers altruism and laziness. The likelihood of public
sector employment increases with a workers altruism, and increases or decreases
with a workers laziness depending on his altruism.
Second, we empirically test these predictions using survey data on German work-
ers. We estimate how the likelihood of public sector employment depends on a
workers self-reported altruism and laziness. Additionally, we explore whether ex-
isting sorting patterns are the result of self-selection at the start of workerscareers
or whether sorting patterns are more or less pronounced for experienced workers.
Sorting may be related to work experience for two possible reasons. First, at the
start of workerscareers they may be holding jobs that are a bad match with their
tastes and abilities (see Johnson 1978, Jovanovic 1979, and Neal 1999). Second,
workerspreferences may adapt to experience as a result of organizational socializa-
tion (Brewer 2008). We examine these issues by investigating di¤erences in altruism
and laziness at di¤erent points of workerscareers and by looking at the rst job
choice at the start of a workers career.
Chapter 4 studies the motivations of government workers in particular. Gov-
ernment organizations make up for an important part of the public sector. These
organizations carry out tasks on behalf of the government in o¢ ce. The objectives
of government organizations are described in the mission of the government. After
an election, with a change in government, the elected politicians set this mission.
However, government workers may di¤er in their valuation of the governments mis-
sion. Besley and Ghatak (2005) formalize this idea and assume that workers di¤er
in their mission preferences, they predict a missionpremium on the matching of
mission preferences between a worker and employer. In this chapter, I empirically
investigate whether government workers whose mission preferences match those of
the politicians in o¢ ce are more satised with their job as compared to government
workers whose mission preferences do not match.
The data used in this chapter come from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for
the Social sciences. My data contain survey data on Dutch workers, covering their
sector of employment, job satisfaction, and political preferences. A workers mission
alignment with the mission of the government is measured by looking at reported
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voting in parliamentary elections. A worker is considered as a match when a worker
voted for one of the parties that has taken up o¢ ce after the election. Reversely,
a worker is classied as a mismatch when a worker voted for a party that did not
take up o¢ ce after the election. My key contribution in this chapter is that I use
variation in mission alignment over time within the individual. I exploit the fact
that after an election, with a change in government, the new politicians in o¢ ce set
new objectives for the government sector. This can be interpreted as an exogenous
shock to a workers mission match. Related studies on mission alignmenthave
mainly used cross sectional variation in mission alignment (Bright 2008, Steijn 2008,
Taylor 2008, and Wright and Pandey 2008).
In addition, I study whether my results are robust when I take all political parties
in a coalition into account. The government in o¢ ce in the Netherlands usually
consist of a coalition government. This implies that even when a workers preferred
party (as measured by their vote in parliamentary elections) takes up o¢ ce, it is still
possible that this party will form a coalition with parties that conict with a workers
mission preferences. I investigate this issue using data on a workers reported stance
towards each individual political party.
The nal study in this thesis is devoted to the education sector. Education is an
important service that is provided mainly by the public sector. Since education is
heavily labor intensive the performance of teachers may play an important role in
achieving high quality education for students. In chapter 5 my co-authors and I study
whether receiving performance feedback has an e¤ect on the performance of teachers.
To do so, we conducted a eld experiment at a large Dutch school for intermediate
vocational education. Teachersperformance was measured by studentsevaluations
of teachers. A randomly chosen group of teachers was provided with their outcomes
of these students evaluations. We determine the e¤ect of receiving feedback by
having all teachers evaluated once more a year later. In total, we collected two
waves of student evaluations (before and after providing teachers with feedback)
containing 15 thousand evaluation questionnaires covering 242 teachers.
We also study whether the content of the feedback matters for the e¤ect of re-
ceiving feedback. Teachers were asked to give a self-assessment of their performance
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both before and after receiving feedback. This allows us to uncover whether teachers
actually learned something new from the studentsfeedback and whether the feed-
back has an e¤ect on the teachersself-assessment of performance. Additionally, we
study whether teachers respond di¤erently when they learn from the feedback that
they perform better than their team or when they learn that they perform worse
than their team.
Finally, chapter 6 provides a summary of the studies in this thesis and o¤ers
some directions for further research.
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Chapter 2
Working for a Good Cause
Joint with Robert Dur1
2.1 Introduction
Many jobs in the public sector involve tasks that help people in need or contribute
to society at large. Such jobs presumably are attractive to people with strong altru-
istic motivations. A rich literature in public administration has provided empirical
evidence in line with this idea. Using a variety of data and methods, it has been
shown that public sector employees are more inclined to help others or serve the
public interest as compared to private sector employees (see Perry et al. 2010 for a
recent overview of the literature).
Inspired by these ndings, a theoretical literature has recently emerged in eco-
nomics studying the sorting of di¤erently motivated people into the public sector
and the consequences of this for optimal pay policies and organizational design (see
Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008 for a survey). A prominent study in this eld is
Besley and Ghatak (2005). In their model, workers are heterogeneous in mission
preferences; that is, workers di¤er in what they consider to be a good cause. Besley
and Ghatak show that there is a premium on matching of mission preferences, im-
plying that workers will sort to organizations they share a mission with.
1A slightly adapted version of this chapter is published in Public Administration Review (2014)
Vol. 74(2): 144-155.
22_RP_Tinbergen Zoutenbier BW STAND.job
12 Working for a Good Cause
Concurrently and independently, a new strand in the public administration lit-
erature has emerged that, like Besley and Ghatak (2005), stresses mission match-
ingor value congruence. Inspired by the organizational psychology literature on
person-organization t (Kristof 1996), several recent studies show that public sector
employees who have a strong willingness to do something useful to society and, in
addition, nd the work that they do valuable for society report higher job satisfac-
tion and a stronger willingness to exert high e¤ort (see Bright 2008, Steijn 2008,
Taylor 2008, Wright and Pandey 2008, and Leisink and Steijn 2009).
This chapter contributes to these literatures in two ways. First, building on
Besley and Ghatak (2005), we develop a simple model of sorting into the public
sector in an economy populated by agents who di¤er in both altruism and mis-
sion preferences. We examine how an individuals altruism and the alignment of
his mission preferences with the public sectors mission a¤ect the likelihood of be-
ing employed in the public sector. Our model predicts that altruism and mission
alignment are mutually reinforcing. When a workers mission preferences are well
in line with the mission of the public sector, the likelihood of working in the public
sector increases in the workers altruism. The reverse holds when a workers mission
preferences conict with the mission of the public sector. Altruism does not a¤ect
sorting of people who feel that the public sector neither serves nor damages the
public interest. Likewise, mission alignment increases the likelihood of working in
the public sector for altruistic people, but decreases it for spiteful people.
Our second contribution is to test these predictions using survey data cover-
ing employees in both the public sector and the private sector in a broad range
of countries around the world. The existing studies that we mentioned above on
person-organization t have used survey data on public sector employees only and
have been restricted to well-developed countries, in particular the United States and
Western European countries. We use data from the World Values Survey conducted
between 2005 and 2008. Our sample contains representative data on more than
30,000 workers from 50 countries, ranging from wealthy countries in North America
and Europe to developing countries in Asia, South America, Africa, and the Mid-
dle East. Such a broad range of countries and corresponding public sector missions
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is particularly well suited to test our predictions on the mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship between workers altruism and mission alignment. We measure a workers
altruism by his response to the survey question: "It is important to this person to
help the people nearby; to care for their well-being". Mission alignment is proxied by
the workers stated condence in political parties. Further, we observe each workers
sector of employment (either government and public institutions or private business
and industry) and a rich set of individual characteristics (age, gender, education,
and country of residence).
The results of our empirical analysis are well in line with our theoretical pre-
dictions. We nd clear evidence that altruism and mission alignment are mutually
reinforcing in determining a workers likelihood of working in the public sector. The
marginal e¤ect of a workers condence in political parties on the probability of
working in the public sector is insignicant and close to zero for workers in the
lowest altruism categories, but signicant and positive for workers in the highest
altruism categories. In other words, mission alignment only a¤ects sector choice
when the worker is su¢ ciently altruistic. Likewise, the marginal e¤ect of a workers
altruism on the probability of working in the public sector is strongly increasing
in the workers condence in political parties. Together, these ndings imply that
only those workers who exhibit both su¢ cient altruism and su¢ cient condence in
political parties are signicantly more likely to end up working in the public sector.
The total e¤ect ranges up to an additional 6.5 percentage points as compared to
the predicted probability of working in the public sector for an average worker of
25.5%. Neither workers with high altruism and weak condence nor workers with
low altruism and strong condence show a signicantly higher likelihood of working
in the public sector as compared to an average worker. In contrast, workers with
low altruism and weak condence are signicantly less likely to work in the public
sector; the probability is up to 4.1 percentage points lower as compared to an average
worker.
Our results di¤er to some extent between workers from well-developed countries
as compared to workers from less-developed countries. In well-developed countries,
altruism is somewhat more important and condence in political parties is some-
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what less important for the likelihood of working in the public sector. The interac-
tion e¤ect between altruism and condence is slightly smaller as compared to the
full sample estimation, indicating that the mutually reinforcing relation between a
workers altruism and condence is slightly weaker in well-developed countries. In
less-developed countries, condence in political parties is more important than al-
truism for the likelihood of working in the public sector. Moreover, we nd that the
mutually reinforcing relation between altruism and condence is especially strong in
these countries, suggesting that the alignment of mission preferences is more impor-
tant in less-developed countries as compared to well-developed countries.
Previous research has shown that altruism or public service motivation is a
better predictor of public sector employment for higher educated workers (Lewis and
Frank 2002). We nd the same pattern in our data for altruism and condence and,
particularly, for the interaction between these two. Interestingly, and in contrast to
our full sample, we nd some indications for spite among respondents in the lowest
altruism category.
While our main motivation is to contribute to the body of knowledge about the
nature of motivations of public sector employees, we believe that our study (and
studies like ours) serve a broader purpose. First, learning about the motivations of
public sector employees can contribute to a better understanding of organizational
performance in the public sector. Performance of public sector organizations depends
considerably on the motivations of their workforce because production is highly labor
intensive. Moreover, public sector organizations make relatively little use of extrinsic
incentives for workers, such as pay-for-performance and steep wage-tenure proles
(see, e.g., Burgess and Metcalfe 1999), rendering intrinsic motivations of workers
even more important than in the private sector. Second, learning about public sector
employeesintrinsic motivations can be useful for policy makers as this information
may help to design more e¤ective HR policies. These policies may address moral
hazard issues, but also adverse-selection issues. For instance, the results of studies
like ours may convince organizations to rely less on self-selection of workers and to
spend more on the use of selection tools such as personality tests to lter out job
candidates with undesirable motivations.
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We proceed as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of related liter-
ature. In section 2.3, we develop a simple model and formally derive predictions.
Section 2.4 describes the data set and explains our empirical strategy. Section 2.5
describes and discusses the main results of the empirical analysis. Section 2.6 con-
cludes.
2.2 Related literature
A formalization of intrinsic motivation to work in the public sector lies in the concept
of public service motivation. Perry and Wise (1990) gave the rst comprehensive
overview of this concept and dene public service motivation as an individuals
predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public insti-
tutions and organizations (p. 368). They propose that workers with high public
service motivation are more likely to end up in a public sector job and will perform
better in such a job. Public service motivation is often equated with a desire to
serve the public interest or, more generally, with altruism. Rainey and Steinbauer
(1999) dene public service motivation as a general altruistic motivation to serve
the interests of a community of people, a state, a nation or humankind(p. 23). We
use their concept of public service motivation.
Recent theoretical research in economics builds on these ideas and assumes that
some workers in the economy intrinsically care about serving the public interest.
In these studies, workers care usually stems from altruism, be it pure or impure
(Handy and Katz 1998, Francois 2000 and 2007, Glazer 2004, Besley and Ghatak
2005, Prendergast 2007, Delfgaauw and Dur 2008, Nyborg and Brekke 2010, Ghatak
and Mueller 2011, and Buurman and Dur 2012). A common nding in this rapidly
growing literature is that public sector organizations optimally set relatively low
wages so as to promote self-selection of altruistic workers.
Empirical studies on di¤erences in workersmotivation between the public and
private sector have mainly used data from the US and Western Europe. Studies
using data on self-reported motivation and preferences almost invariably nd that, as
compared to private sector workers, public sector workers have a stronger willingness
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to serve the public interest, to help others, and to make personal sacrices in order to
do so (Rainey 1982, Crewson 1997, Houston 2000, and Lewis and Frank 2002). Other
studies examine di¤erences in self-reported pro-social actions. Brewer (2003) and
Houston (2006) nd that public sector workers are more inclined than private sector
workers to participate in pro-social activities such as volunteering, donating blood,
and taking part in nonpolitical civic a¤airs. Jacobsen et al. (2011) and Buurman et
al. (2012) explore revealed preferences data and nd that public sector workers are
more likely to make a donation to charity than observationally equivalent private
sector workers, particularly at the start of their career. Lastly, Gregg et al. (2011)
use British panel data and nd that workers who are more inclined to donate labor
in the form of unpaid overtime are more likely to sort to the not-for-prot sector.
This e¤ect is strongest for industries with caring features such as health, education,
and social care.
Few studies have examined whether these results generalize to less developed
countries. Serneels et al. (2007) show that intrinsic motivation to help the pooris
among the most important determinants of nursing and medical students willingness
to work in the relatively underprivileged rural areas in Ethiopia. Serra et al. (2011)
use both survey and lab-experimental data and show that pro-socially motivated
health professionals in Ethiopia are more likely to work in the nonprot sector.
Lastly, Norris (2003) and Vandenabeele and Van de Walle (2008) use survey data
from the International Social Survey Program and show that public sector workers
score higher on altruistic attitudes than their private sector counterparts in all world
regions except Asia.
Our key innovation as compared to the existing literature is to treat altruism
and mission alignment as distinct characteristics. A few empirical papers in public
administration have studied mission motivationof employees, but as a substitute
rather than as a complement to altruism (Wright 2007). Closest to this chapter
are Bright (2008), Steijn (2008), Taylor (2008), Wright and Pandey (2008), and
Leisink and Steijn (2009). Inspired by the organizational psychology literature on
person-organization t (Kristof 1996), these studies show that public sector employ-
ees experience higher job satisfaction, have stronger willingness to exert e¤ort on
27_RP_Tinbergen Zoutenbier BW STAND.job
2.3 Theoretical framework 17
the job, and are more inclined to stay in their job if they nd it important to do
something useful to society and, in addition, nd the work that they do useful to
society. Unlike these studies, our data cover employees in both the public sector and
the private sector, which allows us to study the issue of sorting to the public sector
in a much more comprehensive way.
Upon completing the rst draft of this chapter, we became aware of two other
closely related papers. First, Cowley and Smith (2014) use data from the same wave
of the World Values Survey as we use to study the relation between corruption in a
country and the sorting of intrinsically motivated workers to the public sector. They
nd evidence that the di¤erence in intrinsic motivation between public and private
sector workers in a country decreases with government corruption (appropriately
instrumented). Second, Houston (2011) uses data from the International Social
Survey Programme and shows that the desire to help others is signicantly less
prevalent among government workers in Anglo-Saxon welfare regimes as compared
to Scandinavian welfare regimes. A key di¤erence between these studies and our
study is that we use an individual-level variable for a workers alignment with the
public sectors mission, rather than a nation-specic indicator for all workers in a
country.
2.3 Theoretical framework
To x ideas, we develop a simple model building on the inuential paper by Besley
and Ghatak (2005). In our model, people are heterogeneous in two ways: they di¤er
in their willingness to serve the public interest (or altruism), denoted by i 2 [; ],
and in their valuation of the mission of the public sector (or mission alignment),
denoted by i 2 [; ]. Both characteristics are an individuals private information
and are drawn from a continuous distribution. Altruism is impure; that is, indi-
viduals care about their personal contribution to the public interest, not about the
public interest per se.2 Both  and  can take positive and negative values. A
2See Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010) for eld-experimental evidence supporting this assumption
and Andreoni (1990) for an extensive discussion of pure and impure altruism. Piliavin and Charng
(1990) provide a useful overview of the literature on altruism in all branches of the social sciences.
28_RP_Tinbergen Zoutenbier BW STAND.job
18 Working for a Good Cause
negative  implies that a worker is spiteful; such a worker would rather harm than
serve others.3 A negative  implies that a workers mission preferences conict with
the mission of the public sector; that is, this worker feels that the mission of the
public sector harms rather than serves the public interest.4
The economy consists of two sectors: a public sector and a private sector. The
private sector is perfectly competitive and neither  nor  matters in any way, such
that people who choose to work in the private sector obtain the same utility, given
by U . The public sector o¤ers a wage w and, in addition, yields some nonpecuniary
payo¤ to workers depending on their  and . The utility from working in the public
sector is given by:
Ui = w + ii   "i:
The interaction term ii parsimoniously captures the idea that altruistic workers
(i > 0) only derive some additional nonpecuniary utility from working in the pub-
lic sector when they feel that the public sectors mission contributes to the public
interest (i > 0).
5 The stochastic term "i captures all other possible characteristics
that may a¤ect an individuals relative preference for the public sector. We assume
that " is drawn from a distribution with CDF F (") = Pr("i  "), PDF f(") > 0,
and boundaries " 2 ["; "], such that there is some variation in most preferred sector
for each worker type ii.
A utility maximizing worker joins the public sector when the utility from doing
so is higher than the utility from working in the private sector. The proportion of
3Lab experimental evidence shows that, while altruism is much more prevalent, a substantial
fraction of people is spiteful (Andreoni and Miller 2002, Beckman et al. 2002, Falk et al. 2005,
and Fehr et al. 2013).
4A key di¤erence between Besley and Ghatak (2005)s model and our model lies in the type
space. While their economy consists of selsh and mission motivated workers, in our model workers
are distributed continuously along two dimensions: altruism and mission alignment.
5We implicitly assume that workers have little or no discretion on the job and so take the
public sectors mission as given. Prendergast (2007) and Buurman and Dur (2012) study sorting
when workers have more leeway, which may result in bifurcated self-selection. Further note that
endogenous e¤ort choice by workers need not change any of our conclusions. For instance, a model
where utility from working in the public sector is given by Ui = w+ iiei   12e2i   "i (where ei is
worker is e¤ort choice) produces exactly the same predictions as long as the public sector imposes
a strictly positive minimum e¤ort requirement (which seems reasonable).
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workers of type ii choosing public sector employment is given by:
Pr["i  w   U + ii] = F (w   U + ii):
It immediately follows that the likelihood of public sector employment increases in
workersaltruism for workers who feel that the public sector serves the public interest
( > 0):
@F ()
@i
= if(w   U + ii):
Conversely, for workers who feel that the public sector harms the public interest
( < 0), the likelihood of working in the public sector decreases in the workers
altruism. Altruism has no e¤ect for workers who are indi¤erent about the public
sectors mission ( = 0).
Likewise, it follows that an increase in workersmission alignment increases the
likelihood of working in the public sector for altruistic workers ( > 0), decreases it
for spiteful workers ( < 0), and leaves it una¤ected for selsh workers ( = 0):
@F ()
@i
= if(w   U + ii):
Summarizing, our model thus yields the following key predictions:
Prediction 1 An increase in workersaltruism ( ) increases the likelihood of work-
ing in the public sector for workers who feel that the public sector serves the
public interest ( > 0), decreases it for workers who feel that the public sec-
tor harms the public interest ( < 0), and leaves it una¤ected for indi¤erent
workers ( = 0).
Prediction 2 An increase in workersmission alignment () increases the likeli-
hood of working in the public sector for altruistic workers (  > 0), decreases
it for spiteful workers (  < 0), and leaves it una¤ected for selsh workers
(  = 0).
The resulting predicted probabilities of working in the public sector are depicted
in Figure 2.1.6 The model predicts that workers who are highly altruistic and whose
6In Figure 2.1 the stochastic term " is assumed to follow a continuous uniform distribution.
The gure looks similar with other distributions as long as second-order e¤ects through f 0() are
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mission preferences are strongly aligned with the public sectors mission are overrep-
resented in the public sector. The same is true for workers who are highly spiteful
and feel that the public sector damages the public interest. Highly altruistic work-
ers with mission conict and highly spiteful workers with mission alignment are
underrepresented in the public sector.
[,]
[,][,]
[,]
P
r(
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0
Figure 2.1: Predicted probabilities of working in the public sector
not dominant.
31_RP_Tinbergen Zoutenbier BW STAND.job
2.4 Data and empirical strategy 21
2.4 Data and empirical strategy
We test our key predictions using data from the World Values Survey, conducted
by the World Values Survey Organization (2009). This survey consists of several
waves, starting in 1981. We use data from the 2005-2008 wave that contains one
year of observations for each country.7 The total number of respondents is 82,992.
Respondents answered questions on a wide range of topics, including social, cultural,
and political attitudes and a large set of demographics. Questionnaires were carried
out face-to-face with the exception of Japan and Australia where paper-and-pencil
questionnaires were administered. The range of countries is very diverse, ranging
from wealthy OECD countries to less-developed countries in South America, Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East.
Our key variables of interest are stated altruism, condence in political parties,
and sector of employment. The survey contains the statement "It is important to
this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being" and respondents
were asked to score themselves on a six-point scale ranging from "very much like
me" to "not at all like me". We use this as a measure of altruism.8 Unfortunately,
our data set does not allow us to construct a multi-item measure of altruism that
would be psychometrically preferable (see Gosling et al. 2003 for a discussion of pros
and cons of single-item measures).
Furthermore, respondents were asked to score their condence in political parties
on a four-point scale ranging from "a great deal" to "none at all". We use this as
a proxy for the workers valuation of the mission he contributes to when working in
the public sector. Thus, we assume that workers with high condence in political
parties feel that they contribute to a good cause by working in the public sector,
while this holds to a smaller extent for workers with less condence. We readily
admit that this is not an ideal measure of mission alignment, as political parties are
7Previous waves are excluded from the analysis because these waves do not contain questions
on altruism and sector of employment.
8Ideally, the question would not refer to people nearby but, more generally, to people.
Care for people nearby is a good proxy for care for people more generally if these measures for
altruism are positively correlated. We examined data from the General Social Survey and indeed
nd a strong positive correlation between I would rather su¤er myself than let the one I love
su¤er.and Personally assisting people in trouble is very important to me..
32_RP_Tinbergen Zoutenbier BW STAND.job
22 Working for a Good Cause
an important but certainly not the sole determinant of the public sectors mission.
Miller (1974a and 1974b) provides an interesting discussion of the relation between
public policy and political trust. Quite close to our premise, he describes political
trust (of which condence in political parties is an important component) as "the
belief that the government is operating according to ones normative expectations
of how a government should function." (Miller 1974b: 989).9
Note that our data do not allow us to distinguish spiteful ( < 0) from selsh
workers ( = 0) as both types of people likely answer "not at all like me" to the
question on altruism. Nor can we be sure that we can distinguish workers with
conicting mission preferences ( < 0) from workers with a neutral stance towards
the public sectors mission ( = 0), as we cannot rule out that both answer "none
at all" to the question on condence in political parties. Hence, the variation in our
data mainly stems from workers who are at least to some extent altruistic and who
have a relatively positive attitude towards the public sectors mission. Nevertheless,
as we shall see, we nd some indication for spite among highly educated workers in
the lowest altruism category.
We restrict our analysis to respondents with a job (either full time, part time, or
self employed) who work either in government and public institutions or in private
business and industry. We omit all workers from private not-for-prot organizations,
as it is not obvious how to classify them.10 These restrictions result in a sample of
30,652 workers in 50 di¤erent countries,11 of whom 9,002 (29.4%) work in the public
sector. The number of observations per country ranges from 436 to 1,394. Our data
contain between 60 and 460 workers in the public sector for each country.
9To our knowledge, a data set covering workers in both the public and private sector and
containing both a measure of altruism and a better measure of mission alignment does not exist. In
addition to the question on condence in political parties, the World Values Survey also contains a
question on condence in parliament. Performing our empirical analysis using this measure instead
of condence in political parties gives similar but slightly weaker results.
10In some countries, not-for-prot organizations are highly subsidized and under control of the
public sector. In others, not-for-prot organizations are much more autonomous and sometimes
function as a substitute for public goods provision by the government.
11Countries included in the analysis are: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burk-
ina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldava, Morocco, Netherlands,
Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Serbia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vietnam, and Zambia.
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The sector of employment variable is recoded to a dichotomous variable scoring
one when public sector and zero when private sector. We use binary logistic re-
gression12 to estimate the odds that an individual with given characteristics works
in the public sector. We control for several demographics D, such as age, gender,
and education level of a worker.13 We include country xed e¤ects j to control
for unobserved heterogeneity between countries. The specication of our regression
equation is:
ln

Pr(public)
Pr(private)

= A+ C +  (A C) +D0 + j + "; (2.1)
where A is our measure of altruism, C measures condence in political parties, and
" is the error term. For ease of interpretation of the coe¢ cients, A and C are both
mean-centred. Our key parameter of interest is  , which should be positive when
altruism and condence in political parties are mutually reinforcing, as our theory
suggests. We perform a test whether  = 0 against the one sided alternative that
it is positive. Our theory provides little guidance regarding the signs of  and .
However, following prediction 1, the sum of  and  should be positive for su¢ ciently
high values of C. Likewise, following prediction 2, the sum of  and  should be
positive for su¢ ciently high values ofA. We shall test these predictions by computing
the marginal e¤ects and the corresponding standard errors for all possible values of
A and C.
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample.14 Both altruism and
condence in political parties are slightly but signicantly higher among public sector
workers as compared to private sector workers (p < 0:01). This can also be seen in
Figures 2.2 and 2.3. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests conrm that these distributions are
12We prefer binary logistic regression over probit regression because it simplies the interpreta-
tion of results. Running the analysis with binary logistic regression gives a slightly better t than
probit (based on McFadden R2).
13A referee noted that a workers risk preferences can also be an important determinant of sorting
to the public sector, since the public sector commonly o¤ers relatively secure jobs. Not controlling
for such risk preferences biases our results if altruism and risk preferences are correlated. While it
is not possible to control for risk preferences with the current data set, we checked whether risk
preferences and altruism are correlated in another data set, the German Socio-Economic Panel,
and found a very small and insignicant correlation (see Table 3.2 in chapter 3).
14Compared to the original data, scales of altruism and condence in political parties are reversed
for interpretational purposes.
34_RP_Tinbergen Zoutenbier BW STAND.job
24 Working for a Good Cause
signicantly di¤erent between public sector and private sector workers (p < 0:01).
There are some substantial di¤erences in demographics between public and private
sector workers. Public sector workers are more likely female, higher educated, and
slightly older as compared to private sector workers. In the empirical analysis we
shall control for these di¤erences in observables.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Obs. Public Private Total
Altruism 30652
Mean 4.77 4.68 4.71
Standard deviation (1.08) (1.11) (1.10)
Condence in political parties 28429
Mean 2.09 2.03 2.05
Standard deviation (0.82) (0.80) (0.81)
Gender: % female 30463
Mean 0.49 0.39 0.42
Standard deviation (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
Age: years 30463
Mean 40.49 38.45 39.05
Standard deviation (11.33) (12.34) (12.08)
Education: % level 30463
None 0.01 0.07 0.05
Incomplete primary 0.02 0.05 0.04
Primary 0.05 0.12 0.10
Incomplete secondary 0.05 0.07 0.06
Secondary 0.22 0.22 0.22
Incomplete university preparatory 0.05 0.06 0.06
University preparatory 0.17 0.17 0.17
University: no degree 0.10 0.07 0.08
University 0.34 0.15 0.21
Countries 50
Observations 9002 21650 30652
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Figure 2.2: Density of altruism
Notes: Altruism is measured by the response to the statement "It is important to this
person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being". The answer categories
are [1] Not at all like me, [2] Not like me, [3] A little like me, [4] Somewhat like me,
[5] Like me, and [6] Very much like me.
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Figure 2.3: Density of condence in political parties
Notes: Condence in political parties is measured by the response to the question
"Could you tell me how much condence you have in [Political parties]?" The answer
categories are [1] None at all, [2] Not very much, [3] Quite a lot, and [4] A great deal.
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2.5 Results
Table 2.2 shows the results of the binary logistic regressions for the full sample
of workers. We report both the regression estimates b and the average marginal
e¤ect on the probability ame. The average marginal e¤ect on the probability gives
the average of the marginal e¤ects evaluated for all observations. Following most
previous studies, our rst estimation includes only altruism as explanatory variable.
Clearly, workers with higher levels of altruism are more likely to be employed in
the public sector. This e¤ect is both economically and statistically signicant. A
marginal increase by one from the mean of the altruism variable results in a 1.6
percentage points higher probability of working in the public sector instead of the
private sector.15 This implies a substantial di¤erence in the probability of working
in the public sector instead of the private sector of 7.6 percentage points between
the least altruistic people and the most altruistic people in our sample. This result
is well in line with the earlier empirical studies discussed in section 2.2.
Next we control for demographic characteristics and country dummies. The e¤ect
of altruism is robust in sign and signicance; the marginal e¤ect of altruism decreases
from 1.6 to 1.2 percentage points, but remains highly signicant. The demographic
control variables turn out to be important for sorting to the public sector. Consistent
with earlier studies (e.g. Lewis and Frank 2002, Buurman et al. 2012), we nd
that the likelihood of being employed in the public sector is higher for females
and increases with age and education. Wald tests show that the education level
dummies di¤er signicantly from each other. The country dummies, which control
for unobserved di¤erences across countries, are jointly highly signicant (p < 0:01).
Column 3 of Table 2.2 includes condence in political parties and the interaction
with altruism as explanatory variables. The conditional marginal e¤ect of altruism
remains economically and statistically signicant. The marginal e¤ect of altruism
is 1.1 percentage points, given average condence in political parties (recall that
altruism and condence in political parties are mean-centred). The control vari-
ables remain signicant with similar magnitudes and signs. The marginal e¤ect
15We also tested for nonlinear e¤ects of altruism, but these turn out to be insignicant and add
little explanatory power.
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Table 2.2: Results of the binary logistic regression (full sample)
Dependent variable: sector of employment
(1) (2) (3)
b ame b ame b ame
Altruism 0.077*** 0.016 0.068*** 0.012 0.062*** 0.011
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Female 0.476*** 0.086 0.457*** 0.082
(0.028) (0.029)
Age 0.100*** 0.018 0.094*** 0.017
(0.007) (0.007)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Education:
-Incomplete primary 0.626*** 0.042 0.752*** 0.047
(0.139) (0.161)
-Primary 1.092*** 0.088 1.183*** 0.089
(0.120) (0.141)
-Incomplete secondary 1.526*** 0.145 1.639*** 0.148
(0.125) (0.144)
-Secondary 2.033*** 0.231 2.142*** 0.232
(0.115) (0.136)
-Incompl. university prep. 1.921*** 0.210 1.957*** 0.199
(0.124) (0.145)
-University preparatory 2.167*** 0.256 2.249*** 0.252
(0.115) (0.137)
-University: no degree 2.416*** 0.307 2.517*** 0.306
(0.120) (0.141)
-University 2.946*** 0.424 3.074*** 0.429
(0.115) (0.136)
Condence 0.090*** 0.016
(0.019)
Condence  Altruism 0.024* 0.005
(0.016)
Intercept -0.879*** -5.605*** -5.535***
(0.013) (0.215) (0.231)
Country xed e¤ects No Yes Yes
Observations dep=0 21650 21537 20196
Observations dep=1 9002 8926 8233
Total observations 30652 30463 28429
McFadden R2 0.001 0.124 0.119
Log likelihood -18535 -16149 -15068
Notes: Standard errors between parentheses. Variables altruism and condence are centered
around their sample mean. For factor variables the column ame shows the e¤ect for a discrete
change from the base level. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels,
respectively.
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of condence in political parties conditional on average altruism is also signicant
and positive; an increase of condence in political parties results in a 1.6 percentage
points higher probability of working in the public sector instead of the private sector.
We nd evidence in support of our key prediction, the one-sided test for a positive
interaction e¤ect between altruism and condence in political parties is signicant
(p = 0:066). A unit increase of condence in political parties leads to an additional
marginal e¤ect of altruism of 0.5 percentage points.16
Table 2.3: Average marginal e¤ects (full sample)
Altruism Condence in political parties
Condence in
political parties Marg. e¤. Std. err. Altruism Marg. e¤. Std. err.
1 0.006* (0.004) 1 0.000 (0.010)
2 0.011*** (0.002) 2 0.004 (0.008)
3 0.015*** (0.004) 3 0.008 (0.006)
4 0.020*** (0.006) 4 0.013*** (0.004)
5 0.017*** (0.003)
6 0.022*** (0.005)
Notes: Column ame shows the average marginal e¤ect on the probability given the value of the
other independent variable. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. *, **, and
*** indicate signicance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Table 2.3 shows in more detail how the marginal e¤ect of altruism changes with
condence in political parties, and also how the marginal e¤ect of condence in po-
litical parties changes with altruism. Well in line with our predictions, the marginal
e¤ect of a workers altruism is strongly increasing in the workers condence in polit-
ical parties. Similarly, we nd no signicant marginal e¤ect of condence in political
parties for low values of altruism and positive and signicant e¤ects for high values.
In contrast to our predictions, we do not nd negative marginal e¤ects of altruism
and condence at the lower ends of the scales. As discussed in the previous section,
this may be due to the fact that we cannot distinguish spiteful workers and workers
with conicting mission preferences from workers with a more positive stance.
16The marginal e¤ect of the interaction term is calculated according to the method proposed in
Ai and Norton (2003). We nd a consistently positive interaction e¤ect for all observations in our
sample.
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Figure 2.4 depicts for each possible combination of altruism and condence in
political parties, the predicted probability (and its 95% condence interval in trans-
parent planes) of working in the public sector as compared to people with average al-
truism and condence in political parties (depicted by the light grey plane). Clearly,
highly altruistic workers with strong condence in political parties are more likely
to work in the public sector, with a positive and signicant di¤erence in probability
of up to 6.5 percentage points as compared to an average worker (note that the pre-
dicted probability of working in the public sector for an average worker is 25.5%).
In contrast, a nonaltruistic worker with weak condence shows a signicantly lower
likelihood of working in the public sector (total e¤ect up to  4.1 percentage points
lower probability). Altruistic workers with weak condence and nonaltruistic work-
ers with strong condence are not signicantly more or less likely to work in the
public sector as compared to an average worker.
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Figure 2.4: Predicted probabilities of working in the public sector for each combi-
nation of altruism and condence in political parties (full sample)
Notes: Transparent planes show the 95% condence interval, and the light grey plane shows the
predicted probability of working in the public sector for a worker with average altruism and con-
dence in political parties.
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Our data set includes both well-developed countries and less-developed countries.
We examine heterogeneity between these two groups of countries by estimating equa-
tion (2.1) for two subsamples; well-developed countries (as measured by their OECD
membership) and less-developed countries (without OECD membership). Table 2.4
shows that the di¤erences in results between these two groups of countries are small
but remarkable. The conditional marginal e¤ect of a workers altruism on the likeli-
hood of working in the public sector is stronger in well-developed countries as com-
pared to less-developed countries. The marginal e¤ect of altruism, given average
condence in political parties, is 1.5 percentage points for workers in well-developed
countries and 0.7 percentage points for workers in less-developed countries. Con-
versely, the conditional marginal e¤ect of a workers condence in political parties is
less important in well-developed countries as compared to less-developed countries.
The marginal e¤ect of an increase in condence in political parties, given average
altruism, is 1.1 percentage points for workers in well-developed countries and 1.8
percentage points for workers in less-developed countries. The interaction between
altruism and condence in political parties is also lower in well-developed countries
as compared to less-developed countries. A unit increase in condence results in an
additional marginal e¤ect of altruism of 0.3 percentage points for workers in well-
developed countries and in an additional marginal e¤ect of altruism of 0.5 percentage
points for workers in less-developed countries.17 These results are reasonably well in
line with the results of our full sample estimations.
Summarizing, we nd some remarkable di¤erences between well-developed and
less-developed countries in the e¤ect of altruism, condence, and the interaction
between altruism and condence on the likelihood of working in the public sector.
One possible explanation for why altruism matters more for sorting in well-developed
countries as compared to less-developed countries lies in the stronger need to get any
job in less-developed countries, resulting in stronger competition for public sector
jobs. We would expect to see a diluted e¤ect of altruism in less-developed countries if
selsh workers are more successful in acquiring a job under such strong competition
than altruistic workers, as in, e.g., Lazear (1989). We also nd that a workers
17As in the full sample, the interaction e¤ect calculated according to the method of Ai and
Norton (2003) is consistently positive for all observations in both subsamples.
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Table 2.4: Results of regression for OECD and nonOECD member countries
Dependent variable: sector of employment
Countries: OECD NonOECD
b ame b ame
Altruism 0.080*** 0.015 0.042** 0.007
(0.023) (0.018)
Female 0.719*** 0.134 0.274*** 0.048
(0.046) (0.038)
Age 0.096*** 0.017 0.091*** 0.016
(0.012) (0.009)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Education:
-Incomplete primary 0.193 0.025 0.683*** 0.041
(0.495) (0.173)
-Primary 0.070 0.009 1.139*** 0.082
(0.457) (0.152)
-Incomplete secondary 0.292 0.038 1.727*** 0.158
(0.459) (0.157)
-Secondary 0.522 0.073 2.380*** 0.273
(0.452) (0.143)
-Incompl. university prep. 0.662 0.097 1.978*** 0.199
(0.458) (0.160)
-University preparatory 0.870* 0.134 2.346*** 0.266
(0.452) (0.145)
-University: no degree 0.994** 0.158 2.743*** 0.349
(0.453) (0.154)
-University 1.595*** 0.286 3.257*** 0.464
(0.450) (0.145)
Condence 0.057* 0.011 0.106*** 0.018
(0.035) (0.023)
Condence  Altruism 0.014 0.003 0.028* 0.005
(0.031) (0.019)
Intercept -4.268*** -5.986***
(0.530) (0.248)
Country xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Observations dep=0 7813 12383
Observations dep=1 3088 5145
Total observations 10901 17528
McFadden R2 0.091 0.143
Log likelihood -5909 -9088
Notes: Standard errors between parentheses. Variables altruism and condence are centered
around their sample mean. For factor variables the column ame shows the e¤ect for a discrete
change from the base level. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels,
respectively.
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condence and the mutually reinforcing relation between a workers altruism and
condence are somewhat less important for sorting in well-developed countries as
compared to less-developed countries. A possible explanation for these results is
that there is more variation in quality of the public sector within the group of less-
developed countries making it easier to identify an e¤ect of condence. Alternatively,
public sector jobs may be less secure in less-developed countries, depending on which
parties are ruling the country.
Previous research has shown that public service motivation is a more important
determinant of sector of employment for higher educated workers (Lewis and Frank
2002). To assess di¤erences between education levels in our sample, we estimate
equation (2.1) for three subsamples: a low, intermediate, and high level of education
subsample.18 Table 2.5 reports the estimation results for these subsamples. Well in
line with Lewis and Frank (2002), we nd relatively weak e¤ects for workers with low
and intermediate education, while for highly educated workers we nd very strong
e¤ects on sector of employment of altruism, condence in political parties, and, in
particular, for the interaction between these two. The coe¢ cient for the interaction
term is more than three times as large as compared to the regression using the
full sample and highly signicant (p < 0:01).19 Our hypothesis that altruism and
mission alignment are mutually reinforcing thus nds strong support among the
highly educated workers. Table 2.6 reports the corresponding marginal e¤ects for
the subsample of highly educated workers. In line with our predictions, we nd
no signicant marginal e¤ect of altruism for low values of condence in political
parties, while the marginal e¤ect is positive and highly signicant for high values of
condence. Likewise, we nd a positive and signicant marginal e¤ect of condence
in political parties on public sector employment for highly altruistic workers. For
18The low subsample includes all workers who have less than secondary education (categories
1 to 4 in the data set), the intermediate subsample includes all workers with at least secondary
education and at most university prepatory education (categories 5 to 7), and the high subsample
includes all workers with more than university prepatory education (category 8 and 9).
19The interaction e¤ect is computed according to the method described in Ai and Norton (2003)
and shows a consistently positive and signicant interaction across all observations in the subsam-
ple of highly educated workers. In the subsamples of workers with low and intermediate levels
of education, we nd the interaction e¤ect to be consistently insignicant over all observations,
without a clear prediction on the sign of the interaction in the intermediate subsample.
43_RP_Tinbergen Zoutenbier BW STAND.job
2.5 Results 33
Table 2.5: Results of regression with sample split on educational level
Dependent variable: sector of employment
Group: Low Intermediate High
b ame b ame b ame
Altruism 0.056 0.006 0.047** 0.009 0.078*** 0.017
(0.035) (0.020) (0.024)
Female 0.200*** 0.022 0.364*** 0.067 0.693*** 0.153
(0.076) (0.043) (0.049)
Age 0.058*** 0.006 0.087*** 0.016 0.129*** 0.028
(0.017) (0.011) (0.014)
Age2 -0.000** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education:
-Incomplete primary 0.391** 0.033
(0.173)
-Primary 0.576*** 0.051
(0.158)
-Incomplete secondary 0.982*** 0.100
(0.166)
-Secondary
-Incompl. university prep. -0.213*** -0.036
(0.076)
-University preparatory 0.140*** 0.026
(0.050)
-University: no degree
-University 0.585*** 0.126
(0.058)
Condence 0.079* 0.009 0.104*** 0.019 0.112*** 0.025
(0.047) (0.028) (0.034)
Condence  Altruism -0.012 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.081*** 0.018
(0.037) (0.023) (0.029)
Intercept -3.823*** -3.438*** -3.894***
(0.431) (0.328) (0.327)
Country xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations dep=0 6115 9357 4724
Observations dep=1 1004 3598 3631
Total observations 7119 12955 8355
McFadden R2 0.126 0.083 0.087
Log likelihood -2531 -7020 -5220
Notes: Standard errors between parentheses. Variables altruism and condence are centered
around their subsample mean. For factor variables the column ame shows the e¤ect for a
discrete change from the base level. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at the .10, .05, and .01
levels, respectively.
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the middle altruism categories, we nd no signicant marginal e¤ect of condence.
Lastly, for the lowest altruism category, we nd a sizeable but insignicant negative
marginal e¤ect (p = 0:103). This is fully consistent with our model if many of the
people in the lowest altruism category are spiteful.
Table 2.6: Average marginal e¤ects (high education subsample)
Altruism Condence in political parties
Condence in
political parties Marg. e¤. Std. err. Altruism Marg. e¤. Std. err.
1 -0.001 (0.008) 1 -0.039 (0.024)
2 0.017*** (0.005) 2 -0.022 (0.019)
3 0.035*** (0.008) 3 -0.005 (0.013)
4 0.052*** (0.013) 4 0.012 (0.009)
5 0.030*** (0.007)
6 0.048*** (0.011)
Notes: Column ame shows the average marginal e¤ect on the probability given the value of the
other independent variable. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. *, **, and
*** indicate signicance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Figure 2.5 plots the predicted probabilities to work in the public sector for the
subsample of highly educated workers. Highly educated workers with high altruism
and strong condence in political parties are up to 13.2 percentage points more
likely to work in the public sector as compared to the average highly educated
worker, who faces a predicted probability of 42.5%. Highly altruistic workers with
weak condence and nonaltruistic workers with strong condence show a signicant
lower likelihood of working in the public sector. All three ndings are consistent
with our model, with the latter two indicative of conict of mission preferences and
spite among the highly educated workforce, respectively.
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Figure 2.5: Predicted probabilities of working in the public sector for each combi-
nation of altruism and condence in political parties (high education sample)
Notes: Transparent planes show the 95% condence interval, and the light grey plane shows the
predicted probability of working in the public sector for a worker with average altruism and con-
dence in political parties.
2.6 Conclusion
We have studied how a workers altruism and mission preferences jointly a¤ect his
likelihood of working in the public sector rather than taking a job in the private
sector. We built a very simple model that predicts that a workers altruism and the
alignment of his mission preferences with the mission of the public sector are mu-
tually reinforcing forces. Simply put, our theory predicts that alignment of mission
preferences matters more when a workers altruism is higher and that altruism mat-
ters more when mission preferences are more closely aligned. We have tested these
predictions using data from the World Values Survey, containing data on over 30,000
workers, covering their sector of employment, their willingness to help other people
(altruism), and their condence in political parties (which we take as a proxy for
alignment with the public sectors mission). We nd strong evidence for a mutually
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reinforcing role of altruism and mission alignment in sorting to the public sector,
particularly among highly educated workers and among workers in less-developed
countries. Our results show that only those workers who are highly altruistic as well
as have strong condence in political parties have a signicantly higher likelihood of
working in the public sector, while workers with low altruism and weak condence
are signicantly less likely to work in the public sector. The size of these e¤ects is
substantial. Highly altruistic workers with weak condence and nonaltruistic work-
ers with strong condence are neither more nor less likely to sort to the public sector
in the full sample. Among highly educated workers, the latter two groups have a
signicantly lower likelihood of working in the public sector. These results indi-
cate that conict of mission preferences and spite discourages some highly educated
workers to sort into the public sector.
A caveat of our analysis (that we share with most previous studies) is that we
cannot distinguish whether our results originate from (self-)selection of workers or
from preference adaptation (see Wright and Grant 2010 for an interesting discussion
of this issue). For instance, we cannot rule out that the patterns that we nd in our
data are nonexistent for workers who just started their career and so entirely arise
from adaptation of preferences since workers have started a job in a particular sector.
Following this interpretation of our results, employees acquire higher condence
in political parties and become more altruistic when working in the public sector.
While this interpretation may have some intuitive appeal, the available empirical
evidence points in the opposite direction for public sector workersaltruism. That
is, when tenure increases, workers in the public sector tend to experience a decrease
rather than an increase in altruistic motivations (see Blau 1960, Van Maanen 1975,
Moynihan and Pandey 2007, De Cooman et al. 2009, and Buurman et al. 2012).
Future research should provide insight into whether the same holds for condence
in political parties.
An interesting renement of our study would be to examine how sorting relates
to other, psychometrically sound measures of altruism and mission alignment, taking
into account the complex nature of these concepts. In future research it would also
be interesting to look closer at the di¤erences in sorting patterns across countries.
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For instance, di¤erences between countries in the size of the public sector may lead
to di¤erent sorting patterns when motivated workers are a scarce resource, as in
Jones (2012). However, the size of the public sector might also be endogenous to
the supply of motivated workers in a country. Di¤erences between countries in the
supply of motivated workers may stem from cultural di¤erences. An interesting new
direction for research would be to examine how such cultural di¤erences a¤ect the
supply and sorting of motivated workers.
Much remains to be done to better understand sorting of workers to the public
sector. We believe that this endeavor calls for a multidisciplinary approach where
public administration scholars, psychologists, political scientists, and economists join
forces and benet from each othersstrengths. Economics (which is our discipline)
has much to o¤er to the analysis of institutional design. Issues such as organiza-
tional ownership (for-prot, not-for-prot, public), wage compensation, and incen-
tive structures have been a focus in economic research for many decades. It is only
recently that such analyses have been extended to allow for nonselsh preferences
and other complexities (see the studies discussed in the second paragraph of section
2.2 and the recent survey by Köszegi 2013). We expect major progress in this area in
the next years, resulting in new testable hypotheses, with some of these speaking to
the issue of sorting to the public sector. On the empirical side, economists have made
quite some progress in designing incentivized experiments so as to learn about peo-
ples preferences (see the references in footnote 3 and the review by Andreoni et al.
2008). Such measures of revealed preferences may function as a useful complement
to measures of stated preferences commonly used in public administration.
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Chapter 3
Intrinsic Motivations of Public
Sector Employees: Evidence for
Germany
Joint with Robert Dur1
3.1 Introduction
Public sector organizations often strive for multiple goals, most of them being dif-
cult to describe in an objective and precise way (Dixit 2002). The multitude and
vagueness of public sector organizations goals are also reected in the way perfor-
mance of employees is assessed in the public sector. As compared to employees in
the private sector, performance assessment in the public sector is relatively rare and,
if it exists, often tied to weaker incentives (Burgess and Metcalfe 1999). As a result,
performance of employees in the public sector relies much more on intrinsic motiva-
tions than on extrinsic incentives. A key issue therefore is what types of intrinsic
motivations are prevalent among public sector employees.
A rich empirical literature in public administration and a recent theoretical lit-
erature in economics have addressed this issue. A key nding from the public ad-
ministration literature is that more altruistic people are more likely to end up in a
1A slightly adapted version of this chapter is forthcoming in German Economic Review.
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public-sector job.2 The economics literature has studied the interplay between em-
ployee compensation packages and self-selection of people with di¤erent motivations
to the public sector.3 A common nding is that the public sector can promote self-
selection of motivated or altruistic employees by o¤ering low pay (Handy and Katz
1998, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007). Further, several studies have shown that, even if
performance assessment in the public sector is perfectly feasible, it can be optimal
to provide weak incentives to employees in the public sector so as to extract rents
(Besley and Ghatak 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007, Francois 2007). Providing weak
incentives may, however, also imply that the public sector becomes an attractive
employer for lazy people (Delfgaauw and Dur 2008).
This chapter examines di¤erences in altruism and laziness between employees
in the public sector and the private sector. We start our analysis by developing
a simple model of sorting to the public sector in an economy where workers di¤er
in altruism and laziness. In line with the evidence cited above, we assume that
in a public sector job, extrinsic rewards for performance are relatively low (because
performance is more di¢ cult to measure) while intrinsic rewards for performance are
relatively high (because of the opportunity to contribute to other peoples welfare in
a public sector job). Our theoretical analysis predicts that a workers likelihood of
working in the public sector increases with his altruism, and increases or decreases
with his laziness depending on his altruism. Altruism induces sorting to the public
sector because public sector jobs o¤er an opportunity to contribute to other peoples
welfare. Laziness has a more indirect e¤ect on sorting. As lazy people nd it costly
to work hard, their choice of sector is not so much driven by sectoral di¤erences in
rewards for performance, but more by sectoral di¤erences in other benets and costs
that are unrelated to e¤ort. Hence, for selsh workers, the likelihood of working
in the public sector increases with laziness, because more lazy workers more likely
forego the high extrinsic rewards for performance in the private sector to enjoy
2See among others Rainey (1982), Crewson (1997), Houston (2000 and 2006), Brewer (2003),
Lewis and Frank (2002), and Frank and Lewis (2004). Perry et al. (2010) provide an overview of
this literature.
3See among others Handy and Katz (1998), Francois (2000 and 2007), Besley and Ghatak
(2005), Prendergast (2007), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007 and 2008), Nyborg and Brekke (2010), and
Buurman and Dur (2012). Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) provide an overview of this literature.
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public sector benets that are unrelated to e¤ort (among others the base salary).
The opposite holds for highly altruistic workers who nd e¤ort more rewarding in
the public sector than in the private sector. When such highly altruistic workers
are more lazy, they more likely forego the high intrinsic rewards for performance
in the public sector in return for private sector benets unrelated to e¤ort. Hence,
our theory predicts a negative interaction e¤ect between a workers altruism and
laziness. Depending on the exact parameter values, either workers who are altruistic
and energetic or workers who are altruistic and lazy are most likely to sort to a
public-sector job. Workers who are selsh and energetic are always least likely to
sort to the public sector.
We test our theoretical predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is a yearly panel that started in 1984 and now covers
over 11,000 German households (see Wagner et al. 2007). The rich set of personality
measures and demographic variables in the SOEP o¤ers a rare opportunity to study
sorting of altruistic and lazy workers to the public sector. Following Becker et al.
(2012), our measure for altruism is the workers response to the survey question:
How important is it for you to "be there for others"? This question was included in
the 2004-wave. Our measure for laziness comes from the 2005-wave and is given by
the workers response to the statement: "I see myself as someone who tends to be
lazy." We examine how these self-reported personality characteristics are related to
sector of employment after controlling for a rich set of demographics.4
The results of our empirical analysis are as follows. In line with our predictions,
we nd that the likelihood of working in the public sector is positively and signi-
cantly related to a workers altruism. A one standard-deviation increase in altruism
results in a 1.3 percentage points higher probability of working in the public sector.
We nd a similar result for a workers laziness, both in size and statistical signif-
icance. A one standard-deviation increase in laziness results in a 1.4 percentage
4One may wonder whether respondents always truthfully report such personality characteristics
and, in particular, whether truth-telling might be correlated with sector of employment. While our
data do not allow us to correct for such possible biases, a recent incentivized experiment by Abeler
et al. (2014) nds among a representative sample of the German population that participants
forego considerable amounts of money to avoid lying. Moreover, lying appears to be uncorrelated
with sector of employment (personal communication with Johannes Abeler).
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points higher probability of working in the public sector. In contrast to our predic-
tions, we nd no evidence for an interaction e¤ect between a workers altruism and
laziness. The estimate of the interaction e¤ect is insignicant and very close to zero.
Our estimates imply that workers who are both altruistic and lazy have the highest
likelihood of ending up in the public sector. The predicted probability of a highly
altruistic and highly lazy worker of working in the public sector is 33%. Workers
who are selsh and highly energetic are least likely work in the public sector, with
a predicted probability of 20%.
Next, we do a series of robustness checks. First, we check whether the results are
similar across education levels. In line with previous work for other countries (Lewis
and Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier 2014), we nd stronger e¤ects of altruism (and
also of laziness) for better educated workers, with point estimates that are twice as
large as those for the full sample. Next, following Gregg et al. (2011), we examine
in how far our results are driven by the overrepresentation of caring jobs in the
public sector. Restricting the sample to employees in caring industries, we nd that
altruism becomes twice as important for sorting to the public sector, while we nd
no change in the importance of laziness (though the e¤ect is no longer statistically
signicant). For employees in noncaring industries, we nd positive and signicant
sorting of lazy people to the public sector, but no sorting of altruistic people. These
results nicely complement those of Gregg et al. (2011) for the UK, who exploit panel
data on self-reported unpaid overtime of employees in for-prot and not-for-prot
caring and noncaring industries.
Lastly, we examine whether the sorting patterns that we nd are mainly the result
of self-selection at the beginning of peoples career, or whether the sorting patterns
become more pronounced for more experienced employees. Work experience may
a¤ect sorting patterns for two reasons. First, initial years of peoples careers may be
spent on job shopping,with many people holding jobs that are not a good match
with their tastes and abilities (as in the models by Johnson 1978, Jovanovic 1979,
and Neal 1999). As a result, we would expect weaker sorting patterns for employees
with shorter work experience. Second, employeespreferences may adapt to expe-
rience, for instance as a result of organizational socialization (Brewer 2008). Such
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preference adaptation may result in stronger or weaker sorting patterns depending
on how entrantsattitudes di¤er from the prevailing organizational culture. Previ-
ous empirical work has found a decline in altruistic motivations with tenure among
public sector employees (Blau 1960, Van Maanen 1975, Moynihan and Pandey 2007,
De Cooman et al. 2009, and Buurman et al. 2012). We do not nd a similar pattern
in our data. Public sector employees are more altruistic as compared to their private
sector counterparts at the start of their career, and by and large it remains like this
throughout their career. However, we do nd a striking pattern for laziness, with
small di¤erences between the public and private sector early in peoples career, and
big di¤erences later on. To what extent these di¤erences are driven by early-career
job shopping or preference adaptation is, unfortunately, hard to uncover due to the
cross-sectional nature of our data.
The SOEP data have been used previously to examine sorting of workers to
the public sector. Pfeifer (2011) focuses on risk attitude and nds clear evidence
that people who are more risk averse are more likely to sort to the public sector.
We include risk attitude as a control variable in our regressions and nd a similar
result. In addition to risk attitude, Dohmen and Falk (2010) take up a number
of broad measures of peoples preferences and personality, such as (positive and
negative) reciprocity, trust, and all of the Big Fivepersonality indicators. Likewise,
Luechinger et al. (2010) include the self-assessed importance of having a successful
careerand being engaged in social and political activities. In contrast to these
studies, our empirical analysis is inspired by our theory conned to the role of
more narrowly dened facets of personality, namely altruism and laziness. While
the use of broad personality measures such as Big Five is quite common (see, e.g.,
the reviews by Almlund et al. 2011 and Becker et al. 2012), these measures have
been criticized for being too blunt and for suppressing important underlying facets of
personality (Borghans et al. 2008: 1008-1009). Indeed, several studies in psychology
nd that underlying trait measures do a better job in predicting and explaining
behavior and outcomes than the Big Five indicators (e.g. Paunonen and Ashton
2001 and Roberts et al. 2005). In line with these ndings, we nd pretty strong
sorting to the public sector on the basis of the narrowly dened traits of altruism and
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laziness, whereas Dohmen and Falk (2010) and Luechinger et al. (2010) nd much
weaker and often insignicant patterns using broader measures of social preferences
and conscientiousness.
While the main aim of our study is to contribute to the body of knowledge
about the nature and origin of public sector workersmotivations, we believe that our
ndings may also help policy makers to design better HR policies. By learning about
employeesintrinsic motivations, HR specialists are better able to ne-tune personnel
policies in the public sector to the special needs and wishes of the current workforce.
Moreover, in the light of our ndings, policy makers may wish to reconsider current
personnel policies so as to attract and retain a di¤erently motivated workforce in
the future.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we
develop and analyze a simple model of sorting and derive our key hypotheses. Section
3.3 describes the data and our empirical strategy. The results of the empirical
analysis are presented in section 3.4. Lastly, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theory
Building on Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), we develop a simple model of sorting to the
public sector. Workers in our model are heterogenous in two ways: they di¤er in
altruism, denoted by i 2 [0; ]  0, and in laziness, denoted by i 2 [; ] > 0.
Both characteristics are private information of the individual and are drawn from a
continuous distribution.5 As in Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur
(2008), altruism in our model is of the impure form. That is, altruistic individuals
care about their personal contribution to other peoples welfare, not about other
peoples welfare per se (see Andreoni 1990). Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010) provide
eld-experimental evidence supporting this assumption.
Workers choose their sector of employment, either the private sector or the public
sector. The private sector is perfectly competitive such that workers are paid the
full marginal product, denoted by p, for each unit of e¤ort. For convenience, we
5This contrasts Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), who consider a three-type model (featuring moti-
vated, regular, and lazy workers).
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abstract from opportunities to contribute to other peoples welfare in the private
sector, and so a workers altruism  does not a¤ect his utility when working in the
private sector.6 A workers laziness  enters the workers utility function through
the cost of e¤ort, which is identical across sectors. The utility from working in the
private sector is given by:
Uprivate = pei   ie
2
i
2
;
implying that optimal e¤ort equals:
eprivatei =
p
i
:
By substituting optimal e¤ort into the utility function, we obtain the indirect utility
from working in the private sector for a worker of type (i; i):
p2
2i
. Thus, a workers
indirect utility from working in the private sector increases in the marginal product
of e¤ort and decreases in a workers laziness.
In contrast to the private sector, a workers e¤ort in the public sector is unob-
servable. Hence, workers cannot be paid for performance and, instead, receive a base
salary denoted by w.7 In addition, altruistic workers enjoy a nonpecuniary benet
equal to iei from making a contribution to public sector output. Thus, workers
utility from working in the public sector is given by:
Upublic = w + iei  
ie
2
i
2
  "i;
implying an optimal level of e¤ort equal to:
epublici =
i
i
:
The stochastic term "i captures an individual-specic di¤erence in utility when em-
6Allowing for such opportunities (e.g. making charitable donations, volunteering) would not
change our results as long as such contributions are not a perfect substitute for work e¤ort in
the public sector. For instance, a public sector job may simply make it more easy or less costly
to contribute to other peoples welfare. Huck and Rasul (2010) provide convincing evidence for
substantial transaction costs in making charitable donations.
7Complete absence of performance-related pay is, of course, an extreme assumption and made
for convenience only. All of our results hold as long as incentive pay is weaker in the public sector
than in the private sector.
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ployed in the public sector rather than in the private sector. It is drawn from a
distribution with CDF F (") = Pr("i  "), PDF f(") > 0, and boundaries " 2 ["; "]
such that there is some variation in sector choice for each possible worker type (; ).
We do not restrict " to be positive. That is, " could just as easily be added to the
private sector utility.8 Substituting optimal e¤ort into the utility function gives the
indirect utility of working in the public sector for a worker of type (i; i): w+
2i
2i
 "i.
Hence, a workers indirect utility from working in the public sector is increasing in
his altruism and decreasing in his laziness.
A worker joins the public sector when the utility from working in the public
sector is higher than or equal to the utility from working in the private sector:
w +
2i
2i
  "i  p
2
2i
:
Hence, the fraction of workers of type (i; i) who choose to work in the public sector
is given by:
Pr("i  w + 
2
i   p2
2i
) = F (w +
2i   p2
2i
):
It immediately follows that the likelihood of choosing a job in the public sector
increases in altruism i:
@F ()
@i
=
i
i
f(w +
2i   p2
2i
) > 0:
The intuition is straightforward: Higher altruism implies that a job in the public
sector becomes intrinsically more rewarding and, hence, more attractive. The e¤ect
of a workers laziness i on the likelihood of choosing a public sector job is described
by:
@F ()
@i
=
p2   2i
22i
f(w +
2i   p2
2i
):
Hence, for relatively selsh workers (those with i < p), the likelihood of public
sector employment increases with laziness, while the reverse holds for highly altru-
istic workers (those with i > p). The intuition is as follows. Workers choose sector
8As will become clear, our predictions on altruism and laziness are independent of ". The "
term only has a level e¤ect on the likelihood of public sector employment.
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by comparing extrinsic and intrinsic rewards for performance (p and i) and other
individual-specic sector benets that are unrelated to e¤ort or performance (the
stochastic term "i and the base salary). The latter benets are more important for
sector choice of more lazy workers. The reason is that lazy people nd it costly to
work hard and so they gain less utility when e¤ort becomes more rewarding (in-
trinsically or extrinsically). Consequently, a selsh workers likelihood of working in
the public sector increases in his laziness, because a more lazy worker more likely
foregoes the extrinsic rewards for performance in the private sector to enjoy the
public sectors benets that are unrelated to e¤ort. The opposite holds for a highly
altruistic worker. His likelihood of choosing the public sector decreases with his lazi-
ness, as a more lazy worker more likely chooses to forego the high intrinsic rewards
for performance in the public sector to enjoy the private sectors benets that are
unrelated to e¤ort (represented by "i).
Combined these comparative statics imply that workers who are selsh and ener-
getic are least likely to sort to the public sector. If the type space is su¢ ciently rich
(more precisely, if  > p), then workers who are altruistic and energetic are most
likely to work in the public sector, followed by workers who are altruistic and lazy.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.9 If the type space is smaller such that  < p, then
the e¤ect of laziness on the likelihood of public sector employment is positive for all
possible values of altruism. Hence, in that case, workers who are altruistic and lazy
are most likely to sort to the public sector, see Figure 3.2.
9In creating Figure 3.1 (and Figure 3.2) the stochastic term " is assumed to follow a continuous
uniform distribution on the interval ["; "]. The gures look similar with other distributions as long
as second-order e¤ects through f 0() are not dominant.
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Figure 3.1: Predicted probabilities of working in the public sector (if  > p)
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Figure 3.2: Predicted probabilities of working in the public sector (if  < p)
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3.3 Data and empirical strategy
We test our predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel study
(SOEP), conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin).
The SOEP is an unbalanced panel, containing yearly survey data. The rst wave
was conducted in 1984. The survey includes questions on employment, earnings,
health, and in recent waves a rich set of personality measures. The SOEP covers
over 11,000 German households and 20,000 people living in these households.10
Our key variables of interest are questions on stated altruism, laziness, and sector
of employment. We measure altruism by the response to the question: "[How impor-
tant] are the following things (Be there for others) currently for you?" Respondents
rated themselves on a four-point scale, ranging from "not at all important" to "very
important".11 Laziness is measured by the response to the statement: "I see myself
as someone who tends to be lazy". The response is measured on a seven-point scale
ranging from "does not apply to me at all" to "applies to me perfectly".12 Lastly,
respondents indicated whether they are employed in the public sector by the ques-
tion: "Does the company in which you are employed belong to the public sector?"
A limitation of the data set is that we cannot infer whether a worker who does not
work in the public sector is employed in a for-prot or not-for-prot organization.
If not-for-prot organizations o¤er similar types of jobs as the public sector, our
coe¢ cients of interest are biased towards zero.
We restrict our analysis to respondents from the 2005 wave, because previous
waves do not contain questions on a workers laziness. The data on a workers
altruism are taken from the 2004 wave, because the question on altruism was not
included in 2005. From the 2005 wave we select all workers (including self-employed
workers) who answered the question on altruism in 2004 and who indicate that they
are working in either the public sector or the private sector, resulting in a sample of
10,819 workers of whom 2,824 (26.1%) are employed in the public sector and 7,995
10Detailed information about the SOEP can be found at www.diw.de/gsoep/.
11The same measure for altruism is used in Becker et al. (2012), who study the relation between
economic preferences and personality measures from psychology.
12Our measure for laziness is an underlying facet of one of the Big Fivepersonality measures.
In section 3.1, we briey discuss the pros and cons of using underlying facets.
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(73.9%) are employed in the private sector.
We use a Linear Probability Model to estimate the probability that a worker
with given altruism and laziness is employed in the public sector instead of the
private sector.13 We control for a number of demographics such as gender, age,
education, nationality, marital status, number of children, and state of residence.14
Additionally, we control for workers risk preferences, as in Dohmen and Falk (2010),
Luechinger et al. (2010), and Pfeifer (2011). The measure for risk preferences
is taken from the 2004 wave and indicates a persons general aversion to risk as
measured on an eleven-point scale by the response to the question "How do you see
yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try
to avoid taking risks?". Dohmen et al. (2011) have validated this measure through
incentivized experiments.
Our regression specication is:
Pr (Sector = public) =  + A+ !L+ '(A L) + x0 + ";
where A represents our measure of altruism, L is our measure of laziness, and the
vector x contains all control variables. In line with our theoretical model we expect
a positive e¤ect of laziness (!+'A > 0) for low values of altruism and a negative
e¤ect of laziness (! + ' A < 0) for high values of altruism. This implies that the
conditional e¤ect of laziness should be positive, ! > 0, and the interaction e¤ect of
altruism and laziness should be negative, ' < 0. Next, we expect a positive e¤ect
of altruism for all values of laziness ( + ' L > 0); that is, we expect  > 0 to be
su¢ ciently large as compared to ' < 0.
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. Public sector workers
score themselves slightly higher as compared to private sector workers on altruism,
laziness, and risk aversion. There are considerable di¤erences between public sector
workers and private sector workers in socio-demographic variables. Public sector
13We use the Linear Probability Model for ease of interpretation. Our results are robust to
di¤erent model specications: Probit or Logit give similar results. Fewer than 1% of all predicted
outcomes using the Linear Probability Model fall outside the [0,1] interval.
14States included in the analysis are Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin (East), Berlin (West),
Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, North-Rhine-
Westfalia, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holtstein, and Thuringa.
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workers are on average more likely to be female, older, higher educated, a German
citizen, married, and have less children as compared to private sector workers. Table
3.2 shows correlations between the independent variables. Laziness shows a small but
signicant negative correlation with both altruism and risk aversion. The correlation
between altruism and risk aversion is insignicant. Further, the table shows that
our personality characteristics correlate with gender and age, suggesting that it is
important to control for these demographics in the regression.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Obs. Public Private Total
Altruism 10819
Mean 3.21 3.16 3.18
Standard deviation (0.56) (0.57) (0.56)
Laziness 10819
Mean 2.24 2.19 2.20
Standard deviation (1.48) (1.47) (1.48)
Risk aversion 10574
Mean 5.33 5.13 5.18
Standard deviation (2.13) (2.25) (2.22)
Gender: % female 10574
Mean 0.57 0.43 0.47
Standard deviation (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age 10574
Mean 44.47 42.05 42.68
Standard deviation (10.80) (11.51) (11.38)
Education: % level 10574
Less than high school 0.07 0.12 0.11
High school 0.47 0.67 0.61
More than high school 0.46 0.21 0.28
Nationality: % German 10574
Mean 0.97 0.92 0.93
Standard deviation (0.18) (0.27) (0.25)
Relationship status: % type 10574
Single 0.21 0.26 0.25
Married 0.66 0.63 0.64
Widowed 0.02 0.02 0.02
Divorced 0.08 0.08 0.08
Separated 0.03 0.02 0.02
Number of children 10574
Mean 0.58 0.66 0.64
Standard deviation (0.88) (0.96) (0.94)
Observations 2824 7995 10819
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3.4 Results
Table 3.3 shows the estimation results of the linear probability model using the full
sample. The coe¢ cient estimates show the change in the decimal probability of
working in the public sector instead of the private sector given a unit change in the
independent variable. We report robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedas-
ticity resulting from the binary structure of our response variable.
The rst column shows the estimation results without taking up any control
variables as well as without allowing for a possible interaction e¤ect between altru-
ism and laziness. The estimation results show that the likelihood that a worker is
employed in the public sector is increasing in his altruism. This e¤ect is positive
and signicant. A unit increase in altruism increases the likelihood of working in
the public sector instead of the private sector by 3.3 percentage points. We nd a
weaker result for laziness. A unit increase in laziness has a positive but insignicant
e¤ect (p = 0:117) of 0.5 percentage points on the likelihood of working in the public
sector.15
Next, we control for socio-demographics and risk preferences in column 2. The
e¤ect of a workers altruism is robust in both sign and signicance; the magnitude
of the e¤ect slightly decreases from 3.3 to 2.4 percentage points. We now also nd a
positive and highly signicant e¤ect of a workers laziness on sector of employment.
A unit increase in laziness results in a 0.9 percentage points increase in the likelihood
of working in the public sector. The increase in the magnitude of the coe¢ cient stems
mainly from the inclusion of age and gender as control variables. Older people and
females on average claim to be less lazy (see Table 3.2) as well as have a higher
likelihood of working in the public sector (see Table 3.1). Omission of these control
variables gave rise to a downward bias in the coe¢ cient for laziness in column 1.
As discussed in the previous section, altruism is measured on a four-point scale
whereas laziness is measured on a seven-point scale. We compare the e¤ect size of
altruism and laziness by computing standardized coe¢ cients. We estimate the e¤ect
of a one standard deviation change in the independent variable on the likelihood of
15We have checked for nonlinear e¤ects of altruism and laziness on the likelihood of working in
the public sector and found no signicant nonlinear e¤ects.
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Table 3.3: Results of the linear probability model (full sample)
Dependent variable: sector of employment
(1) (2) (3)
Altruism 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Laziness 0.005 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Altruism  Laziness 0.001
(0.005)
Risk aversion 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.112*** 0.112***
(0.009) (0.009)
Age 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Education: high school (HS) 0.006 0.006
(0.013) (0.013)
Education: more than HS 0.242*** 0.241***
(0.015) (0.015)
Nationality (=German) 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.014) (0.014)
Married 0.007 0.007
(0.014) (0.014)
Widowed -0.013 -0.013
(0.036) (0.036)
Divorced -0.010 -0.010
(0.019) (0.019)
Separated 0.022 0.022
(0.032) (0.032)
Number of children -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes
State dummies No Yes Yes
Observations dep=0 7995 7792 7792
Observations dep=1 2824 2782 2782
Total observations 10819 10574 10574
R2 0.002 0.095 0.095
Log likelihood -6439 -5805 -5805
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors between parentheses. Variables altruism and
laziness in column (3) are centred around their sample median. *, **, and *** indicate signi-
cance based on a two-sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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working in the public sector. We nd that the e¤ect sizes of altruism and laziness are
similar in magnitude. An increase by one standard deviation in altruism results in a
1.3 percentage points increase in the probability of working in the public sector. A
one standard deviation increase in laziness results in a 1.4 percentage points increase
in the probability of working in the public sector. These results suggest that altruism
and laziness are equally important in determining a workers sector of employment.
Several of our control variables turn out to be important in explaining a workers
sector of employment. In line with the literature on risk preferences, we nd that
workers who are more risk averse are signicantly more likely to work in the public
sector instead of the private sector. A unit increase in risk aversion results in a 0.5
percentage points higher likelihood of working in the public sector. This corresponds
to a standardized e¤ect size that is slightly smaller than the standardized e¤ect sizes
for altruism and laziness. Additionally, we nd that public sector employees are more
likely to be female, older, better educated, and have fewer kids. The state dummies,
which control for unobserved heterogeneity between states, are jointly signicant
(p < 0:01).
Column 3 of Table 3.3 adds the interaction of altruism and laziness. In contrast to
our theoretical predictions, we do not nd evidence for an interaction e¤ect between
a workers altruism and laziness. The estimate of the coe¢ cient is insignicant and
very close to zero.16 The marginal e¤ect of altruism on the likelihood of public sector
employment does not change with laziness, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. Likewise, the
marginal e¤ect of laziness on the likelihood of public sector employment does not
change with altruism, see Figure 3.4. This implies that not the most altruistic and
energetic workers have the highest likelihood of being employed in the public sector,
but those workers who are most altruistic and lazy. Our estimates imply that they
face an estimated probability of working in the public sector of 32.8%.17 Workers
16One possible interpretation for the insiginicant coe¢ cient for the interaction term together
with the signicant coe¢ cient for altruism is that public sector employeescontribution to society
is (partly) independent of their e¤ort. For instance, public sector employees may consider the wage
gap between the private sector and the public sector as a donation to society. This interpretation
ts well with Perry and Wise (1990)s classic typology of public service motivation that includes
both the desire to serve as well as the desire to participate, where the former depends on a
workers e¤ort while the latter does not. A recent economic model including both types of public
service motivation is Delfgaauw and Dur (2010).
17Predicted probabilities are calculated given the mean values of all control variables. Signi-
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Figure 3.3: Marginal e¤ect of altruism given a workers laziness
Notes: Solid black line shows the estimated e¤ect of a unit increase in al-
truism on the likelihood of working in the public sector given a workers
reported laziness. Dashed lines show the 90% condence interval.
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Figure 3.4: Marginal e¤ect of laziness given a workers altruism
Notes: Solid black line shows the estimated e¤ect of a unit increase in laziness
on the likelihood of working in the public sector given a workers reported
altruism. Dashed lines show the 90% condence interval.
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who are most altruistic and energetic are signicantly less likely to work in the public
sector with an estimated probability of working in the public sector of 27.1%. This
probability does not di¤er signicantly (p > 0:10) from the corresponding probability
for workers who are most selsh and lazy, who face an estimated probability of
working in the public sector of 25.7%. Workers who are most selsh and energetic
are least likely to sort to the public sector, with an estimated probability of 20%.
Recent literature suggests that intrinsic motivation is a more important deter-
minant of sorting to the public sector for higher educated workers (Lewis and Frank
2002, Dur and Zoutenbier 2014). We nd evidence in line with these studies for
altruism and laziness. Table 3.4 shows the regression results for subsamples of each
category of education. Neither a workers altruism nor laziness has a signicant
e¤ect on sector of employment for workers with less than high school education. We
do nd some evidence for sorting of altruistic workers and lazy workers to the public
sector among high-school graduates. We nd the strongest results for workers in
the highest education category. A unit increase in altruism given median laziness
(altruism and laziness are median centered) increases the likelihood of working in
the public sector for a highly educated worker by 3.5 percentage points. A unit
increase in laziness given median altruism increases the likelihood of working in the
public sector for a highly educated worker by 1.7 percentage points. The estimated
interaction e¤ect of altruism with laziness is insignicant in all education subsam-
ples. A possible reason why altruism matters more for the sorting of higher educated
workers lies in the nature of their job, with higher educated workers having more
opportunities to make a signicant contribution to society in a public sector job.
Laziness may matter more for the sorting of higher educated workers because in
Germany extrinsic rewards for performance are generally rare among less educated
workers and more prevalent among better educated workers (see tables 3 and 4 in
Dur et al. 2010). We nd some further support for this interpretation from our re-
sult that risk aversion only matters for sector of employment of the highly educated
workers. The signs and signicance of the other control variables are fairly similar
across all levels of education, aside from risk aversion.
cance levels (p < 0:01) are calculated using delta method standard errors.
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Table 3.4: Results of the linear probability model with the sample split on education
level
Dependent variable: sector of employment
(1) (2) (3)
Less than High school More than
high school high school
Altruism 0.009 0.021** 0.035**
(0.017) (0.009) (0.017)
Laziness 0.005 0.006* 0.017**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Altruism  Laziness 0.002 -0.005 0.013
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011)
Risk aversion -0.002 0.002 0.018***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Female 0.126*** 0.106*** 0.132***
(0.022) (0.010) (0.019)
Age 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.016**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education: high school (HS)
Education: more than HS
Nationality (=German) 0.052** 0.093*** 0.124***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.045)
Married -0.064 -0.005 0.057*
(0.042) (0.016) (0.029)
Widowed 0.002 -0.052 0.097
(0.105) (0.042) (0.088)
Divorced -0.103** -0.011 0.024
(0.052) (0.023) (0.044)
Separated -0.058 0.041 0.019
(0.094) (0.040) (0.063)
Number of children -0.005 -0.007 -0.043***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.010)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes
State dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations dep=0 962 5184 1646
Observations dep=1 188 1309 1285
Total observations 1150 6493 2931
R2 0.050 0.037 0.055
Log likelihood -458 -3162 -2022
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors between parentheses. Variables altruism and
laziness are centred around their sample median. *, **, and *** indicate signicance based on
a two-sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Next, we examine heterogeneity in sorting to the public sector between industries.
Relatively many jobs in the public sector involve taking care for people. Our esti-
mates of sorting to the public sector may be confounded if altruistic (and/or lazy)
workers have a particular tendency to take a job in a caring industry. Following
Gregg et al. (2011), we have constructed two subsamples: the caring industries and
the noncaring industries.18 Table 3.5 reports the regression results for these subsam-
ples. While the coe¢ cients for laziness hardly di¤er between industries, there is a
big di¤erence between industries in sorting of altruistic workers to the public sector.
As compared to the full sample, the sorting of altruistic workers to the public sector
is much stronger in the caring industries and is virtually absent in the noncaring
industries. These results nicely t with those of Gregg et al. (2011) for the UK.
As in the full sample, we do not nd signicant interaction e¤ects of altruism and
laziness in the subsamples.
Finally, we explore whether the di¤erences in altruism and laziness that we have
found are more or less pronounced for more experienced employees. As discussed
in section 3.1, sorting may be related to work experience in two important ways.
First, workers might spend time at the start of their career on nding a job that is
a good match with a workerstastes and abilities (as in the job shoppingmodels
by Johnson 1978, Jovanovic 1979, and Neal 1999). Following this line of reasoning
we expect weaker sorting patterns for workers with little work experience. Second,
sorting patterns may also be stronger or weaker for more experienced workers when
workers adapt their preferences to the prevailing organizational culture (see Brewer
2008). Following this line of reasoning workers become more or less altruistic and lazy
by working in the public sector. In Table 3.6, we show the results of regressions that
include an interaction of altruism and (full-time) work experience, and of laziness
and (full-time) work experience (measured in years).19 The rst column shows that
18The following 2 digit industry classications are labeled a caring industry: Education and
Sport, Health Service, Service Industries, Voluntary Church, and Private Household. The remain-
ing 2 digit industry classications are labeled a noncaring industry: Agriculture and Forestry,
Fisheries, Energy and Water, Mining, Chemicals, Synthetics, Earth, Clay and Stone, Iron and
Steel, Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Wood, Paper and Print, Clothing and Tex-
tile, Food Industry, Construction, Construction Related, Wholesale, Other Transport, Financial
Institutions, Insurance, Restaurants, Trash Removal, Other Services, and Public Administration.
19Unfortunately, we only have data on workers aggregate work experience, not on work expe-
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Table 3.5: Results of the linear probability model with the sample split on industry
Dependent variable: sector of employment
(1) (2)
Caring industries Noncaring industries
Altruism 0.039** 0.003
(0.016) (0.008)
Laziness 0.007 0.009***
(0.007) (0.003)
Altruism  Laziness 0.004 -0.002
(0.010) (0.005)
Risk aversion 0.014*** 0.003
(0.004) (0.002)
Female 0.071*** 0.046***
(0.020) (0.010)
Age 0.023*** 0.006**
(0.006) (0.003)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Education: high school (HS) -0.006 0.021*
(0.035) (0.012)
Education: more than HS 0.127*** 0.221***
(0.036) (0.017)
Nationality (=German) 0.112*** 0.078***
(0.041) (0.013)
Married -0.003 0.018
(0.030) (0.014)
Widowed -0.000 0.002
(0.075) (0.037)
Divorced -0.020 0.004
(0.041) (0.020)
Separated 0.011 0.039
(0.063) (0.036)
Number of children -0.031*** -0.012**
(0.010) (0.005)
Intercept Yes Yes
State dummies Yes Yes
Observations dep=0 1628 5883
Observations dep=1 1494 1238
Total observations 3122 7121
R2 0.046 0.073
Log likelihood -2190 -2924
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors between parentheses. Variables altruism and
laziness are centred around their sample median. *, **, and *** indicate signicance based on
a two-sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Results of the linear probability model including the interaction of altru-
ism and laziness with total work experience
Dependent variable: sector of employment
(1) (2)
Altruism 0.027** 0.038***
(0.012) (0.014)
Laziness 0.002 0.006
(0.005) (0.006)
Work experience 0.001 0.009
(0.002) (0.006)
Altruism  work experience -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Laziness  work experience 0.001** -0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Work experience2/100 -0.023
(0.016)
Altruism  work experience2/100 0.006
(0.005)
Laziness  work experience2/100 0.002
(0.002)
Intercept Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
State dummies Yes Yes
Observations dep=0 7786 7786
Observations dep=1 2781 2781
Total observations 10567 10567
R2 0.095 0.095
Log likelihood -5799 -5798
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors between parentheses. Control variables in-
cluded in estimation are risk aversion, gender, age, age squared, education, nationality, marital
status, and number of children. The variable work experience is measured in years. *, **, and
*** indicate signicance based on a two sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
a unit increase in altruism for workers with no work experience, results in a positive
and signicant e¤ect of 2.7 percentage points on the likelihood of working in the
public sector.20 This suggests that altruistic workers already at the start of their
rience within a sector.
20We additionally examined sorting by workers who started their career only after their altruism
and laziness had been measured (that is, workers who took their rst job between 2005 and 2010).
This certainly precludes any feedback e¤ects from working in a particular sector on personality
traits, but does pose di¢ culties in obtaining a su¢ ciently large sample size. The results of this
estimation are very similar in sign and magnitude as compared to the estimates for workers with
low levels of work experience in Table 3.6. However, we do not nd statistically signicant results,
which could well be due to the very limited sample size.
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career self-select to the public sector. We do not nd a clear relation between a
workers altruism and work experience in the likelihood of public sector employment.
The interaction e¤ect of altruism and work experience is negative and insignicant.
This result is in contrast with a number of previous studies that do nd a signicant
decrease in public sector workers altruism with work experience (Blau 1960, Van
Maanen 1975, Moynihan and Pandey 2007, De Cooman et al. 2009, and Buurman
et al. 2012). The second column allows the e¤ect of altruism to depend nonlinearly
on work experience.21 The combined interaction e¤ects are interpreted by looking at
the marginal e¤ect of altruism given the number of years of work experience. This
marginal e¤ect is illustrated in Figure 3.5. We nd that even though the e¤ect of
a workers altruism slightly declines with work experience in the rst few years of
a workers career, the e¤ect slightly increases in the last years of a workers career.
Hence, overall, there is not a very clear relation between a workers altruism and his
work experience. Public sector employees are more altruistic as compared to their
private sector counterparts at the start of their career, and by and large it remains
like this throughout their career. For laziness, we do nd a striking pattern. Column
1 shows that the e¤ect of a unit increase in laziness for workers with low levels of
work experience is insignicant and very close to zero. However, the e¤ect of laziness
increases for workers with higher levels of work experience. The estimated interaction
e¤ect of laziness with work experience is 0.1 percentage points and signicant. The
second column adds an interaction between a workers laziness and work experience
squared. Figure 3.6 illustrates the estimated marginal e¤ect of laziness including the
interaction e¤ects of laziness and work experience and laziness and work experience
squared. We nd that a workers laziness becomes more important for sorting as
work experience increases. Whether this stems from preference adaptation or delayed
self-selection cannot be assessed due to the cross-sectional nature of our data.22
21We have also estimated our regression including nonlinear terms for altruism and laziness. We
nd no evidence of nonlinearities in altruism and laziness.
22To be sure, the SOEP is a panel, but the survey question on laziness was included only recently.
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Figure 3.5: Marginal e¤ect of altruism given the years of work experience
Notes: Solid black line shows the estimated e¤ect of a unit increase in altruism on
the likelihood of working in the public sector for a given number of years of work
experience. Dashed lines show the 90% condence interval.
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
M
ar
gi
na
l e
ffe
ct
 o
f l
az
in
es
s
0 10 20 30 40
Years of work experience0 10 20 30 40
Years of work experience
0
.01
.02
.03
.04
M
ar
gi
na
l
e¤
ec
t
of
la
zi
ne
ss
Figure 3.6: Marginal e¤ect of laziness given the years of work experience
Notes: Solid black line shows the estimated e¤ect of a unit increase in laziness on
the likelihood of working in the public sector for a given number of years of work
experience. Dashed lines show the 90% condence interval.
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3.5 Concluding remarks
We have studied how intrinsic motivations of public sector employees compare to
those of private sector employees using a representative sample of German workers.
In line with our theoretical predictions, we have found that public sector employees
are signicantly more altruistic than private sector employees. This di¤erence is
already present at the start of peoples career and is more pronounced among highly
educated employees and in caring industries. We have also found that public sector
employees are signicantly more lazy than private sector employees. This di¤erence
only shows up for more experienced employees, which could be due to early-career
job shopping or to preference adaptation. Lastly, we did not nd evidence for
our theoretical prediction of a negative interaction between altruism and laziness in
the sorting to the public sector, which may indicate that public sector employees
contribution to society is (partly) independent of their e¤ort. Together these results
imply that workers who are both highly altruistic and lazy have the highest likelihood
of sorting to the public sector (with a predicted probability of 33%), whereas selsh
and highly energetic workers have the lowest likelihood of sorting to the public sector
(with a predicted probability of 20%).
A natural next step would be to include wages in the empirical analysis, as
in the endogenous switching regression models by Van der Gaag and Vijverberg
(1988), Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993), and Dustmann and Van Soest (1998). Our
theory predicts that wages in the private sector decrease in a workers laziness and
are independent of his altruism, whereas public sector wages are at. It would
be interesting to learn how much of the di¤erences in personality characteristics
between public sector and private sector employees that we have found in this study
can be attributed to di¤erences in the wage returns to altruism and laziness between
sectors. Such a study does pose the challenge of nding variables that are credibly
exogenous to wage determination but not to selection (or the other way around).
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Matching Mission
Preferences on Well-being at Work
4.1 Introduction
Many organizations have a clearly dened mission statement. This statement de-
scribes the key purpose and main objectives of the organization. Government or-
ganizations have little leeway in establishing their organizations mission, as their
mission is set by the politicians in o¢ ce. The objectives specied in the governments
mission statement are carried out by workers that are employed by the government
sector. However, government workers may have their own preferences regarding the
choice of available objectives to work on. Hence, the preferences of a government
worker are not necessarily aligned with the preferences of the politicians in o¢ ce.
Recent studies in economics have formalized this idea and have stressed the
importance of the alignment of mission preferences between an agent and a principal
(Besley and Ghatak 2005, Dur and Zoutenbier 2014). A common prediction is that
workers enjoy a missionpremium in jobs where their mission preferences match the
employers mission preferences. That is, workers enjoy working on objectives that
are in line with their own preferences regarding the available objectives. Closely
related is the rich literature on person-organization t in organizational psychology,
that has emphasized the importance of congruence of values between a worker and an
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organization for attraction, retention, and performance (Kristof 1996). The theory
of person-organization t has also been studied in a public sector context. Studies in
public administration have shown that public sector workers who nd it important to
be able to help others, report higher job satisfaction in jobs that o¤er the opportunity
to help others (Bright 2008, Steijn 2008, Taylor 2008, and Wright and Pandey 2008).
This chapter studies the importance of matching mission preferences for govern-
ment workers using survey panel data covering Dutch workers. More specically, I
test whether government workers are more satised with their job if their mission
preferences are better aligned with the mission of the government in o¢ ce. While
previous studies have mainly used cross-sectional data on mission alignment or
value congruence, this chapter exploits panel data from the Longitudinal Internet
Studies for the Social sciences (LISS). The sample covers a period from 2008 up
to 2011, which allows to observe workers under di¤erent government compositions
and, therefore, di¤erent government missions. The detailed questions on respon-
dentsoccupation details, political preferences, and individual characteristics o¤er a
unique opportunity to examine the e¤ects of the alignment of mission preferences in
the government sector. A workers mission alignment is measured by comparing a
workers reported vote in parliamentary elections to the outcome of the formation of
a coalition government after the election. The preferences of a worker are classied
as a match to those of the government when a worker voted for one of the political
parties that is in o¢ ce after the election. A workers preferences do not match when
a worker voted for one of the political parties that is not in o¢ ce after the elections.
Next, self-reported job satisfaction is used to measure a workers well-being in a job.
Job satisfaction is measured by the question: "How satised are you with the type
of work that you do?" This facet of job satisfaction relates most closely to a workers
satisfaction with work itself (which is of prime interest given the subject of study).
Finally, I restrict the focus of the analysis to workers who are employed in the gov-
ernment sector rather than all workers in the public sector. The measure of mission
alignment used in this chapter seems more important for those workers under the
most direct control of the politicians in o¢ ce. In contrast, the measures used in
the previously mentioned studies on person-organization t apply more widely to all
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jobs in the public sector.
The results of the empirical analysis are in line with the hypothesis. I nd clear
evidence of a premium in job satisfaction on the matching of mission preferences
in the government sector. Government workers report signicantly higher job satis-
faction when they match on political preferences to the political parties in o¢ ce as
compared to when their preferences do not match. The estimated di¤erence in re-
ported job satisfaction is 0:391 points on a eleven-point scale. The size of this e¤ect
is substantial, it is comparable to the e¤ect of half an hour reduction in commuting
time and is even larger than the e¤ect of having to work overtime on a regular basis.
The e¤ect of a match of political preferences is insignicant for workers employed
outside the government sector. Additionally, the results are robust to including both
individual and time xed e¤ects and controlling for a rich set of individual charac-
teristics (age, education level, and health) and job characteristics (working hours,
income, overtime, irregular hours, supervising task, commuting time, tenure, and
job type).
My results nicely complement the existing empirical studies on person-organization
t. Moreover, studies on job satisfaction in economics have found that public sector
workers report higher job satisfaction as compared to private sector workers (see,
e.g., Clark and Senik 2006). I nd a similar result. Government workers report, on
average, higher job satisfaction as compared to workers employed outside the gov-
ernment sector. Interestingly, this di¤erence is partly explained by the matching of
political preferences. Only those workers who match on political preferences to the
political parties in o¢ ce enjoy signicantly higher job satisfaction when employed
in the government sector. The estimated e¤ect on job satisfaction is positive but
insignicant for a nonmatching worker at 0:420 points, but is highly signicant and
doubles in size for a matching worker (with an estimated e¤ect of 0:819 points).
Previous studies have shown that mission motivation is especially important for
higher educated workers (Lewis and Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier 2014). In
contrast to these studies I nd that matching political preferences are particularly
important for government workers with intermediate levels of education. The e¤ect
of a match of political preferences is almost twice as large for government workers
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in the intermediate education categories as compared to the full sample of workers.
The results for workers in the lowest or highest education categories are slightly
weaker as compared to the full sample.
In a parliamentary system, such as the Dutch system, a government in o¢ ce
usually consists of a coalition of political parties rather than a single political party.
This implies that even when a workers preferred political party (as measured by
their vote) makes it into government, it is still possible that this party will form
a coalition with political parties that are conicting with a workers preferences.
Information on a workers reported stance towards each political party is used to
investigate this. My results show that it is not only important if the party a worker
voted for takes up o¢ ce, but also how a worker rates all of the political parties in
a coalition. Government workers with a more positive attitude towards all coalition
parties report signicantly higher job satisfaction as compared to workers with a
more negative stance. A similar e¤ect is found when assessing the relative di¤erence
in a workers stance towards the coalition parties as compared to a workers stance
towards the opposition parties. Government workers who rate the coalition parties
more favorably than the opposition parties report signicantly higher job satisfac-
tion. The reverse is found for government workers who rate the coalition parties
more negatively than the opposition parties.
I continue as follows. The next section briey discusses the relevant literature
on job satisfaction. Section 4.3 describes the data used in testing and explains the
empirical strategy. The results of the empirical analysis are reported and discussed
in section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
There is a growing literature in economics on peoples subjective well-being (see
Frey and Stutzer 2002 for an extensive discussion on well-being measures and ap-
plications). A main eld of interest in this literature is well-being at work or job
satisfaction. Following the seminal paper by Freeman (1978), a number of studies
have examined the role of job satisfaction as a predictor of labor market outcomes.
79_RP_Tinbergen Zoutenbier BW STAND.job
4.2 Related literature 69
These studies have documented strong associations between job satisfaction and be-
havior in the workplace, such as job quits (Akerlof et al. 1988, Clark et al. 1998,
and Shields and Ward 2001), absence rates (Clegg 1983), and counterproductive
activities in the workplace (Mangione and Quinn 1975). A second strand of job
satisfaction literature has examined the determinants of a workers job satisfaction.
Job satisfaction has been explained by a variety of di¤erent individual and job char-
acteristics such as: a workers age, gender, education, wage and tenure (Hamermesh
1977, Borjas 1979, Clark and Oswald 1996, Clark 1997).
More recently, a number of studies have examined di¤erences in subjective well-
being between public sector and private sector employment (Blanchower and Os-
wald 1999, Cabral Viera 2005, Diaz-Serrano and Cabral Viera 2005, Demoussis and
Giannakopoulos 2007, and Ghinetti 2007). The evidence on a public-private sector
di¤erential in subjective well-being is mixed across countries. However, for most
countries a public sector premium is found for a variety of di¤erent facets of job
satisfaction. It is often argued that this di¤erential in job satisfaction is a result of
intrinsic motivation or high job security in the public sector (see, e.g., Luechinger et
al. 2006).
Few studies have tried to empirically explain di¤erences in subjective well-being
between public sector and private sector workers. A notable exception is a study
by Luechinger et al. (2008). They nd that di¤erences between countries in public-
private sector life satisfaction di¤erentials are partly explained by cross-country dif-
ferences in regulatory policies and institutional constraints for the public sector.1
Other studies have attributed the di¤erence in subjective well-being between public
sector and private sector workers to sorting. Heywood et al. (2002) use data on
British workers and nd no evidence of a public sector premium after controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. This indicates that the positive
premium found in some studies is mainly the result of sorting. People who tend
to report greater subjective well-being are more likely to work in the public sector
(this is conrmed in a study by Luechinger et al. 2010). These results generalize
to a number of facets of job satisfaction such as satisfaction with work itself, pay,
1A workers job satisfaction is often considered as part of a workers general subjective well-
being or life satisfaction (Clark and Oswald 1996 and Van Praag et al. 2003).
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and the relation with the boss. Lastly, Clark and Senik (2006) do nd a signicant
premium for public sector workers in Britain and France after controlling for unob-
served heterogeneity between individuals. However, they do not condition on wages
indicating that these rents are (partly) a result of wage rents in the public sector
(although for the French sample this is less likely). Again, these results generalize
to a number of facets of job satisfaction including satisfaction with work itself.
Closely related to this chapter are studies in public administration that examine
how person-organization t relates to job satisfaction using data on public sector
workers. A common nding in this literature is that public sector workers who rate
it important to help others, and in addition, nd that their job o¤ers the opportunity
to help others report higher job satisfaction as compared to public sector workers
who do not nd that their job o¤ers the opportunity to help others (Bright 2008,
Steijn 2008, Taylor 2008, and Wright and Pandey 2008). Additionally, Leisink and
Steijn (2009) show that these workers also report a higher willingness to exert e¤ort.2
This chapter di¤ers from the studies on person-organization t in two ways. First,
this chapter uses data on workers from all sectors of the economy, which allows
to compare the found results on government workers to nongovernment workers.
Second, studies on person-organization t have used only cross sectional variation
in mission matchingto determine an e¤ect on job satisfaction whereas this chapter
exploits variation within the individual over time.
After completing a rst draft of this chapter I became aware of a closely related
paper by Tabvuma et al. (2014). They use data on British public sector workers
to study gender di¤erences in the e¤ect of political preferences on job satisfaction.
Tabvuma et al. nd no e¤ect of matching political preferences for female public
sector workers and only a weak and temporary e¤ect for male public sector workers.
2Closely related to this study are a number of (eld and lab) experiments in economics on
mission motivation (Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2010, 2012, Gerhards 2012, Carpenter and Gong 2013,
and Fehrler and Kosfeld 2014). These studies invariably nd that participants with aligned mission
preferences exert more e¤ort in a chosen or real e¤ort experiment as compared to participants with
conicting mission preferences.
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4.3 Data and empirical strategy
The data used in this chapter come from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the
Social sciences (LISS), conducted by CentERdata.3 The LISS panel is a represen-
tative panel for the Dutch population aged 16 and older, covering roughly 5,000
households. Panel participants were selected through random sampling from the
community registers of Statistics Netherlands. The LISS panel is an unbalanced
panel, the rst wave dates back to 2008 and the most recent wave has been com-
pleted in 2012. Panel members are contacted on a monthly basis to answer questions
from a specic survey module. The panel includes modules on work and schooling,
health, political values, and a survey on a number of demographic characteristics.
Each module is administered only once a year (with exception of the demographic
survey) resulting in a yearly survey data structure.
The key variables of interest from this data set are a workers political preferences,
job satisfaction, and industry of employment. Workers political preferences, as
measured by the question: "For which party did you vote in the parliamentary
elections of [22 November 2006/9 June 2010]?", are used to construct a variable
indicating whether a worker matches on mission preferences to the government in
o¢ ce. A worker is considered as a match when the political party that the worker has
voted for in the foregoing elections has taken up o¢ ce in that specic time period.4
A worker is classied as not matching when a worker indicated to have voted for a
political party that has not become part of the government in o¢ ce.5
Furthermore, the survey includes a number of statements on facets of job satisfac-
tion (such as wage, hours, career, atmosphere at work, and type of work). Respon-
3For more information on the LISS panel study see www.lissdata.nl.
4The Netherlands has a parliamentary political system with proportional representation in
the house of representatives. In a parliamentary system, political parties that have a (coalition)
majority in the house of representatives are able to take o¢ ce as a government. Such a majority is
su¢ cient to implement policies. Political parties in o¢ ce after the elections of November 2006 are
CDA (Christian Democrat party), PvdA (Labor party), and CU (Christian Union party). Political
parties in o¢ ce after the elections of June 2010 are VVD (Liberal party) and CDA (Christian
Democrat party) with support of the PVV (Freedom party) in parliament.
5A possible bias would occur if people are dishonest about revealing their vote in the foregoing
parliamentary elections. While it is not possible to observe whether a respondent reports honestly,
respondents were given the opportunity to indicate that they "do not know" what they had voted
or indicate that they "prefer not to say" on which party they voted. The number of observations
in these categories is very low, namely between 1 and 5 percent each year.
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dents were asked to score themselves on a eleven-point scale ranging from "Not at
all satised" to "Fully satised". I use the facet of job satisfaction that relates most
closely to satisfaction with work itself, measured by the question: "How satised are
you with the type of work that you do?"6
Finally, respondents indicated their sector of employment by answering the ques-
tion: "In what sector do you work?" Respondents who answered: "Government Ser-
vices, Public Administration and Mandatory Social Insurances" are labelled as a
government worker, those who answered di¤erently are labeled as a nongovernment
worker.7 The focus of the analysis is on government workers rather than all workers
in the public sector. Government workers are under most direct control of the gov-
ernment and, therefore, should benet most when their preferred political party is
in o¢ ce.
The sample is restricted to observations from the 2008 to 2011 wave. The 2012
wave is excluded from the analysis because at the time of data collection there was
no active government in o¢ ce, making it di¢ cult to dene the matching variable.
This restriction leads to a sample of 1,714 unique observations for whom there is
data on employment details, political preferences, and a number of demographic
variables.
Two methodical issues arise when trying to estimate the e¤ect of a workers
political preferences on a workers job satisfaction using longitudinal data. First, a
test proposed by Wooldridge (2002, pp. 290-291) shows that the xed e¤ects model
is preferred to the random e¤ects model (p < 0:01), to account for unobserved
heterogeneity between individuals.8 The second issue relates to the ordinal nature
of the measure of job satisfaction. Several solutions have been put forth to account
6The results of the analysis are similar but slightly weaker when measuring job satisfaction
by the more general question: "How satised are you, all in all, with your current work?". No
signicant e¤ect is found on a workers satisfaction with wages, hours worked, career, or atmosphere
at work.
7Other answer categories include: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Hunting, Mining, Indus-
trial Production, Utilities, Construction, Retail trade, Catering, Transport, Storage and Communi-
cation, Financial, Business Services, Education, Healthcare and Welfare, Environmental Services,
Culture, Recreation and other services, and Other.
8In contrast to the Hausman test, the test proposed by Wooldridge (2002) allows for clustering
of errors at the individual level.
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for endogeneity of individual e¤ects in models estimating ordinal relationships.9 A
drawback of these ordinal xed e¤ects methods is that the estimated coe¢ cient size is
very di¢ cult to interpret due to the inability to estimate ordinal category thresholds.
Given that the ordinal xed e¤ects methods o¤er no benets in interpretation over
the linear xed e¤ects specication, I use a cardinal scale of job satisfaction in the
estimation. Geishecker and Riedl (2012) show that the assumption of cardinality
still allows to interpret the results in ratios of parameter estimates. A feel for the
size of an e¤ect can be obtained by comparisons with other estimates from the same
regression.
The following specication is used in estimation:
JSit= Git+M it+ (GitM it) + x0it + i+ t+"it: (4.1)
The dependent variable, denoted by JSit, is the reported job satisfaction of worker
i at time period t. The main variables of interest are a dichotomous variable Git
indicating whether a worker is employed in the government sector or not, a dichoto-
mous variable Mit indicating whether a worker matches on political preferences to
the government in o¢ ce or not, and an interaction between the government variable
and the matching variable. Additionally, I include time varying control variables
xit, individual xed e¤ects i, and time xed e¤ects  t. Following the hypothesis,
I would expect that a match of political preferences has no e¤ect when a worker is
not employed in the government sector, so  = 0. Whereas for workers employed in
the government sector a match of political preferences should have a positive e¤ect
+  > 0, because such a worker can work on policy measures that are in line with
a workers own preferences regarding such a policy.
9See for instance Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) who suggest to choose a cut-o¤ point
and estimate a xed e¤ect binary logit, Ferrer i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) who allow cut-o¤
points to di¤er over individuals, and Das and Van Soest (1999) or Baetschmann et al. (2011) who
combine estimates for each possible cut-o¤ point made possible by the data.
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Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample including a short descrip-
tion of each variable used in estimation. Average job satisfaction in the sample is
around 7.7 on a scale to 10. Roughly 13 percent of all respondents are employed
in the government sector, corresponding to 131 to 189 observations each year. The
fraction of workers that voted for a political party that has become part of the
government in o¢ ce varies between 44 and 47 percent each year.
Table 4.1: Description of variables used in regression
Variable Description Mean Std.dev.
Job satisfaction Self-reported job satisfaction on a 0-10 scale. 7.71 1.46
Government Variable indicating 1 if a worker is employed in
the government sector.
0.13 0.34
Match Variable indicating 1 if a worker matches on po-
litical preferences to the political parties in of-
ce.
0.46 0.50
Age Age in years. 44.93 10.82
Education level Highest attained level of education (Statis-
tics Netherlands categories): 1=primary school,
2=intermediate secondary, 3=higher secondary,
4=intermediate vocational, 5=higher voca-
tional, and 6=university.
4.08 1.34
Subjective health Self-reported health: 1=poor, 2=moderate,
3=good, 4=very good, and 5=excellent.
3.27 0.70
Hours Contracted weekly work hours. 31.77 9.48
Income Gross monthly income in euros. 2819 1651
Overtime Required to work overtime measured by:
1=never, 2=sometimes, and 3=often.
1.94 0.60
Irregular hours Required to work irregular hours measured by:
1=never, 2=sometimes, and 3=often.
1.67 0.76
Supervisor Variable indicating 1 if a worker has supervising
tasks.
0.32 0.47
Commuting time Travel time in minutes. 27.96 21.95
Tenure Years employed by current organization. 12.55 10.82
Job classication Worker classications include: 1=agrarian,
2=blue collar, and 3=white collar.
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Table 4.2: Distribution of reported votes over political parties
Political party Nongovernment Government Di¤erence
employment employment
Christian Democrats (CDA) 0.20 0.17 -0.03*
Labor party (PvdA) 0.19 0.25 0.06***
Liberal party (VVD) 0.18 0.18 0.00
Socialist party (SP) 0.16 0.11 -0.05***
Green party (GroenLinks) 0.08 0.06 -0.02**
Freedom party (PVV) 0.06 0.06 0.00
Social-Liberal party (D66) 0.05 0.06 0.01
Christian Union party (CU) 0.04 0.07 0.03***
Animal Welfare party (PvdD) 0.02 0.01 0.01
Christian Reformed party (SGP) 0.01 0.01 0.00
Other 0.01 0.01 0.00
Notes: A workers reported vote is measured by the question: "For which party did you vote in
the parliamentary elections of [date of election]?" *, **, and *** indicate a signicant di¤erence
at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Figure 4.1 shows that the di¤erence in job satisfaction between government work-
ers and nongovernment workers is relatively small over the observation period. Look-
ing closer at the job satisfaction of government workers over time in Figure 4.2, I
nd that job satisfaction of matching government workers is slightly higher as com-
pared to nonmatching government workers in each observation year (although only
signicantly so in 2008 and 2010). Additionally, Table 4.2 shows the distribution
of reported votes over political parties. Almost 75 percent of all workers voted for
one of the four larger political parties. The remaining 25 percent of workers indi-
cated to have voted for one of the many smaller parties. The di¤erences in reported
voting between government and nongovernment workers are small. There are a few
exceptions, for instance, government workers are more likely to vote Labor party or
Christian Union and less likely to vote Christian Democrats party, Socialist party,
or Green party.10
10A number of studies have examined the political preferences of government workers. These
studies nd that government workers, as compared to the general population, are more likely to
be left-wing orientated (Rattso and Sorensen 2013), although this does not always translate into
a higher likelihood to vote for left-wing or socialist parties (Knutsen 2001, 2005, and Jensen et al.
2009).
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Figure 4.1: Average job satisfaction over the observation period by sector
Note: Histogram shows the average reported job satisfaction in each year including a
90% condence interval.
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Figure 4.2: Average job satisfaction of government workers over the observation
period
Note: Histogram shows the average reported job satisfaction in each year including a 90% condence
interval.
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4.4 Results
Table 4.3 shows the results of the linear xed e¤ects estimation using the full sam-
ple of workers. The size of the coe¢ cient estimates should be interpreted with some
caution due to the ordinal nature of the response variable.11 The reported stan-
dard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for correlation of errors
over time within the individual. The rst estimation includes only a dummy that
indicates whether a worker is employed in the government sector and a dummy in-
dicating whether a worker matches on political preferences to the political parties in
o¢ ce. In line with previous literature, I nd that workers in the government sector
report higher levels of job satisfaction as compared to workers in other sectors. The
di¤erence in reported job satisfaction is 0:578 and signicant. The e¤ect of a match
of political preferences for workers in all sectors in the economy is insignicant and
very close to zero (with a point estimate of 0:001).
The second column of Table 4.3 additionally includes an interaction between
a workers sector of employment and the variable match. Results show that gov-
ernment workers are signicantly more satised with their job when their political
preferences match those of the political parties in o¢ ce as compared to when their
preferences do not match. The estimated interaction e¤ect of government employ-
ment with match is positive and highly signicant. The interaction e¤ect is inter-
preted by looking at marginal e¤ects. A match of political preferences for workers
in the government sector is associated with signicantly higher job satisfaction; the
estimated e¤ect ( +  ) is 0:349 with a p-value of 0:03. In contrast, a match of
political preferences for workers outside the government sector seems to be of lit-
tle importance for a workers reported job satisfaction. The marginal e¤ect of a
match is slightly negative at  0:050 but highly insignicant. This result clearly
indicates a premium in job satisfaction on the matching of political preferences in
11It is important to note that all of the reported main results are robust to performing the
analysis using an ordinal xed e¤ects method (see table 4.A in Appendix 4.A). This result is in
line with Ferrer i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) who nd evidence that the bias of the linear xed
e¤ects estimator is generally small when using ordinal data. The ordinal xed e¤ects estimator
used in comparison is the blow-up and cluster estimator (see Baetschmann et al. 2011 for an
extensive discussion). Geishecker and Riedl (2012) show that this method performs as well as or
better than the other available ordered xed e¤ects methods.
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Table 4.3: Results of the xed e¤ects estimation on job satisfaction
Dependent variable: job satisfaction
(1) (2) (3)
Government 0.578** 0.420 0.325
(0.291) (0.269) (0.280)
Match 0.001 -0.050 -0.042
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Government  Match 0.399** 0.433***
(0.164) (0.165)
Age -0.165
(0.102)
Age2 0.003***
(0.001)
Education level:a
- Intermediate secondary -0.041
(0.276)
- Higher secondary 0.094
(0.280)
- Intermediate vocational -0.415
(0.254)
- Higher vocational -0.049
(0.247)
- University -0.146
(0.295)
Subjective health score:b
- Moderate 0.694
(0.505)
- Good 0.836
(0.512)
- Very good 0.799
(0.512)
- Excellent 0.887*
(0.513)
Work hours -0.010
(0.007)
Log(income) 0.556***
(0.197)
Overtime:c
- Sometimes -0.120*
(0.065)
- Often -0.252***
(0.089)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.3 - continued from previous page
Dependent variable: job satisfaction
(1) (2) (3)
Irregular hours:c
- Sometimes 0.026
(0.056)
- Often 0.011
(0.110)
Supervisor 0.056
(0.111)
Commuting time -0.014***
(0.005)
Commuting time2 0.000***
(0.000)
Tenure -0.008
(0.008)
Job classication:d
- Blue collar 0.873*
(0.525)
- White collar 1.237***
(0.438)
Individual xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Time xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5161 5161 5161
Individuals 1714 1714 1714
Log likelihood -6012 -6006 -5953
Notes: Standard errors between parentheses are clustered at the individual level. aReference cat-
egory: "primary education". bReference category: "poor health". cReference category: "never".
dReference category: "agrarian". *, **, and *** indicate signicance based on a two sided test
at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
the government sector.12
A number of recent studies have shown that public sector workers report signif-
icantly higher levels of job satisfaction as compared to private sector workers (al-
though this result is not robust to controlling for individual xed e¤ects and income,
see Heywood et al. 2002). I nd no signicant e¤ect of government employment on
job satisfaction for workers who do not match on political preferences to the political
12Additionally one may wonder whether all workers in the public sector enjoy higher job satis-
faction when their political preferences match those of the political parties in o¢ ce. Robustness
analyses show that public sector workers experience a small but highly insignicant mission pre-
mium. This indicates that the ndings in this chapter are indeed specic to workers employed in
the government sector rather than all workers in the public sector.
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parties in o¢ ce. The conditional coe¢ cient is positive at 0:420 but insignicant. In
contrast, becoming a government worker seems to have a particularly positive e¤ect
when a worker has matching political preferences. The marginal e¤ect doubles in
size (0:819) and is highly signicant (p = 0:01).
Next, column 3 includes a number of time varying demographic and job charac-
teristics as control variables. The e¤ect of a match of political preferences for gov-
ernment workers is robust in both sign and signicance; the e¤ect increases slightly
from 0:349 to 0:391 and remains highly signicant.13 Likewise, the e¤ect of a match
of political preferences for workers outside the government sector reduces slightly
from  0:050 to  0:042 and remains insignicant. Several of the demographic con-
trol variables turn out to have a signicant impact on job satisfaction. Older workers
are less satised with their job as compared to younger workers, although this ef-
fect is decreasing as workers grow older. The results do not show a clear e¤ect of
education. The lowest and highest educated workers are more or less equally sat-
ised with their job but the intermediate educated workers are much less satised
(although marginally insignicant p = 0:102). A workers subjective health score
seems to matter only when the assessed health is very poor. Workers with at least
moderate levels of health enjoy similar levels of job satisfaction. There are also some
remarkable e¤ects of job characteristics on job satisfaction. For instance, workers
who are expected to work overtime and workers who need to travel long to get to
work are signicantly less satised with their job. On the other hand, a workers
reported job satisfaction increases in the gross monthly income of a worker. Finally,
the time xed e¤ects, which control for unobserved di¤erences between years, are
jointly signicant (p < 0:01).
13A feel for the size of the estimated e¤ects is found by comparing the estimates for the key
variables to the estimates of the control variables. For instance, the e¤ect of a match of political
preferences for government workers ·(0:391) is equivalent to a half an hour reduction in daily (one
way) commuting time and is even larger than the e¤ect of having to work overtime on a regular
basis.
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Table 4.4: Marginal e¤ects by education level
(1) (2) (3)
Low Intermediate High
education education education
Marginal e¤ect of match:
Nongovernment employment -0.097 -0.094 0.013
(0.120) (0.085) (0.065)
Government employment 0.360 0.697** 0.228
(0.322) (0.291) (0.223)
Marginal e¤ect of government employment:
Nonmatching preferences 0.316 -0.044 0.488
(0.362) (0.376) (0.340)
Matching preferences 0.773** 0.748* 0.703*
(0.394) (0.395) (0.412)
Notes: Marginal e¤ects calculated based on equation (4.1) with additional two-way and three-way
interactions between the variables match, government, and education. The variable education
is recoded into (1) low education: primary school or intermediate secondary, (2) intermediate
education: higher secondary or intermediate vocational, and (3) high education: higher voca-
tional or university. Delta method standard errors between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
signicance based on a two sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Previous research has shown that mission motivation is more important for higher
educated workers (Lewis and Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier 2014). To assess dif-
ferences between education levels I estimate equation (4.1) including all two-way and
three-way interactions between the variables government, match and three education
dummies (low education, intermediate education, and high education).14 Table 4.4
reports the marginal e¤ects for each education category. In contrast to the previous
literature I nd that not the highly educated government workers but the intermedi-
ate educated government workers are a¤ected most by matching mission preferences.
The e¤ect of a match of political preferences for intermediate educated government
workers is 0:697 and highly signicant. The marginal e¤ect for low or high educated
government workers is smaller and almost of equal size to the full sample, but in-
14The low education category contains all workers who have completed only primary school or
intermediate secondary education, the intermediate education category includes all workers who
have completed higher secondary or intermediate vocational education, and the high education
category includes all workers who have completed higher vocational or university education.
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signicant. In line with the main results, a match of political preferences has no
e¤ect on job satisfaction in any education category for workers employed outside the
government sector. The di¤erences between education levels in the e¤ect of match-
ing political preferences for government workers is mainly explained by di¤erences
in the marginal e¤ect of government employment for nonmatching workers. Table
4.4 additionally shows the marginal e¤ect of government employment for matching
and nonmatching workers. Becoming a government worker has the same e¤ect at
any education level for workers with matching political preferences. The marginal
e¤ect ranges from 0:703 for higher educated government workers to 0:773 for lower
educated government workers. There are, however, substantial di¤erences across
education levels in the e¤ect of becoming a government worker for workers whose
political preferences do not match. The marginal e¤ect for lower educated work-
ers (0:316) and, in particular, higher educated workers (0:488) is much larger as
compared to the marginal e¤ect for intermediate educated workers ( 0:044). As a
result, the di¤erence between matching and nonmatching workers is largest in the
intermediate education category.
In the Netherlands the government in o¢ ce usually consists of multiple political
parties, also referred to as a coalition government. This implies that even when a
workers preferred political party (as measured by their vote) makes it into govern-
ment, it is still possible that this party will form a coalition with political parties
that are conicting with a workers preferences. Table 4.5 shows the average re-
ported stance towards each political party for both government and nongovernment
workers.15 There are relatively small di¤erences in reported stance between govern-
ment and nongovernment workers. The most remarkable di¤erences are found for
the Socialist party and Freedom party. Government workers are signicantly less
positive about the Socialist party and Freedom party as compared to nongovernment
workers.
15A workers opinion of a political party is measured on a eleven-point scale using the question:
"What do you think of [party name]?".
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Table 4.5: Average reported stance towards individual political parties
Political party Nongovernment Government Di¤erence
employment employment
Christian Democrats (CDA) 5.20 5.28 0.07
(0.032) (0.078)
Labor party (PvdA) 5.33 5.45 0.12
(0.031) (0.082)
Liberal party (VVD) 5.16 5.10 -0.06
(0.032) (0.080)
Socialist party (SP) 5.36 5.06 -0.30***
(0.033) (0.082)
Green party (GroenLinks) 5.30 5.34 0.04
(0.035) (0.086)
Freedom party (PVV) 2.88 2.51 -0.36***
(0.044) (0.109)
Social-Liberal party (D66) 5.44 5.59 0.15*
(0.032) (0.081)
Christian Union party (CU) 4.48 4.53 0.05
(0.035) (0.089)
Animal Welfare party (PvdD) 3.72 3.68 -0.04
(0.039) (0.098)
Christian Reformed party (SGP) 3.33 3.27 -0.06
(0.035) (0.085)
Notes: A workers opinion is measured on a eleven-point scale by the question: "What do you
think of [party name]?" Standard errors between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a signicant
di¤erence in means at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
Table 4.6 shows the results of the analysis using the information on a workers
stance towards each political party. Column 1 shows the e¤ect of a workers stance
towards the largest coalition party on reported job satisfaction. Government work-
ers who report a more positive stance towards the largest party in a coalition enjoy
higher levels of job satisfaction as compared to workers with a less positive stance.
The standardized marginal e¤ect equals 0:122 and is marginally signicant. Addi-
tionally, the estimation in column 2 shows that it is far more important whether
a workers stance towards all political parties in a coalition is positive. A workers
stance towards the entire coalition is measured by a workers average rating of all in-
dividual coalition parties. Government workers with a more positive stance towards
all coalition parties report signicantly higher levels of job satisfaction as compared
to government workers with a more negative stance. The marginal e¤ect of a stan-
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dard deviation increase in reported stance equals 0:162. A workers stance towards
coalition parties is unimportant for job satisfaction of workers in other sectors of
the economy. As reported in column 3, these results are robust to weighting the
political parties by their number of seats in parliament. The standardized marginal
e¤ect for government workers reduces slightly from 0:162 to 0:154 but remains highly
signicant.
Next, column 4 of Table 4.6 reports the results using information on the relative
di¤erence between a workers reported stance towards coalition parties and opposi-
tion parties. The results are very much in line with the previous columns. Workers
in the government sector who have a more positive stance towards the coalition
parties as compared to the opposition parties enjoy signicantly higher levels of job
satisfaction than workers with a more positive stance towards the opposition parties
as compared to the coalition parties. The marginal e¤ect of a standard deviation
increase for government workers equals 0:131 and is highly signicant. Column 5
shows that these results are robust to weighting political parties by their number of
seats in parliament. The standardized marginal e¤ect increases slightly from 0:131
to 0:135: In summary, these results indicate that it is not only important whether a
workers rst preference (as measured by their vote) matches to the political parties
in o¢ ce, but also what other parties have joined the coalition government after the
election. A natural explanation is that, in the Netherlands, government policy is a
result of intensive negotiations by coalition parties on the policy matters at hand.
Therefore, political parties in o¢ ce often have to compromise when making policy
plans.
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4.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has studied how matching mission preferences a¤ect job satisfaction of
government workers using a sample of Dutch workers. Results show that government
workers are more satised with their job when their mission preferences (as mea-
sured by their reported vote in parliamentary elections) match those of the political
parties in o¢ ce as compared to when their preferences do not match. This result is
particularly strong for intermediate educated workers. Matching mission preferences
do not a¤ect job satisfaction of workers employed outside the government sector. My
results additionally show that government workers report higher job satisfaction as
compared to nongovernment workers. This di¤erence is partly explained by match-
ing mission preferences. Only those workers whose mission preferences match those
of the political parties in o¢ ce are signicantly more satised when employed in the
government sector. Finally, it is not only important whether a workers preferred
party (as measured by their vote) takes up o¢ ce, but also how a worker rates all of
the other coalition parties that have taken up o¢ ce. Workers with a more positive
stance towards all coalition parties are signicantly more satised with their job as
compared to workers with a more negative stance.
An interesting addition to this study would be to examine how matching mission
preferences relate to sorting. Theory predicts that workers sort to organizations they
share a mission with (Besley and Ghatak 2005, Dur and Zoutenbier 2014). This leads
to two interesting implications. First, employee turnover should be higher following
election years with a change in government as compared to years without a change
in government. As a change in government (and therefore mission) would create
an exogenous shock to workersmission motivation. Second, one would expect an
inow of workers whose mission preferences match those of the government, while
the outow of workers should consist largely of workers whose mission preferences
conict with the mission of the government. Unfortunately it is not possible to shed
light on these issues using the LISS data.
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4.A Appendix
Table 4.A: Results of the ordered xed e¤ects estimation on job satisfaction
Dependent variable: job satisfaction
(1) (2) (3)
Government 1.195** 0.772 0.793
(0.536) (0.508) (0.536)
Match 0.011 -0.102 -0.073
(0.114) (0.119) (0.118)
Government  Match 0.820** 0.810**
(0.349) (0.357)
Control variables No No Yes
Individual xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Time xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -2523 -2517 -2455
Notes: The method used in estimation is the blow-up and clustermethod as described by
Baetschmann et al. (2011). Standard errors between parentheses are clustered at the individual
level. *, **, and *** indicate signicance based on a two sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 levels,
respectively.
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Chapter 5
The E¤ect of Student Feedback to
Teachers: Evidence from a Field
Experiment
Joint with Margaretha Buurman, Josse Delfgaauw and Robert Dur
5.1 Introduction
Regular provision of performance feedback to employees is common practice in many
organizations. Feedback often serves as a means to provide recognition to good per-
formers as well as to help employees learn about how to improve ones performance.
Several recent studies have investigated the e¤ect of receiving feedback on perfor-
mance. In a variety of organizations, these studies have shown that the provision of
feedback can have sizeable positive e¤ects on performance (Azmat and Iriberri 2010,
2014, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2011, Kuhnen and Tymula 2012, Tran and Zeck-
hauser 2012, Delfgaauw et al. 2013, Gerhards and Siemer 2014). Barankay (2012)
and Bandiera et al. (2013) nd that feedback may also have an adverse e¤ect.
Providing employees with feedback on their performance has also become in-
creasingly popular in education. Many schools use studentsevaluations of teachers
to enable and motivate teachers to improve teaching. Moreover, evaluations some-
times play a role in tenure, bonus, and promotion decisions (Watts and Becker,
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1999). There is an extensive literature that studies the use of studentsevaluations
in teaching (see for instance Cohen 1980 and Marsh 2007 for overviews of the litera-
ture). In general, studies nd positive but small e¤ects of studentsfeedback on the
performance of teachers.
This chapter studies the e¤ect of studentsfeedback on the performance of teach-
ers by conducting a eld experiment at a large Dutch school for intermediate vo-
cational education. Students were asked to evaluate their teachers using a ques-
tionnaire consisting of 19 items. We implemented a feedback treatment where a
randomly chosen group of teachers received the outcomes of their studentsevalu-
ations. The other group of teachers was evaluated as well but did not receive any
personal feedback. We estimate the e¤ect of receiving feedback on teachersperfor-
mance by examining studentsevaluations of teachers a year later.1 In contrast to
most previous studies (Centra, 1973, being the main exception), we also investigate
whether the e¤ect of feedback depends on how student evaluations di¤er from the
teachers own performance assessment on the same items. For that purpose, we
collect data on teachersself-assessed performance both before and after the experi-
ment. Another di¤erence with most previous studies is that we examine the e¤ect of
feedback over a much longer period of time, namely a full year. Most earlier studies
are restricted to studying the e¤ects of feedback within a semester.
The results of our experiment show that receiving feedback has no e¤ect on
feedback scores of teachers a year later. We nd a precisely estimated zero average
treatment e¤ect of 0:04 on a ve-point scale with a standard error of 0:05. Our
results di¤er somewhat from the ndings of the existing studies mentioned above.
A possible explanation for the lack of a treatment e¤ect in our study may be that
we investigate the e¤ect of feedback in the long run. Feedback may a¤ect short-run
performance, but the e¤ect may fade away in the long run, as in Azmat et al. (2014)
in the context of providing relative performance information to students.
1There are no standardized test scores or other objective measures of student performance
available. Hence, we cannot examine whether providing feedback a¤ects students performance
and/or teachersvalue-added. Carrell and West (2010) and Braga et al. (2014) present evidence
that student evaluation scores are negatively correlated with teachersvalue-added. It is important
to stress that these ndings need not imply that improvements in student evaluations caused by
teachersresponse to studentsfeedback lead to a worsening of student performance.
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Next, we study whether the content of the feedback matters for the e¤ect of
receiving feedback on performance. For that purpose, we compare the received
student feedback with the teachers prior self-assessment of performance on the same
items. This allows us to uncover whether a teacher actually learns something new
from the received feedback. We nd no e¤ect of the feedback treatment for teachers
who evaluate themselves similarly to the studentsevaluation. The estimate of the
treatment e¤ect for these teachers is very close to zero. We do nd a signicant
positive treatment e¤ect for teachers who learn that their own assessment is much
more favorable than their studentsevaluation.
Our ndings are well in line with Centra (1973), the only prior study to our
knowledge investigating whether teachersresponse to student evaluations depends
on the discrepancy between teachersself-assessment and their studentsevaluations.
Among a sample of about 350 teachers at 5 di¤erent colleges in the US, he nds
on average little e¤ect of mid-semester feedback on end-of-semester student ratings.
However, among teachers for whom studentsmid-semester ratings fell short of their
own assessment, end-of-semester ratings increased more strongly in the di¤erence
between the teachers and studentsmid-semester ratings for teachers who received
mid-semester feedback as compared to teachers who did not receive feedback. Our
study nds, in a di¤erent population, similar results that hold over the period of a
full year.
How a teachers performance compares to the performance of her colleagues may
also matter for the e¤ect of receiving feedback. In our experiment, all teachers 
both in treatment and controlwere informed about the average of the evaluation
outcomes of the teachers in their team. This implies that some teachers in the
treatment group learn that they perform better than their direct co-workers, while
others learn that they perform worse. Relative performance information may matter
for the performance of teachers when they care about their status (Moldovanu et
al. 2007, Besley and Ghatak 2008, Auriol and Renault 2008) or when teachers want
to conform to social norms (Bernheim 1994, Sliwka 2007). Our results show that
the treatment e¤ect is very close to zero for teachers who perform better than their
team and for teachers who perform a lot worse than their team. We do nd a small
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positive (but only marginally signicant) e¤ect of feedback for workers who perform
only slightly worse than their team.
An additional response of teachers to receiving student evaluations that conict
with their self-assessment is to adjust their self-assessment. We nd only small e¤ects
of the feedback treatment on the self-assessment of teachers. Teachers who learn that
their studentsevaluations are on average better than their self-assessment do not
update their self-assessment. Teachers who learn that their studentsevaluations
are worse than their self-assessment do lower their self-assessment of performance,
but only to a limited extent.
Finally, we investigate whether receiving feedback and the content of the feedback
have an e¤ect on teachersjob satisfaction. Receiving information about performance
might a¤ect teachers job satisfaction when teachers intrinsically care about their
performance (as in, e.g., Besley and Ghatak 2005 and Delfgaauw and Dur 2008) or
when they enjoy being perceived as a competent or dedicated teacher (Suurmond
et al. 2004, Benabou and Tirole 2006). In either case we would expect that job
satisfaction of teachers in the treatment group increases with the di¤erence between
student feedback and teachers self-assessment. Earlier work by Ryan et al. (1980)
shows that the introduction of studentsevaluations negatively a¤ects job satisfac-
tion on average. Our results show that providing teachers with feedback on their
performance has no signicant e¤ect on their job satisfaction. We nd a similar
result when we look at the e¤ect of the content of feedback.
We proceed as follows. The next section provides a detailed description of the
eld experiment. Section 5.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample. In
section 5.4 we describe our empirical strategy. The results of the eld experiment
are presented in section 5.5. Finally, section 5.6 concludes.
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5.2 Experimental design
5.2.1 Background
The eld experiment took place at a Dutch school for intermediate vocational educa-
tion between the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2013. The school o¤ers education
to teenagers (usually in the age range from 16 to 20) and (young) adults. The o¤ered
curricula prepare for a large number of occupations, including technical professions,
administrative jobs, maritime professions, and jobs in information technology, health
care, and the hospitality sector. In all elds, there are multiple programs that di¤er
by level and duration. The durations of programs vary between one and four years.
All teachers are assigned to teams that are supervised by a manager. The teams
are organized around educational elds. Each team consists of roughly 10 to 20
teachers. Teachers teach one or several courses to a number of di¤erent classes of
students. Teachers of general subjects (such as language or math) typically teach
in multiple elds, while most teachers of eld-specic courses (such as cooking or
inland shipping) only teach students within their own eld. Depending on the eld
of education, the average class size is 10 to 30 students. Students can have the same
teacher for di¤erent courses in their program.
In 2011, the school had almost 8,000 students and about 470 teachers divided over
27 teams. The school merged in 2012 with another intermediate vocational education
school, which increased the number of students to about 9,500 and the number of
teachers to about 550. In 2013, the school had 9,000 students and 520 teachers. The
merger did not interfere with our experiment, in that the organizational structure as
well as the composition of the teams in the experiment remained largely unchanged.
However, the merger did result in a higher attrition of teachers, which we shall
analyze in depth in the next section.
The teachers in the experiment had not received individual feedback from student
evaluations at this school in the past. During the experiment, no other individual
feedback based on student evaluations was provided to the teachers. The school
does participate in a national survey on student satisfaction, which provides infor-
mation about the student evaluations of the school and of educational elds. Fur-
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thermore, most teachers have annual performance interviews with their manager.
Finally, in 2011 teachers participated in a 360 degree evaluation, which included
feedback from their manager, colleagues, and external clients (such as companies
that provide internships), but not from students. None of these alternative types of
feedback di¤ered between teachers in the treatment group and the control group in
our experiment.
Teachers at this school earn a at wage. The school originally intended to follow
up on this feedback experiment with another, government-funded experiment aimed
at testing the e¤ects of individual incentive pay for teachers, partially based on
student evaluation scores. However, this plan was abandoned in May 2012 due
to central government budget cuts. The school did continue the yearly student
evaluations after the experiment ended.
5.2.2 Set-up of the experiment
The experiment is based on two waves of student evaluations of teachers. The rst
wave took place at the end of 2011, the second wave at the end of 2012. In a pilot
prior to 2011, six teams had implemented student evaluation surveys that consisted
of 19 items. After analyzing the outcomes of these surveys, we used an adjusted
version of this questionnaire in our study. The six pilot-teams are not part of our
experiment, which took place among the remaining 21 teams. The nal version
of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 5.A. It consists of 19 statements, to
which students could respond on a ve-point scale ranging from disagreeto agree,2
as well as a space for comments and recommendations. The questionnaire includes
statements on teacher quality, organizational aspects, and interpersonal skills.
In both years, the questionnaires were administered at the end of the rst teach-
ing period in the school year. Before the start of the school year, teachers were
informed through an information bulletin that student evaluations would take place.
Further, in 2011, teachers were informed that a random half of the teachers would
2In addition, students could respond "Do not know / not applicable" to a statement. Through-
out the analysis, we treat such responses as missing observations. Alternatively, we could drop
questionnaires with partial nonresponse altogether. This reduces the sample size to quite some
extent, but does not a¤ect any of our main conclusions.
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receive their evaluation scores, so as to enable us to evaluate the e¤ects of feedback
provision. Exactly which teachers would receive their scores was determined later
on, through a randomization procedure described below. In 2012, teachers were
informed that all of them would receive their scores this time.3
The completion of the survey by students took place during class hours, in a
separate classroom under the supervision of (preferably) a person who was not eval-
uated by that class of students. It was decided that students would evaluate about
three teachers. Asking students to evaluate many more teachers was deemed unde-
sirable, as students might lose interest after lling out several questionnaires. The
team managers decided which teachers would be evaluated by a particular class of
students. In the data, the number of teachers evaluated by a student ranges from
1 to 5. Nearly all teachers in the 21 teams were evaluated by students. All teach-
ers were asked to complete a self-assessment questionnaire on the same items as
contained in the student evaluation questionnaire.4
After the rst wave of evaluations had taken place, we randomly assigned teach-
ers to treatment and control. Within each team, we stratied the assignment by
average student evaluation score and by the di¤erence between teachers average
self-assessment score and average student evaluation score, in the following way.
Within each team, we ranked teachers by their average score (over all students that
evaluated them) on all 19 statements except statements 14 and 15.5 Based on this
ranking, we create three equally large strata. Within these strata, we ranked all
teachers based on the di¤erence between their average self-assessment scores and
their average student evaluation score, both based on the same 17 items. Using this
3Our experiment thus yields an estimate of the e¤ect of feedback provision on subsequent
performance. Our design does not enable us to assess the e¤ect of the anticipation of feedback
provision (as all teachers anticipated that they might receive feedback), nor can we assess the
possible e¤ects of performance measurement (because all teachers knew that their performance
would be measured).
4In contrast to the student evaluation form, the questionnaire for teachers did not contain "Do
not know / not applicable" as a possible answer category. Only 5 teachers refrained from answering
one or more items. We excluded these teachers from the sample.
5We excluded statements 14 and 15 here because these consider factual statements regarding
time taking for answering e-mails and grading (see Appendix 5.A). We expected that on these
items, students answers were unlikely to surprise teachers. On the other 17 items, students
experience may di¤er from the teachers perception and, hence, these are more likely to contain
novel information for the teacher.
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ranking, we alternated the assignment of teachers to treatment and control, using a
random device to determine whether the teachers in odd positions or the teachers
in even positions are placed in the treatment group.6 This procedure helps to cre-
ate balance between the treatment group and the control group in terms of average
student evaluation score as well as in terms of the gap between student evaluation
scores and self-assessment. Moreover, we obtain balance across teams.
The teachers in the treatment group received their feedback in Spring 2012. It
contained the average student evaluation score on each of the 19 items, both over all
evaluations as well as split out by class. It also contained the average evaluation score
over all items, again averaged over all evaluations as well as by class. Furthermore,
it included the teachers self-assessment scores, on all items as well as the overall
average. Lastly, it contained the average student evaluation score of all teachers in
the teachers team, on all 19 items as well as the overall average. Note that in the
team scores, the student evaluations of teachers in the control groups are included.
The teammanagers also received this feedback of the teachers in the treatment group
(but not of the teachers in the control group). The teachers in the control groups
did not receive their individual student evaluation scores, but they did receive their
self-assessment scores as well as the team scores.
To study the e¤ect of receiving feedback, our main performance measure is av-
erage student evaluations one year later. Unfortunately, there are no objective
performance measures available. During the period of our experiment, there were
no standardized tests at this school. Moreover, as students had about half of their
teachers who did and the other half of their teachers who did not receive feedback, we
cannot use passing rates, drop-out rates, or grade averages as performance measures.
At the end of 2012, we conducted another wave of student evaluations, using the
same questionnaire and the same procedure. This time, all teachers were informed
that they would receive their 2012 student evaluation scores, which happened in
Spring 2013. Furthermore, all teachers were asked to complete the self-assessment
questionnaire again. This allows us to study whether teachersself-assessments re-
spond to studentsfeedback.
6Teachers who did not complete the self-assessment were randomly assigned to treatment and
control within their stratum.
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Lastly, to examine the e¤ect of feedback on teachers job satisfaction, we use
data from an employee satisfaction survey that was conducted independently of this
experiment at the end of 2012. We measure a teachers job satisfaction by her answer
to the statement: I am satised with working at [school name]. Respondents had
to pick one answer on a ve-point scale ranging from not at all satisedto fully
satised.7
5.3 Data description
In the rst wave of student evaluations, 323 teachers are evaluated. These teachers
are randomly assigned to the treatment or the control group, in the manner described
above. In the second wave of student evaluations, 242 out of these 323 teachers are
again evaluated. Hence, 81 teachers drop out of our sample between the rst and
second wave of student evaluations. Our estimations are based on the remaining 242
teachers, of whom 116 teachers have been assigned to the treatment group, while
the remaining 126 teachers are in the control group. Over the two waves, we have a
total of 15,194 student evaluation scores for these teachers. There are some outliers
in the data, but 95% of all teachers in the analysis are evaluated between 10 to 55
times per wave. The number of evaluations per teacher may di¤er due to di¤erences
in class size or di¤erences in response rates across classes. Below, we rst provide
descriptive statistics for the 242 teachers in the analysis and subsequently discuss
attrition.
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the teachers in our analysis. In the
rst wave, teachers are on average evaluated by about 33 students. The average
evaluation score of a teacher in 2011 is 4:12 on a ve-point scale. The average
evaluation score in 2011 hardly di¤ers between teachers in the treatment group and
teachers in the control group. The di¤erence is 0:05 and statistically insignicant.
On average, teachers self-assessment score is 4:60, which is considerably higher
7The job satisfaction question is part of the organizations employee satisfaction survey that is
conducted on a yearly basis. Unfortunately, both the wording of the job satisfaction question as
well as the answer scales di¤er between the year before and the year after we provided feedback
to a random subset of the teachers. As a result, it is di¢ cult to compare job satisfaction before
receiving feedback to job satisfaction after receiving feedback.
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than the evaluations by their students. There is no signicant di¤erence in teachers
self-evaluations between the treatment group and the control group. On observable
characteristics, teachers in the treatment and the control groups are also comparable.
Teachers in the treatment group are slightly less likely to be female, are a bit younger,
have shorter tenure, and work less hours on average. Only the di¤erences in working
hours and tenure are marginally signicant at the 10-percent level.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of teachers
Treatment Control All
group group teachers
First wave evaluation by students
Mean 4.15 4.10 4.12
Standard deviation (0.46) (0.49) (0.48)
First wave number of evaluations by students
Mean 32.27 33.40 32.86
Standard deviation (12.65) (14.97) (13.89)
First wave self-evaluationa
Mean 4.62 4.59 4.60
Standard deviation (0.29) (0.30) (0.29)
Gender: % female
Mean 0.46 0.49 0.48
Standard deviation (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age: years
Mean 47.25 49.22 48.26
Standard deviation (10.26) (9.97) (10.14)
Employment: % of fte
Mean 0.76 0.81 0.78*
Standard deviation (0.23) (0.20) (0.21)
Tenure: years
Mean 14.10 16.42 15.28*
Standard deviation (10.42) (10.01) (10.26)
Number of teachers 116 126 242
Notes: aThe self-evaluation was completed by 166 teachers in our sample, 82 in the treatment
group and 84 in the control group. *, **, and *** indicate a statistically signicant di¤erence
between the treatment group and control group at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.
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Figure 5.1 shows the average student evaluation score in the treatment group and
the control group for both years. For both groups, the average evaluation score in the
rst year is slightly higher than the average score in the second year. This reduction
in evaluation scores is slightly smaller for teachers in the treatment group. Figures
5.2 and 5.3 show the distribution of the student evaluation scores in the treatment
group and the control group, for the rst and second year, respectively. Figure
5.2 shows that our stratied randomization was successful in balancing teachers
2011 average student evaluation scores between the treatment group and the control
group. The distributions of the 2012 average evaluation scores do not markedly
di¤er from their 2011 counterparts.
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Figure 5.1: Average student evaluation scores by year
Notes: A students evaluation of a teacher is dened as the average score on
19 statements on the teachers performance (see Appendix 5.A). The answer
categories for each statement are [1] Disagree, [2] Disagree somewhat, [3]
Disagree somewhat/agree somewhat, [4] Agree somewhat, and [5] Agree.
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of student evaluations in the rst wave
Notes: Distribution estimated using a kernel density function. A students evaluation
of a teacher is dened as the average score on 19 statements on the teachers perfor-
mance (see Appendix 5.A). The answer categories for each statement are [1] Disagree,
[2] Disagree somewhat, [3] Disagree somewhat/agree somewhat, [4] Agree somewhat,
and [5] Agree.
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of student evaluations in the second wave
Notes: Distribution estimated using a kernel density function. A students evaluation
of a teacher is dened as the average score on 19 statements on the teachers perfor-
mance (see Appendix 5.A). The answer categories for each statement are [1] Disagree,
[2] Disagree somewhat, [3] Disagree somewhat/agree somewhat, [4] Agree somewhat,
and [5] Agree.
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Table 5.2 compares the teachers in our sample with the 81 teachers who drop
out of the sample after the rst wave of student evaluations.8 Attrition is balanced
between the treatment and control group: 38 teachers (24.7%) drop out of the treat-
ment group and 43 teachers (25.4%) drop out of the control group. Teachers who
drop out of the sample receive lower student evaluations in the rst wave as compared
to teachers who remain in the sample. The di¤erence is 0:11 points and statistically
insignicant. The average self-assessment score is signicantly lower among teachers
who drop out as compared to the teachers in our sample. Furthermore, teachers
who leave the sample are signicantly older and have longer tenure, suggesting that
retirement is partially responsible for attrition. The nal two columns in Table 5.2
split the group of teachers who drop out by their assignment to the treatment group
and the control group. Teachers who were assigned to the treatment group receive
slightly worse student evaluation scores, evaluate themselves higher, and have longer
tenure as compared to teachers assigned to the control group. However, none of these
di¤erences is statistically signicant.9
Not all teachers in our sample completed the self-assessment questionnaire. Among
the 242 teachers in our analysis, 166 teachers performed the self-assessment in the
rst year and 132 teachers did so in both years. Table 5.3 compares the teachers who
completed the self-assessment survey twice with the teachers who did so only once or
never. Most importantly, there is no signicant di¤erence between the treatment and
control group in the number of times a teacher completes the self-evaluation. Fur-
thermore, we nd no di¤erence in rst-wave self-evaluation scores between teachers
who did and did not complete the second self-evaluation. We do nd that teachers
who completed both self-evaluations receive signicantly higher student evaluation
scores in the rst wave. On observables, males are relatively likely to refrain from
completing the rst self-evaluation.
8A large fraction of these 81 teachers left the school, in part as a result of a severance pay
package o¤ered to employees after the merger.
9We further examine the issue of selective attrition in section 5.5.
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Table 5.2: Attrition
Sample Total Attrition
Attrition Treatment Control
First wave evaluation by students
Mean 4.12 4.02 3.98 4.06
Standard deviation (0.48) (0.56) (0.58) (0.56)
First wave number of evaluations by students
Mean 32.27 28.15** 27.34 28.86
Standard deviation (12.65) (15.58) (14.71) (16.46)
First wave self-evaluationa
Mean 4.60 4.41*** 4.51 4.36
Standard deviation (0.29) (0.68) (0.35) (0.81)
Gender: % female
Mean 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.46
Standard deviation (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51)
Age: years
Mean 48.26 50.95* 50.96 50.95
Standard deviation (10.14) (9.75) (8.65) (10.50)
Employment: % of fte
Mean 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.77
Standard deviation (0.21) (0.23) (0.20) (0.25)
Tenure: years
Mean 15.28 18.15* 16.58 19.17
Standard deviation (10.26) (10.16) (9.90) (10.37)
Number of teachers 242 81 38 43
Notes: aThe self-evaluation was completed by 166 teachers in our sample and by 46 teachers
who dropped out, of whom 29 had been assigned to the treatment group and 17 to the control
group. *, **, and *** indicate a statistically signicant di¤erence between the sample group
and attrition group at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. Within the group of teachers who
drop out, none of the di¤erences between teachers assigned to the treatment group and teachers
assigned to the control group are statistically signcant.
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics by self-evaluation
Both Only rst No
self-evaluations self-evaluation self-evaluation
completed completed completed
Assigned to treatment group
Mean 0.49 0.50 0.45
Standard deviation (0.50) (0.51) (0.50)
First wave evaluation by students
Mean 4.21 4.05 4.00***
Standard deviation (0.41) (0.49) (0.55)
First wave number of evaluations by students
Mean 32.20 33.41 33.74
Standard deviation (13.05) (12.49) (15.88)
First wave self-evaluation
Mean 4.60 4.61
Standard deviation (0.30) (0.27)
Gender: % female
Mean 0.50 0.61 0.37*
Standard deviation (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Age: years
Mean 48.23 46.88 48.94
Standard deviation (9.91) (11.21) (10.12)
Employment: % of fte
Mean 0.82 0.69 0.77***
Standard deviation (0.19) (0.24) (0.22)
Tenure: years
Mean 15.42 15.53 14.89
Standard deviation (9.97) (11.35) (10.41)
Number of teachers 132 34 76
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate a statistically signicant di¤erence between the groups at the .10,
.05, and .01 level, respectively (based on an F-test).
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5.4 Empirical strategy
We estimate the e¤ect of receiving feedback using OLS with time and teacher xed
e¤ects. The dependent variable, denoted by yit, is the average student evaluation
score of teacher i at time t 2 f1; 2g. This is given by the mean score on the 19
items on the evaluation questionnaire (see Appendix 5.A) averaged over all students
that evaluate a teacher in a given year.10 The main variable of interest is Tit, which
is a dummy variable that equals one in the second year when teacher i is part of
the treatment group and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we include a time xed e¤ect
and teacher xed e¤ects, denoted by t and i, respectively. The regression equation
reads:
yit = Tit + t + i + "it: (5.1)
The estimated average treatment e¤ect of receiving feedback is given by . In all
our estimations, we cluster standard errors at the teacher level.11
Next, we investigate how the e¤ect of receiving feedback depends on the content
of the feedback. First, we include the interaction between the treatment dummy
and the variable 4selfi, which denotes the di¤erence between teacher is average
self-assessment score in the rst year and teacher is average student evaluation score
in the rst year. Hence, 4selfi gives the extent to which teacher i overestimates
or underestimates her performance as compared to her studentsassessment. We
analyze this interaction e¤ect by estimating:
yit = Tit + ' (Tit 4selfi) +  (Et 4selfi) + t + i + "it: (5.2)
Note that we also interact4selfi with dummy variable Et that takes value one in the
second year of our experiment and is zero otherwise. This interaction accounts for
correlations between second-year evaluation scores and 4selfi that are independent
of whether the teacher received her rst-year evaluation scores, for instance due to
reversion to the mean.
10Using instead the average score excluding statements 14 and 15 (as used to stratify assignment
to treatment) does not a¤ect our results in any important way.
11Equation (5.1) is specied at the teacher level. We also estimate the average treatment e¤ect
at the student level.
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Second, in a similar way we include the interaction between the treatment dummy
and the variable 4teami, which gives the di¤erence between teacher is average
student evaluation score in the rst year and the average of the rst-year evaluations
of all teachers in her team. Hence,4teami denotes whether teacher i performs better
or worse than her colleagues, on average.
Lastly, we estimate similar regressions using teachers average self-assessment
scores and teachersjob satisfaction as dependent variables.
5.5 Results
The estimates of the average treatment e¤ect of receiving feedback on subsequent
student evaluation scores are given in Table 5.4. The rst column gives the results
of estimating equation (5.1). The estimated average treatment e¤ect on the aver-
age student evaluation score is 0:043, which is both economically and statistically
insignicant. This e¤ect is quite precisely estimated, with a standard error equal to
0.054 and a 95 percent condence interval that runs from  0:063 to 0:149. This re-
sult is in contrast to most previous studies on the provision of feedback as discussed
in section 5.1, which usually nd a positive e¤ect of feedback on performance. A
possible explanation for this di¤erence may be that previous studies focus on the
e¤ect of feedback in the short run, whereas we study the e¤ect of feedback over the
period of a full year. This interpretation is consistent with Azmat et al. (2014) who
nd that students respond to relative performance information in the short run, but
not in the long run (where the long run in their paper is a full year, as in ours).
The second column of Table 5.4 shows the average treatment e¤ect estimated
at the student level. Here, the dependent variable is the average evaluation score
of a teacher by individual students. Again, the estimated average treatment e¤ect
is small and statistically insignicant. The di¤erence between the two estimates
indicates that the average treatment e¤ect is slightly higher for teachers who are
evaluated by relatively few students.12 In the remainder of this chapter, we only
12In the estimation at the teacher level, all teachers are weighted equally, independent of the
number of students that evaluate them. In contrast, teachers who are evaluated by many students
receive a higher weight in the estimation at the student level, relative to teachers who are evaluated
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Table 5.4: E¤ect of feedback on teachersperformance
Dependent variable: average student evaluation
(1) (2)
Teacher level Student level
Treatment 0.043 0.021
(0.054) (0.046)
Year xed e¤ect Yes Yes
Teacher xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Observations 484 15194
Teachers 242 242
Within R2 0.016 0.000
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the teacher level between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
signicance based on a two-sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively
report the estimates at the teacher level; the estimated e¤ects at the student level
are qualitatively similar.13
Next, we consider possible heterogeneity in treatment e¤ects depending on the
content of the feedback. First, we investigate whether the e¤ect of feedback de-
pends on the gap between teachers self-assessment scores and the evaluation scores
they receive from their students. Column 1 of Table 5.5 gives the results of esti-
mating equation (5.2). The interaction e¤ect is positive but insignicant. The esti-
mated treatment e¤ect for teachers who learn that their rst-period self-assessment
is equal to their studentsassessment is very close to zero at 0:014. For teachers who
learn that they overestimate their performance by one point, the treatment e¤ect is
0:104 higher. In column 2, we add a quadratic interaction between the treatment
dummy and the di¤erence between teachersrst-period self-assessment score and
their studentsevaluation scores. Figure 5.4 depicts the estimated e¤ects of receiv-
ing feedback. We nd that teachers whose own assessment corresponds to students
assessment do not respond to receiving feedback. The treatment e¤ect is positive
for teachers who learn that they highly underestimate or, in particular, highly over-
by few students. Estimating the average treatment e¤ect at the teacher level while weighing
teachers by the number of students evaluating them in either the rst or second wave gives results
close to those reported in column 2 of Table 5.4.
13Additionally, we have also estimated the average treatment e¤ect on each of the 19 items of
the questionaire separately. Estimated e¤ects range from 0:00 to 0:11, and is signicant (at the
0.06 level) only for item 5 (The teacher is able to explain the connection to the real world.).
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Table 5.5: Heterogenous treatment e¤ects of feedback on performance
Dependent variable: average student evaluation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.014 -0.005 0.062 0.087
(0.066) (0.062) (0.048) (0.058)
self  treatment 0.104 -0.031
(0.110) (0.113)
self2  treatment 0.146
(0.101)
team  treatment -0.090 -0.127
(0.101) (0.112)
team2  treatment -0.115
(0.164)
self  second period 0.216** 0.044
(0.087) (0.078)
self2  second period 0.185**
(0.076)
team  second period -0.369*** -0.353***
(0.075) (0.076)
team2  second period 0.058
(0.129)
Year xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teacher xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 332 332 484 484
Teachers 166 166 242 242
Within R2 0.166 0.249 0.217 0.219
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the teacher level between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
signicance based on a two-sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. The variable
self indicates the di¤erence between a teachers rst-period average self-assessment score and
her average rst-period student evaluation score. The variable team indicates the di¤erence
between a teachers rst-period average student evaluation score and average of all rst-period
average student evaluation scores of the teachers in her team.
estimate their performance. This e¤ect is signicant at the 10-percent level for
teachers who overestimate their performance by more than one point. However, the
fraction of teachers in this interval is fairly small, about ten percent (as can be seen
from light grey kernel density in Figure 5.4).14
14We also examined whether treatment e¤ects di¤er by rst-period student evaluation score.
To do so, we ran a regression similar to (5.2), but with the rst-period student evaluation score
instead of 4selfi. We nd that the treatment e¤ect is very close to zero and negatively but not
signicantly related to rst-period student evaluation score. Including both rst-period student
evaluation score and 4selfi in one single regression gives rise to problems of multicollinearity.
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Figure 5.4: Estimated e¤ect of feedback by the di¤erence between a teachers self-
evaluation score and her student evaluation score
Notes: This gure shows the estimated treatment e¤ect given the di¤erence between a teachers
rst-period average self-assessment score and her average rst-period student evaluation score
(selfi). Dashed lines show the 90% condence interval. The transparent grey area shows a
kernel density of the observations.
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Figure 5.5: Estimated e¤ect of feedback by the di¤erence between a teachers own
student evaluation score in the rst wave and her teams average score
Notes: This gure shows the estimated treatment e¤ect given the di¤erence between a teachers
rst-wave average student evaluation score and average of all rst-wave average student evaluation
scores of the teachers in her team (teami). Dashed lines show the 90% condence interval. The
transparent grey area shows a kernel density of the observations.
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Second, we examine whether the e¤ect of feedback depends on the gap between
a teachers rst-period student evaluation score and the average score in his team.
The third column of Table 5.5 gives the results of estimating equation (5.2) with
4teami instead of 4selfi. We nd that the estimated interaction e¤ect is negative
and statistically insignicant. The estimated treatment e¤ect for teachers who learn
that they perform as well as their team (on average) is 0:062. For teachers who learn
that their student evaluation score is one point above the average of their colleagues,
this e¤ect is reduced by 0:090 points. In column 4, we add a quadratic interaction
between the treatment dummy and the di¤erence between a teachers rst-period
average student evaluation score and her teams average score. As illustrated in
Figure 5.5, the estimated treatment e¤ect is close to zero for teachers who learn that
they perform better than their team and for teachers who learn that they perform
considerably worse than their team. However, the treatment e¤ect is positive and
marginally signicant (at the 10-percent level) for teachers who learn that they score
only slightly worse than their colleagues (up to 0:5 points below their teamsaverage).
A possible explanation is that teachers dislike scoring below average. Teachers who
learn that they score slightly below average may feel that it is possible to catch
up and increase their e¤orts. A teacher who learns that she performs considerably
worse than her colleagues might feel discouraged from trying to catch up.
As discussed before, 81 teachers who were evaluated in 2011 and assigned to
either the treatment group or control group were not evaluated in 2012 and, hence,
are not included in the analysis. If attrition is related to the content of the feedback
received, the teachers who drop out of the treatment group may di¤er from the
teachers who drop out of the control group, which could bias our results. To examine
whether attrition is related to the content of the feedback received, we perform probit
estimations on the set of teachers with student evaluation scores in 2011, with a
dummy that takes value one if a teacher drops out as a dependent variable. As
reported in Table 5.A in the Appendix, the estimations show that neither receiving
feedback nor the content of this feedback signicantly a¤ects the probability of
dropping out.15
15These results are robust to not including individual controls. Since we miss data on one or
more individual characteristics for 41 teachers, the sample size then increases to 323.
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Table 5.6: E¤ect of feedback on the self-evaluation by teachers
Dependent variable: average self-evaluation
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment -0.067 -0.042 -0.065
(0.046) (0.059) (0.057)
self  treatment -0.108 -0.075
(0.097) (0.117)
self2  treatment 0.031
(0.109)
self  second period -0.091 -0.222***
(0.060) (0.059)
self2  second period 0.136***
(0.037)
Year xed e¤ect Yes Yes Yes
Teacher xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 264 264 264
Teachers 132 132 132
Within R2 0.016 0.095 0.137
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the teacher level between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
signicance based on a two-sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. The variable
self indicates the di¤erence between a teachers rst-period average self-assessment score and
her average rst-period student evaluation score.
We have seen that on average, teachersself-assessment is much more favorable
than the evaluations by their students. Hence, students evaluations may help teach-
ers in making a more realistic assessment of their own performance. As teachers were
asked to complete the self-assessment in both waves, we can examine whether teach-
ers use the feedback to update the self-assessment of their performance. Table 5.6
reports the e¤ects of receiving feedback on teachersself-assessment. The estima-
tion reported in the rst column only includes a treatment dummy, a year dummy,
and teacher xed e¤ects. We nd that, on average, teachers who have received
feedback evaluate themselves worse in the second wave compared to teachers who
have not received feedback. The average treatment e¤ect is  0:067, but statistically
insignicant. The estimation reported in the second column adds the interaction
between the treatment dummy and the di¤erence between teachersrst-period self-
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assessment score and their studentsrst-period evaluation scores. As expected, the
interaction e¤ect is negative, but statistically insignicant. In column 3, we add a
quadratic interaction term. As depicted in Figure 5.6, we nd no signicant e¤ect
of the treatment for teachers who learn that they underestimate their own perfor-
mance. In contrast, teachers who learn that their own assessment is more positive
than their studentsevaluations assess themselves signicantly less positive in the
second wave, compared to similar teachers who do not receive feedback. The e¤ect of
the treatment on a teachers self-assessment remains similar in sign and magnitude
but loses statistical signicance for teachers whose own assessment is more than one
point higher than their average student evaluation score.
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Figure 5.6: Estimated e¤ect of feedback on teachersself-evaluation
Notes: This gure shows the estimated treatment e¤ect on teachersaverage self-
evaluation score given the di¤erence between a teachers rst-period average self-
evaluation score and her average rst-period student evaluation score (selfi).
Dashed lines show the 90% condence interval. The transparent grey area shows
a kernel density of the observations.
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Table 5.7: E¤ect of feedback on job satisfaction of teachers
Dependent variable: job satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment -0.068 -0.257 -0.149 -0.047 -0.070
(0.133) (0.214) (0.233) (0.134) (0.177)
self -0.407 0.174
(0.262) (0.567)
self2 -0.415
(0.360)
self  treatment 0.292 -0.125
(0.321) (0.649)
self2  treatment 0.252
(0.449)
team 0.274 0.229
(0.211) (0.231)
team2 -0.165
(0.348)
team  treatment -0.419 -0.395
(0.283) (0.320)
team2  treatment 0.104
(0.476)
Intercept 3.632*** 4.079*** 4.115*** 3.625*** 3.691***
(0.583) (0.685) (0.687) (0.583) (0.611)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 162 130 130 162 162
R2 0.032 0.053 0.066 0.046 0.057
Notes: Standard errors between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signicance based on a
two sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. Control variables are gender, age,
tenure, and full-time equivalent. The variable self indicates the di¤erence between a teachers
rst-period average self-assessment score and her average rst-period student evaluation score.
The variable team indicates the di¤erence between a teachers rst-period average student
evaluation score and average of all rst-period average student evaluation scores of the teachers
in her team.
Lastly, we examine whether receiving feedback a¤ects teachersjob satisfaction.
Teachers may be positively or negatively surprised about their average evaluation
score, leading to feelings of pride or resentment. Similarly, learning that ones per-
formance is better or worse than the performance of direct colleagues may a¤ect
job satisfaction as a result of status concerns or conformity preferences. Table 5.7
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reports the e¤ect of receiving feedback on teachersjob satisfaction. The estimation
reported in the rst column includes only the treatment dummy. We nd that on
average, receiving feedback has no e¤ect on job satisfaction. The estimated e¤ect
is  0:068 and statistically insignicant. The estimation in the second column adds
an interaction between the treatment dummy and the di¤erence between teachers
rst-period self-assessment score and their studentsrst-period evaluation scores.
Surprisingly, the estimated interaction e¤ect is positive, but insignicant. Column 3
adds a quadratic interaction term. The results of this estimation are depicted Figure
5.7. The e¤ect of receiving feedback is very close to zero and nowhere statistically
signicant.
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Figure 5.7: Estimated e¤ect of feedback on teachersjob satisfaction by the di¤erence
between a teachers self-evaluation score and her student evaluation score
Notes: This gure shows the estimated treatment e¤ect on job satisfaction of teachers given the
di¤erence between a teachers rst-period average self-evaluation score and her average rst-period
student evaluation score (selfi). Dashed lines show the 90% condence interval. The transparent
grey area shows a kernel density of the observations.
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In columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.7, we interact the treatment dummy with the
di¤erence between a teachers rst-period average student evaluation score and her
teams average student evaluation score. The estimated interaction e¤ect is negative
and insignicant, and the coe¢ cient on the quadratic interaction term in column 5 is
close to zero. Figure 5.8 depicts the results of the estimation as reported in column
5 of Table 5.7. We nd that the e¤ect of receiving feedback on job satisfaction is
insignicant both for teachers whose evaluation scores are above their teamsaverage
as well as for teachers who perform worse than their direct colleagues. Hence, we
nd no e¤ect of performance feedback on job satisfaction.
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Figure 5.8: Treatment e¤ect on teachersjob satisfaction by the di¤erence between
a teachers own student evaluation score in the rst wave and her teams average
score
Notes: Figure shows the estimated treatment e¤ect on job satisfaction of teachers given the di¤er-
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rst-wave average student evaluation score and average of all rst-wave
average student evaluation scores of the teachers in her team (teami). Dashed lines show the
90% condence interval. The transparent grey area shows a kernel density of the observations.
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5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has studied the e¤ects of receiving studentsfeedback on teacher perfor-
mance as measured by student evaluations one year later. We nd that on average,
receiving studentsfeedback has no e¤ect on teacher performance. This contrasts
with recent studies on short-run e¤ects of performance feedback, which tend to nd
positive e¤ects. Our study suggests that e¤ects of feedback may be short-lived. A
possible remedy might be to provide feedback more frequently. It would be interest-
ing to examine in a future eld experiment how teachers respond to more frequent
feedback, and to learn about the dynamics of their response.
Additionally, we examined whether the response to feedback depends on the
content of feedback. We found that teachers who learn that their studentsassess-
ment is much less favorable than their own assessment improve performance after
receiving feedback. These teachers also moderate their self-assessment, albeit to a
limited extent. We found no evidence that teachersjob satisfaction is a¤ected by
(the content of) feedback. Lastly, we found that teachers who learn that they do
worse than their team improve, unless their score is far below the team average.
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Table 5.A: The e¤ect of feedback content on attrittion (probit estimates)
Dependent variable: drop-out after rst year
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment -0.178 -0.490 -0.188
(0.188) (0.294) (0.191)
self -0.236
(0.240)
self  treatment 0.356
(0.414)
team -0.110
(0.258)
team  treatment -0.310
(0.384)
Intercept -2.530*** -1.484 -2.493***
(0.866) (0.989) (0.870)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 282 198 282
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.081 0.075
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate signicance based on a two-sided test at the .10, .05, and .01 level,
respectively. Control variables are gender, age, tenure, and full-time equivalent. The variable
self indicates the di¤erence between a teachers rst-period average self-assessment score and
her average rst-period student evaluation score. The variable team indicates the di¤erence
between a teachers rst-period average student evaluation score and average of all rst-period
average student evaluation scores of the teachers in her team.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Directions for
Further Research
Production in public organizations is highly labor intensive. Learning about the
motivations of public sector workers is, therefore, vital to our understanding of
public sector performance. The rst part of this thesis empirically investigated
the di¤erence in motivations between workers in the public sector and the private
sector. In particular, it studied three closely related topics: Are altruistic workers
more likely to be employed in the public sector when their mission preferences align
with the mission of the public sector? Are public sector workers more likely to rate
themselves as altruistic and lazy as compared to private sector workers? And, are
government workers more satised with their job when their own mission preferences
match the mission preferences of the politicians in o¢ ce? The last part of this thesis
studied one possible way to motivate workers in the public sector. A eld experiment
was conducted at a large Dutch school for intermediate vocational education. We
answered the question whether the provision of studentsfeedback to teachers may
help improve the performance of teachers. The remainder of this chapter provides a
summary of the studies in this thesis and o¤ers some directions for further research.
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6.1 Summary
A large literature in public administration and economics has shown that public
sector workers report a strong willingness to help others or to serve the public interest
at large (see Perry et al. 2010 for an overview). In chapter 2 my co-author and I
proposed that public sector workers might di¤er in their valuation of the public
sectors mission. That is, not all workers may feel that the mission of the public
sector contributes to the public interest. We have studied how workersaltruism
and the alignment of their mission preferences with the mission of the public sector
jointly a¤ect the likelihood of public sector employment.
This idea was formalized by developing a very simple model, building on Besley
and Ghatak (2005), where workers di¤er in their altruism and their valuation of the
public sectors mission. Our model predicts that altruism and mission alignment
are mutually reinforcing. The likelihood of public sector employment increases in
altruism for workers who feel that the public sectors mission serves the public in-
terest, decreases in altruism for workers who feel that the public sectors mission
harms the public interest, and is una¤ected for indi¤erent workers. Likewise, the
likelihood of public sector employment increases in mission alignment for altruistic
workers, decreases in mission alignment for spiteful workers, and is una¤ected for
selsh workers.
We have tested our predictions using survey data from the World Values Survey,
covering a broad range of countries over the world. Our data set contains information
on workerssector of employment, their willingness to help others (altruism), and
their condence in political parties (which is used as a proxy for mission alignment).
The results of our empirical analysis are very much in line with our theoretical pre-
dictions. We have found a strong mutually reinforcing relation between a workers
altruism and mission alignment on the likelihood of public sector employment. More-
over, we found that the mutually reinforcing relation between altruism and mission
alignment is especially strong among highly educated workers and in less-developed
countries. Workers who are highly altruistic and report strong condence in politi-
cal parties are signicantly more likely to work in the public sector as compared to
workers with average altruism and condence. Workers with low altruism and weak
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condence are signicantly less likely to work in the public sector. The di¤erence in
probability between these two groups is substantial. Finally, workers with high al-
truism and weak condence and workers with low altruism and strong condence are
neither more nor less likely to work in the public sector. Among the higher educated
workers the latter two groups have a signicant lower likelihood of working in the
public sector. A possible explanation may be that conicting mission preferences or
spite discourage some highly educated people from working in the public sector.
There are two possible explanations for the sorting patterns we have found. The
sorting patterns may follow from selection into the public sector (see, e.g., models by
Handy and Katz 1998, Francois 2000 and 2007, Delfgaauw and Dur 2008) or from
preference adaptation by working in the public sector (see Wright and Grant 2010
for a discussion). We cannot rule out that the patterns we nd are nonexistent for
workers who just started their career and arise from adaptation of preferences by
working in the public sector. Following this explanation of the results some workers
become more altruistic and gain condence in political parties by working in the
public sector. However, existing evidence points in the other direction for workers
altruism. A number of empirical studies have shown that workersaltruism in the
public sector decreases rather than increases with work experience (Blau 1960, Van
Maanen 1975, Moynihan and Pandey 2007, De Cooman et al. 2009, and Buurman
et al. 2012).
Chapter 3 studied a closely related topic. We examined whether public sector
workers rate themselves as more altruistic and lazy as compared to private sector
workers. First, we developed a theoretical model of sorting to the public sector
where workers di¤er in their altruism (willingness to help others) and their laziness
(cost of e¤ort). Our model predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment
increases in a workers altruism, and increases or decreases in a workers laziness
depending on his altruism. Altruistic workers are more likely to work in the public
sector because of the opportunity to contribute to the welfare of others. The e¤ect
of laziness on sorting is more indirect. A lazy workers choice of sector is driven
by the sectoral di¤erence in benets and cost unrelated to e¤ort and not by the
sectoral di¤erence in rewards for performance, because working hard is costly for a
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lazy worker. Hence, the likelihood of public sector employment increases in laziness
for selsh workers, because more lazy workers prefer the benets unrelated to e¤ort
in the public sector (such as the base wage) over the high rewards for performance in
the private sector. Reversely, the likelihood of public sector employment decreases in
laziness for highly altruistic workers, because more lazy workers benet less from the
relatively high intrinsic rewards for performance in the public sector. Summarizing,
our model predicts a negative interaction e¤ect between a workers altruism and
laziness on the likelihood of public sector employment.
These predictions were empirically tested using survey data on German workers
from the German Socio-Economic Panel study. In line with our theoretical model
we found that public sector workers rate themselves signicantly more altruistic and
lazy as compared to private sector workers. We did not nd evidence of a negative
interaction between a workers altruism and laziness. Together these results imply
that workers who are highly altruistic and lazy are signicantly most likely to work in
the public sector. Workers who are selsh and energetic are signicantly least likely
to work in the public sector. A possible explanation for the lack of a signicant
interaction e¤ect may be that public sector workerscontribution to society is partly
independent of their e¤ort. For instance, because the di¤erence between the public
sector wage and the private sector wage may already be considered as a contribution
to the public interest.
We additionally examined whether sorting patterns are di¤erent for workers with
di¤erent levels of work experience. Sorting patterns may be related to work expe-
rience in two ways. First, workers may spend the initial years of their career on
job-shopping. That is, workers may be holding jobs that are not a good match
with their tastes and abilities (see the models by Johnson 1978, Jovanovic 1979, and
Neal 1999). Second, the preferences of workers may adapt to experience, for instance
due to organizational socialization (Brewer 2008). Following this line of reasoning
we expect either stronger of weaker sorting patterns for more experienced workers.
Our results show that the di¤erence in altruism between public sector and private
sector workers is already present at the start of their career, and for the most part,
this remains the same throughout their career. We did nd a statistically signicant
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relation between laziness and work experience. At the start of workerscareers there
are no signicant di¤erences in laziness between public sector and private sector
workers. However, this di¤erence increases for more experienced workers. Whether
this is the result of job-shopping or preference adaptation is hard to uncover using
the current data.
Chapter 4 studied the motivations of government workers in more detail. Govern-
ment workers carry out tasks on behalf of the government in o¢ ce. The objectives of
government organizations are described in the mission of the government, which is set
by the elected politicians in o¢ ce. Government workers may di¤er from politicians
in their preferred mission of the government. In this chapter I empirically studied
whether the mission motivation of government workers matters for their satisfaction
with their job. Mission motivation may matter for job satisfaction when workers
enjoy working on missions that are in line with their own preferences regarding the
mission of the government.
The used data come from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sci-
ences. My sample contains data on Dutch workers, covering their individual char-
acteristics, employment details, and political preferences. Workersreported voting
in parliamentary elections is used to construct a measure of mission alignment. A
workers mission preferences are classied as a match to the governments mission
when a worker voted for one of the political parties that has taken up o¢ ce after
the election. A worker who voted for a political party that does not take up o¢ ce is
classied as a nonmatching worker. In estimating the e¤ect of this variable on job
satisfaction I exploited the fact that the mission of the government changes when
new political parties take up o¢ ce. It is examined whether a government workers
job satisfaction changes after a change in a workers mission alignment.
The results of the empirical analysis clearly show that mission motivation of
government workers is important for their satisfaction with their job. Government
workers are more satised with their job when their mission preferences match those
of the politicians in o¢ ce as compared to when their mission preferences do not
match. The di¤erence in job satisfaction is both economically and statistically sig-
nicant. The alignment of mission preferences does not a¤ect job satisfaction of
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workers employed outside the government sector.
In addition, I investigated whether it matters for a workers job satisfaction
which other political parties join the coalition government. In the Netherlands,
the government in o¢ ce consists of a coalition of political parties. This implies
that political parties often have to compromise when making policy plans. In line
with this idea my results show that, next to a workers rst preference (as measured
by their reported vote), it is also important which other parties join a coalition
government. Government workers with a more positive stance towards all political
parties in a coalition government are signicantly more satised with their job as
compared to workers with a more negative stance.
In the last study of this thesis my co-authors and I focus on an important public
service that is provided predominantly by the public sector, namely education. Many
governments will consider good education as one of their top priorities. The provision
of education is highly labor intensive, hence, the performance of teachers plays a
crucial role in the provision of good education. In chapter 5 we studied whether
receiving performance feedback matters for the performance of teachers.
We conducted a eld experiment at a large Dutch school for intermediate voca-
tional education to study the e¤ect of studentsfeedback on teachersperformance.
Teachersperformance was measured by having students evaluate their teachers us-
ing a questionnaire with 19 items about the performance of teachers. After collecting
this information we implemented our feedback treatment. A randomly chosen group
of teachers was provided with their outcomes of the studentsevaluations. We de-
termined the e¤ect of receiving feedback by having teachers evaluated by students
again in the next year. Teachers were also provided with information on the aver-
age evaluation outcome of their team as a whole and teachers were asked to give a
self-assessment of performance both before and after receiving feedback.
The results show that receiving feedback on performance does not a¤ect the
subsequent performance of teachers. We have found a precisely estimated zero av-
erage treatment e¤ect. Additionally, we investigated whether the content of the
feedback matters for the e¤ect of receiving feedback. First, the e¤ect of receiving
feedback is estimated dependent on whether teachers assess their own performance
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di¤erently than students evaluate their performance. Teachers who assess their own
performance similarly to the studentsevaluation show no response to the feedback
treatment. We do nd a positive treatment e¤ect for teachers who assess their own
performance a lot more positively as compared to the studentsassessment. Next,
the e¤ect of receiving feedback is estimated for workers who learn they perform bet-
ter or perform worse than their team as a whole. We found no clear relation between
the e¤ect of feedback and the di¤erence between a teachers own performance and
the average performance of their team.
Learning about past performance may motivate workers (e.g. when they are
intrinsically motivated) but is also a way of informing workers about their past
performance. We examined whether teachers who receive feedback adjust their self-
assessment of performance when they learn from the feedback that there is a discrep-
ancy between their self-assessment and the studentsassessment. Our results show
that teachers who learn that they assess their own performance more favorably than
students lower their self-assessment of performance afterwards. However, the esti-
mated e¤ect loses statistical signicance for teachers who assess their performance
a lot more favorably.
6.2 Directions for further research
This thesis has studied the motivations of public sector workers. In chapters 2 and
4 we have studied the importance of the alignment of a workers mission preferences
with the mission of the public sector (or the governments mission in particular).
We found that mission motivation is important for sorting and job satisfaction. An
interesting issue that remains is what the ideal motivational composition of the
government workforce is, given that workers di¤er in their mission preferences. To
properly address this issue we need to build a better understanding of how mission
motivation a¤ects behavior at the workplace. For instance, it would be interest-
ing to explore whether the mission motivation of government workers also a¤ects
their e¤ort and performance on the job (as in the lab experiments mentioned in
section 1.1). Relatedly, nonmatching workers might be more easily tempted to frus-
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trate, inuence or even sabotage the implementation of government policy. From
the politicians perspective it could, therefore, be optimal to hire only workers whose
mission preferences match those of the politicians. However, from societys perspec-
tive it may be optimal to hire a mixed workforce that resembles the preferences of
society as a whole.
Closely related, mission preferences may also be important for sorting within
the government organization. That is, mission preferences might inuence the pro-
motion opportunities of government workers. Politicians in o¢ ce might prefer to
have workers with strongly aligned mission preferences at key positions within the
government organization. As a result, workers with matching mission preferences
might be promoted to such positions more easily. Summarizing, in future research
it would be interesting to examine the role of mission motivation at the government
workplace.
The nal study in this thesis has shown that receiving feedback has no e¤ect
on the performance of teachers. However, receiving feedback may a¤ect workers
di¤erently when they care about their output. Receiving feedback from recipients of
public services, such as students, may inuence motivated workers in the following
ways. First, workers motivated to contribute to the well-being of others might adapt
or increase their e¤orts when they learn from the feedback that their e¤orts are badly
reviewed. They might be willing to look for new ways in which to improve the well-
being of recipients. Receiving negative feedback from recipients may also have a
negative e¤ect on motivated workersperformance. Motivated workers might get
discouraged from working hard when they learn that their e¤ort and output are not
very highly appreciated by the recipients. This hypothesis also ts well with the
empirical literature on motivations of public sector workers. A number of studies
have shown that the altruistic motivations of public sector workers decreases with
work experience (Blau 1960, Van Maanen 1975, Moynihan and Pandey 2007, De
Cooman et al. 2009, and Buurman et al. 2012). While workers might join the public
sector due to an intrinsic motivation to help others, they might gradually learn from
receiving recipient feedback that their contributions are poorly appreciated.
Recipients may also give positive feedback to public sector workers. Receiving
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positive feedback may a¤ect motivated workers di¤erently than receiving negative
feedback. Motivated workers might respond more strongly to positive feedback, as
this may serve as an acknowledgement that their contributions are appreciated and
that they can really make a di¤erence in peoples lives. As a possible extension of
our eld experiment in chapter 5 it would be interesting to nd a good measure
of intrinsic motivation and examine how the e¤ect of feedback interacts with this
measure of motivation.
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Introductie
De publieke sector vormt een belangrijk onderdeel van onze economie. Volgens
schattingen door het OECD (2008) is een groot deel van de beroepsbevolking in
OECD-landen werkzaam in de publieke sector.1 Werknemers in de publieke sec-
tor leveren een grote verscheidenheid aan goederen en diensten aan de samenlev-
ing. Voorbeelden van diensten die publiek geleverd worden zijn onder andere on-
derwijs, zorg, openbaar vervoer, afvalverwerking en het houden van de openbare
orde. Deze verscheidenheid aan publieke diensten doet vermoeden dat alle mensen,
op een bepaald moment in hun leven, geconfronteerd worden met of gebruik maken
van publiek geleverde diensten. De prestaties van organisaties in de publieke sector
krijgen daardoor veel aandacht van de samenleving. Bovendien worden publieke di-
ensten betaald met belastinggeld. Burgers verwachten kwalitatief goede diensten en
waar voor belastinggeld.
De productie van publieke goederen en diensten is zeer arbeidsintensief. De in-
spanningen en prestaties van werknemers in de publieke sector zijn van doorslaggevend
belang voor de productie van kwalitatief goede publieke diensten. Het kan echter
kostbaar en lastig zijn om werknemers in de publieke sector te prikkelen om harder
te werken. Prestaties in de publieke sector zijn over het algemeen lastig te meten en
controleren, dit komt ook tot uiting in de manier waarop prestaties beoordeeld wor-
1De OECD schat dat 6 tot 29 procent van de beroepsbevolking in OECD-landen werkzaam is
bij de overheid of andere publieke organisaties.
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den in de publieke sector. Prestatiebeoordeling in de publieke sector komt relatief
weinig voor en, als het voorkomt, is het vaak verbonden aan zwakke prikkels (zie
Burgess en Metcalfe 1999). Daarom zijn de intrinsieke werkmotivaties van werkne-
mers in de publieke sector in grote mate bepalend voor de prestatie van de publieke
sector. Een beter begrip van de motivaties van deze werknemers kan bijdragen aan
een beter begrip van de prestatie van publieke organisaties.
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de groeiende literatuur over motivaties van werkne-
mers in de publieke sector. In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift worden ver-
schillen in motivaties tussen werknemers in de publieke sector en de private sector
bestudeerd. Er zijn twee sterk gerelateerde onderwerpen in het bijzonder bestudeerd.
Eerst is onderzocht hoe het altruïsme van een werknemer en zijn waardering voor
de missie van de publieke sector gezamenlijk de kans beïnvloeden dat een werkne-
mer werkzaam is in de publieke sector. Daarnaast is geanalyseerd of werknemers
in de publieke sector zichzelf als meer altruïstisch en luier schatten dan werkne-
mers in de private sector. Vervolgens worden in hoofdstuk 4 de motivaties van
ambtenaren in het bijzonder bestudeerd. In dit hoofdstuk wordt empirisch onder-
zocht of ambtenaren vaker aangeven tevreden te zijn met hun werk als hun eigen
missievoorkeuren overeenkomen met de missievoorkeuren van de regerende politici.
In het laatste deel van het proefschrift is voor een enigszins andere aanpak gekozen,
er is één mogelijke manier bestudeerd om medewerkers in de publieke sector te
motiveren. Er is een veldexperiment uitgevoerd bij een grote Nederlandse school
voor mbo-onderwijs en er is onderzocht of het geven van feedback aan docenten de
prestaties van docenten kan verbeteren.
Het resterende deel van deze samenvatting is als volgt opgebouwd. De volgende
sectie bespreekt de huidige inzichten in intrinsieke motivaties van werknemers en de
gevolgen voor de publieke sector. Daarna zal een korte discussie volgen over feedback
en, in het bijzonder, feedback als prikkel voor prestaties. Dit hoofdstuk sluit af met
een samenvatting van de studies in dit proefschrift.
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Intrinsieke motivaties in de publieke sector
Het doorgronden van motivaties is doorslaggevend in het begrijpen van elke vorm
van gedrag. Elke actie die ondernomen wordt, is een gevolg van een motivatie om
deze actie te ondernemen. Motivaties kunnen voortkomen uit verscheidene bronnen
en kunnen verschillen in richting en intensiteit. Een klassiek onderscheid in soorten
motivatie wordt gegeven door Ryan en Deci (2000), zij maken onderscheid tussen
intrinsieke motivatie en extrinsieke motivatie. Een persoon wordt beschouwd als
intrinsiek gemotiveerd als deze persoon plezier of voldoening ontleent aan de actie
zelf. Extrinsieke motivatie komt voort uit gevolgen die los staan van de actie zelf,
zoals druk of beloningen. Op de werkvloer bestaan zulke beloningen of druk uit
bijvoorbeeld nanciële prikkels, mogelijkheden tot promotie, sociale waardering of
lof. De intrinsieke motivaties van werknemers staan centraal in het eerste deel van
dit proefschrift.
Intrinsieke motivaties zijn uitgebreid bestudeerd bij werknemers in de publieke
sector. In hun invloedrijke artikel beschrijven Perry en Wise (1990) het concept
public service motivation. Zij deniëren motivatie voor de publieke zaak als een
"aanleg om te reageren op motivaties die voornamelijk of alleen voorkomen bij werk
in publieke instellingen en organisaties" (p. 368). Perry en Wise stellen dat mensen
met een hoge motivatie voor de publieke zaak een grotere kans hebben om in de
publieke sector te werken en beter presteren in een baan in de publieke sector. Ze
beschrijven drie bronnen van motivatie voor de publieke zaak: deelname aan het
formuleren van beleid, betrokkenheid bij een beleidsonderwerp en de wil om bij te
dragen aan het openbaar belang. Het streven naar deelname aan het formuleren
van beleid is sterk gerelateerd aan persoonlijk welzijn. Dit streven kan voortkomen
uit een persoonlijke behoefte aan een spannende en uitdagende baan of misschien
zelfs uit overwegingen gerelateerd aan zelfbeeld of status. De betrokkenheid bij een
beleidsonderwerp en de wil om bij te dragen aan het openbaar belang is meer gere-
lateerd aan een algemene toewijding aan het welzijn van anderen. Deze toewijding
aan het welzijn van anderen heeft de meeste aandacht gekregen binnen de literatuur
over motivaties van werknemers in de publieke sector (zie Perry et al. 2010).
In later onderzoek is public service motivationvaak gelijkgesteld aan generieke
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gevoelens van altruïsme (Rainey en Steinbauer 1999). Altruïstische motivaties zijn
gedenieerd als "gemotiveerd zijn uit overwegingen met betrekking tot de behoefte
van anderen in plaats van eigen behoefte" (Piliavin en Charng 1990: p. 30). Met
andere woorden, altruïsme is een verlangen om anderen te helpen zonder directe vo-
ordelen voor de persoon zelf. Dit verlangen om anderen te helpen kan voortvloeien
uit gevoelens van empathie, sympathie of mededogen. Recente economische theo-
rieën bouwen voort op deze ideeën en maken de aanname dat werknemers intrinsiek
geven om het publieke belang (zie Tonin en Vlassopoulos 2008 voor een overzicht).
Een gedeelde bevinding in deze sterk groeiende literatuur is dat het voor publieke
organisaties optimaal is om relatief lage lonen te bieden en zo de zelfselectie van
gemotiveerde werknemers naar de publieke sector te versterken (Handy en Katz
1998, Delfgaauw en Dur 2007). Binnen deze theorieën wordt vaak aangenomen dat
de toewijding aan het publieke belang een gevolg is van altruïstische motivaties;
dit kunnen zuiver altruïstische motivaties of onzuiver altruïstische motivaties zijn
(zie ook Andreoni 1990 voor een discussie over altruïsme). Werknemers gemotiveerd
door een onzuivere vorm van altruïsme geven intrinsiek om hun persoonlijke bijdrage
aan de publieke zaak; deze werknemers ervaren een warm gevoelals gevolg van hun
bijdrage. Werknemers kunnen ook gemotiveerd zijn door zuiver altruïstische moti-
vaties. Werknemers gemotiveerd door zuiver altruïsme geven om het publieke belang
in het algemeen; deze werknemers geven om de totale bijdrage aan het publieke be-
lang. Deze werknemers nemen in overweging dat wanneer zij niet zelf bijdragen aan
het publieke belang, anderen hun plaats zullen innemen en dat wel zullen doen.
Een andere belangrijke en sterk gerelateerde literatuur bestudeert de missiemoti-
vatie van werknemers. Veel organisaties hebben een specieke missie. De missie van
een organisatie beschrijft de primaire functie en de doelstellingen van een organisatie.
Voor organisaties in de publieke sector beschrijft de missie hoe publieke organisaties
bijdragen aan het publieke belang. Besley en Ghatak (2005) ontwikkelden een model
waarin werknemers verschillen in missievoorkeuren; dat wil zeggen, werknemers ver-
schillen in hun waardering van de missie van een organisatie. Besley en Ghatak
laten zien dat er een premie bestaat op het overeenkomen van missievoorkeuren,
met als gevolg dat werknemers kiezen om bij een organisatie te werken waarmee
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zij missievoorkeuren delen. Een aantal (lab)experimentele studies heeft de rol van
missievoorkeuren bestudeerd (Tonin en Vlassopoulos 2010, 2012, Gerhards 2012,
Carpenter en Gong 2013, en Fehrler en Kosfeld 2014). Een gemeenschappelijke
bevinding is dat proefpersonen waarbij de missievoorkeuren aansloten bij de uit-
gevoerde taak meer inspanning uitoefenden in hun werk dan proefpersonen waarbij
de missievoorkeuren minder goed aansloten bij de uitgevoerde taak. Bovendien, en
in lijn met de studies hierboven, kan de zelfselectie van werknemers naar taken met
overeenkomende missievoorkeuren gestimuleerd worden door een lager basisloon te
bieden.
Feedback als prikkel voor prestaties
Veel organisaties verzamelen informatie over de prestaties van hun werknemers. Deze
informatie wordt gebruikt om prestaties te beoordelen, maar ook om toekomstige
prestaties van werknemers te verbeteren. De informatie over prestaties wordt vaak
naar de werknemer teruggekoppeld als informele feedback of als formele feedback in
een functioneringsgesprek. In het laatste deel van dit proefschrift bestuderen we het
e¤ect van het ontvangen van feedback op de prestaties van werknemers. Feedback
op prestaties is gedenieerd als "acties ondernomen door een extern persoon met
als doel het informeren van de ontvanger over aspecten van de prestatie" (Kluger
en DeNisi 1996: p. 255). Leren over prestaties uit het verleden kan e¤ect hebben
op toekomstige prestaties wanneer werknemers intrinsiek of extrinsiek geven om
prestaties (bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van intrinsieke motivatie of prestatieprikkels). De
e¤ectiviteit van feedback in het verbeteren van prestaties is een punt van stevige
discussie onder psychologen en bedrijfskundigen. In een overzicht en meta-analyse
van de psychologische literatuur vinden Kluger en DeNisi (1996) dat het ontvangen
van feedback over prestaties maar in twee derde van alle onderzochte studies een
positief e¤ect heeft op toekomstige prestaties. Alvero et al. (2001) vinden een
vergelijkbaar resultaat wanneer zij de bedrijfskundige literatuur bestuderen, ook
hier geldt dat het ontvangen van feedback niet altijd leidt tot betere prestaties. In
een poging om deze gemengde resultaten te verklaren benadrukken Alvero et al.
(2001) het belang van de bron (bijv. de manager of onderzoeker), het medium (bijv.
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verbaal of schriftelijk) en de inhoud van de feedback.
In veel organisaties wordt relatieve feedback gegeven. Relatieve feedback bestaat
uit informatie over de prestaties van een werknemer ten opzichte van een vooropgesteld
doel of de prestaties van collegas. Feedback over relatieve prestaties kan e¤ect
hebben op de prestaties van een werknemer wanneer werknemers gevoelig zijn voor
status of sociale erkenning (Moldavanu et al. 2007, Besley en Ghatak 2008, Auriol
en Renault 2008) of wanneer werknemers zich willen conformeren aan sociale nor-
men (Bernheim 1994). Een aantal studies heeft met experimenteel onderzoek laten
zien dat relatieve feedback een positief e¤ect kan hebben op prestaties (Azmat en
Iriberri 2010, 2014, Blanes i Vidal en Nossol 2011, Kuhnen en Tymula 2012, Tran
en Zeckhauser 2012, Delfgaauw et al. 2013, Gerhards en Siemer 2014). Barankay
(2012) en Bandiera et al. (2013) vinden echter dat relatieve feedback ook een nadelig
e¤ect op prestaties kan hebben.
Overzicht van de hoofdstukken
Een uitgebreide bestuurskundige en economische literatuur heeft aangetoond dat
werknemers in de publieke sector een grotere bereidheid tonen om anderen te helpen
of het publieke belang te dienen (zie Perry et al. 2010 voor een overzicht). In hoofd-
stuk 2 stellen mijn co-auteur en ik dat werknemers verschillen in hun waardering van
de missie van de publieke sector. Dat wil zeggen dat mogelijk niet alle werknemers
van mening zijn dat de missie van de publieke sector het publieke belang dient. We
bestuderen hoe altruïsme en de overeenkomst van missievoorkeuren van een werkne-
mer met de missie van de publieke sector gezamenlijk de kans beïnvloeden dat een
werknemer in de publieke sector werkt.
We hebben onze ideeën gestructureerd door een simpel model te ontwikkelen,
voortbouwend op het werk van Besley en Ghatak (2005), waar werknemers ver-
schillen in hun altruïsme en waardering voor de missie van de publieke sector. Ons
model voorspelt dat altruïsme en de gelijkenis van missievoorkeuren elkaar wederzi-
jds versterken. Altruïstische werknemers hebben een grotere kans om in de publieke
sector te werken wanneer zij van mening zijn dat de missie van de publieke sec-
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tor de publieke zaak dient en hebben een kleinere kans om in de publieke sector te
werken wanneer zij van mening zijn dat de missie van de publieke sector de pub-
lieke zaak schaadt. Als een werknemer onverschillig is, heeft altruïsme geen invloed.
Andersom geldt dat werknemers met overeenkomende missievoorkeuren een grotere
kans hebben om in de publieke sector te werken wanneer zij altruïstisch zijn en een
kleinere kans hebben om in de publieke sector te werken wanneer zij afgunstig zijn.
De kans wordt niet beïnvloed voor egoïstische werknemers.
We hebben onze voorspellingen getest met enquêtegegevens uit de World Values
Survey, dat gegevens bevat uit een groot aantal landen. Onze dataset bevat infor-
matie over de sector waarin een werknemer werkzaam is, de bereidheid om anderen
te helpen (altruïsme) en het vertrouwen in politieke partijen (wat wij gebruiken als
indicator voor de gelijkenis van missievoorkeuren). De bevindingen uit onze em-
pirische analyse zijn sterk in lijn met onze theoretische voorspellingen. We hebben
een wederzijds versterkende relatie gevonden tussen altruïsme en de gelijkenis van
missievoorkeuren op de kans dat een werknemer werkzaam is in de publieke sector.
De resultaten laten bovendien zien dat deze wederzijds versterkende relatie vooral
belangrijk is voor hoog opgeleide werknemers en voor werknemers in minder on-
twikkelde landen. Werknemers die zeer altruïstisch zijn met een hoog vertrouwen
in politieke partijen tonen een signicant hogere kans om in de publieke sector te
werken dan werknemers met gemiddeld altruïsme en vertrouwen. Werknemers die
beperkt altruïstisch zijn met laag vertrouwen in politieke partijen tonen een signi-
cant lagere kans om in de publieke sector te werken. Tot slot werken zeer altruïstis-
che werknemers met laag vertrouwen en beperkt altruïstische werknemers met hoog
vertrouwen niet meer of minder waarschijnlijk in de publieke sector. In de groep
van hoog opgeleide werknemers hebben de laatste twee groepen zelfs een lagere kans
om in de publieke sector te werken. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is dat con-
icterende missievoorkeuren of afgunst sommige werknemers ontmoedigt om in de
publieke sector te werken.
Er bestaan twee mogelijke verklaringen voor de resultaten die we hebben gevon-
den. Onze resultaten kunnen het gevolg zijn van zelfselectie naar de publieke sector
(zie bijvoorbeeld Handy en Katz 1998, Francois 2000 en 2007, Delfgaauw en Dur
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2008) of het gevolg zijn van werknemers die hun voorkeuren aanpassen aan de sec-
tor waarin zij werken (zie Wright en Grant 2010 voor een discussie). Het kan zo
zijn dat de gevonden resultaten niet opgaan voor werknemers aan het begin van
hun carrière. De resultaten zouden dan tot stand zijn gekomen doordat werkne-
mers hun voorkeuren aanpassen aan de publieke sector als ze eenmaal in die sector
werkzaam zijn. In lijn met deze mogelijke verklaring zouden sommige werknemers
meer altruïstisch worden en een hoger vertrouwen in politieke partijen krijgen door
te werken in de publieke sector. De bestaande literatuur wijst echter in de richting
van de tegenovergestelde verklaring voor het e¤ect van altruïsme. Een aantal em-
pirische studies laat zien dat het altruïsme van werknemers juist afneemt in plaats
van toeneemt in de publieke sector (Blau 1960, Van Maanen 1975, Moynihan en
Pandey 2007, De Cooman et al. 2009, en Buurman et al. 2012).
In hoofdstuk 3 hebben we een nauw verwant onderwerp bestudeerd. We hebben
onderzocht of werknemers in de publieke sector zichzelf meer altruïstisch en luier
schatten dan werknemers in de private sector. Eerst is een theoretisch model gefor-
muleerd waarin werknemers in de publieke sector of in de private sector kunnen
werken. In dit model verschillen werknemers in altruïsme (bereidheid om anderen
te helpen) en luiheid (kosten van inspanning). Het model voorspelt dat de kans
dat een werknemer in de publieke sector werkt groter is wanneer een werknemer
altruïstisch is en, afhankelijk van het altruïsme, groter of kleiner is voor een luie
werknemer. Altruïstische werknemers hebben een grotere kans om in de publieke
sector te werken, omdat de publieke sector de mogelijkheid biedt om bij te dragen
aan het welzijn van anderen. Het e¤ect van luiheid op sectorkeuze is indirect. De
sectorkeuze van een luie werknemer wordt bepaald door verschillen tussen sectoren
in kosten en baten die niet gerelateerd zijn aan de inspanningen van een werknemer,
want hard werken is kostbaar voor een luie werknemer. Luiere werknemers hebben
een grotere kans om in de publieke sector te werken wanneer zij egoïstisch zijn, om-
dat luiere werknemers de baten niet gerelateerd aan inspanningen in de publieke
sector (zoals het vaste loon) de voorkeur geven boven de hoge beloningen voor in-
spanning in de private sector. Luiere werknemers hebben daarentegen een kleinere
kans om in de publieke sector te werken wanneer zij zeer altruïstisch zijn, want luiere
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werknemers hebben relatief lagere baten van de hoge intrinsieke beloningen voor in-
spanning in de publieke sector. Kort samengevat, ons model voorspelt een negatieve
interactie tussen het altruïsme en de luiheid van een werknemer op de kans dat een
werknemer in de publieke sector werkt.
We hebben onze voorspellingen empirisch getest met enquêtegegevens over Duitse
werknemers uit het German Socio-Economic Panel. In lijn met ons theoretisch
model hebben wij gevonden dat werknemers in de publieke sector zich als signi-
cant meer altruïstisch en luier schatten dan werknemers in de private sector. We
hebben geen bewijs gevonden voor een negatieve interactie tussen altruïsme en lui-
heid. Gezamenlijk impliceren deze resultaten dat werknemers die zeer altruïstisch
en lui zijn de hoogste kans hebben om in de publieke sector te werken. Werknemers
die egoïstisch en energiek zijn hebben de laagste kans om in de publieke sector te
werken. Een mogelijke verklaring voor het ontbreken van een signicant interactie-
e¤ect kan zijn dat de bijdrage aan het publieke belang van werknemers in de publieke
sector onafhankelijk is van hun inspanningen. Werknemers kunnen bijvoorbeeld het
loonverschil tussen een baan in de publieke sector en de private sector al als een
bijdrage aan het publieke belang zien.
In een aanvullende analyse hebben we bestudeerd of onze resultaten het gevolg
zijn van zelfselectie aan het begin van de carrière van een werknemer of dat onze re-
sultaten meer of minder uitgesproken zijn voor werknemers met meer werkervaring.
Er zijn twee mogelijke redenen waarom de werkervaring van werknemers belangrijk
kan zijn voor onze analyse. Ten eerste kunnen werknemers de eerste jaren van hun
carrière besteden aan jobshoppen. Werknemers aan het begin van hun carrière
nemen mogelijk banen aan die niet goed passen bij de voorkeuren en competenties
van de werknemer (zie theoretische modellen door Johnson 1978, Jovanovic 1979,
en Neal 1999). Ten tweede kunnen de voorkeuren van werknemers ook veranderen
naarmate werknemers meer werkervaring opdoen, bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van social-
isatie binnen de organisatie (Brewer 2008). Volgens deze redenering zouden onze
resultaten sterker of zwakker zijn voor meer ervaren werknemers. Onze resultaten
tonen dat het verschil in altruïsme tussen werknemers in de publieke sector en de
private sector al aanwezig is aan het begin van de carrière van werknemers en, over
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het geheel genomen, blijft dit onveranderd over de gehele carrière. We hebben wel
een statistisch signicante relatie gevonden tussen luiheid en werkervaring. Aan
het begin van de carrière van werknemers bestaan nog geen signicante verschillen
in luiheid tussen werknemers in de publieke sector en de private sector, maar dit
verschil stijgt voor meer ervaren werknemers. Met de huidige gegevens kunnen we
echter niet achterhalen of dit het gevolg is van jobshoppenof dat een werknemer
zijn voorkeuren aanpast.
Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert de motivaties van ambtenaren in het bijzonder. Ambtenaren
voeren taken uit namens de overheid. De doelstellingen van de overheid zijn beschreven
in de missie van de overheid. De missie van de overheid wordt bepaald door gekozen
politici. Ambtenaren kunnen verschillen van politici in de regering in hun voorkeur
voor een missie voor de overheid. In dit hoofdstuk heb ik empirisch bestudeerd
of de missiemotivatie van ambtenaren invloed heeft op de arbeidstevredenheid van
ambtenaren. Missiemotivatie kan belangrijk zijn voor arbeidstevredenheid wanneer
medewerkers voldoening halen uit het werken aan een missie die in lijn is met hun
eigen voorkeur.
De gebruikte data zijn afkomstig uit de Longitudinal Internet Studies for the
Social sciences. De steekproef bevat gegevens over Nederlandse werknemers, zoals
individuele eigenschappen, details over hun dienstbetrekking en politieke voorkeuren.
Informatie over gerapporteerd stemgedrag bij parlementaire verkiezingen is gebruikt
om te meten of de missievoorkeuren van een werknemer overeenkomen met die
van de regering. Er wordt gesteld dat de missievoorkeuren van een werknemer
overeenkomen met die van politici in de regering als een werknemer heeft gestemd op
een politieke partij die in de regering heeft plaatsgenomen. Er wordt gesteld dat de
missievoorkeuren van een werknemer en de politici in de regering niet overeenkomen
als een werknemer heeft gestemd op een politieke partij die na de verkiezingen geen
deel uitmaakt van de regering. Om het e¤ect van deze variabele op arbeidstevre-
denheid te schatten is gebruik gemaakt van het feit dat de missie van de overheid
verandert als er een nieuwe overheid aantreedt. Ik heb onderzocht of de arbeidstevre-
denheid van een ambtenaar verandert nadat de gelijkenis tussen missievoorkeuren
van een ambtenaar en regerende politici verandert als gevolg van verkiezingen.
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De resultaten laten duidelijk zien dat de missiemotivatie van ambtenaren belan-
grijk is voor de mate waarin ambtenaren tevreden zijn met hun werk. Ambtenaren
geven aan meer tevreden te zijn met hun werk als hun missievoorkeur overeenkomt
met die van de regerende politici dan wanneer hun voorkeur niet overeenkomt. Het
verschil in arbeidstevredenheid is zowel economisch als statistisch signicant. Het
e¤ect van een gelijkenis in missievoorkeur is ongeveer van dezelfde omvang als een
half uur minder woon-werkreistijd. Een gelijkenis van missievoorkeur heeft geen
e¤ect op de arbeidstevredenheid van werknemers buiten de overheidssector.
Daarnaast is onderzocht of het belangrijk is voor de arbeidstevredenheid van een
ambtenaar welke andere politieke partijen aantreden in een coalitieregering. In Ned-
erland bestaat de regering uit een coalitie van politieke partijen, dit heeft als gevolg
dat politieke partijen vaak compromissen moeten sluiten wanneer zij beleidsplannen
maken. In lijn met dit idee tonen de resultaten dat, naast de eerste voorkeur van
een ambtenaar (als gemeten door gerapporteerd stemgedrag), het ook belangrijk is
welke andere partijen deel uitmaken van een coalitie. Ambtenaren met een positie-
vere houding ten opzichte van de coalitiepartijen zijn signicant meer tevreden met
hun werk dan ambtenaren met een negatievere houding.
In de laatste studie van dit proefschrift bestuderen mijn co-auteurs en ik een
belangrijke dienst die voornamelijk door de publieke sector geleverd wordt, namelijk
onderwijs. Goed onderwijs is een topprioriteit voor vele overheden. Het leveren van
onderwijs is zeer arbeidsintensief. De prestaties van docenten spelen daarom een
cruciale rol bij het leveren van goed onderwijs. In hoofdstuk 5 hebben we bestudeerd
of het ontvangen van feedback over prestaties een e¤ect heeft op de prestaties van
docenten.
We hebben een veldexperiment uitgevoerd op een grote Nederlandse school voor
mbo-onderwijs om het e¤ect van feedback door studenten op de prestaties van do-
centen te onderzoeken. De prestatie van docenten is gemeten door studenten de
docenten te laten beoordelen met behulp van een vragenlijst bestaande uit vragen
over negentien onderwerpen over de prestatie van docenten. Nadat we deze infor-
matie hebben verzameld is een feedbacktreatment ingevoerd: een willekeurig gekozen
groep docenten kreeg de uitkomsten van de evaluaties door studenten. Het e¤ect
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van het ontvangen van feedback is bepaald door alle docenten een jaar later opnieuw
te laten evalueren door studenten. We hebben alle docenten bovendien informatie
gegeven over de gemiddelde prestatie van de docenten in het team van een docent
en we hebben docenten gevraagd om zowel voor als na het ontvangen van feedback
een zelfevaluatie te geven van de eigen prestaties.
Onze resultaten tonen dat het ontvangen van feedback geen e¤ect heeft op de
toekomstige prestatie van docenten. We hebben een precies geschat nihil gemiddeld
e¤ect gevonden. We hebben vervolgens ook onderzocht of de inhoud van de feedback
belangrijk is voor het e¤ect van het ontvangen van feedback. Ten eerste hebben
we geschat of het e¤ect van feedback afhangt van de mate waarin een docent zijn
eigen prestatie kan inschatten. Docenten die een zelfevaluatie geven die overeenkomt
met de evaluatie door studenten tonen geen reactie op het ontvangen van feedback.
Docenten die leren dat zij zichzelf een stuk positiever beoordelen dan studenten
reageren wel op de feedback en presteren in het volgende jaar beter. Vervolgens
hebben we ook geschat of het e¤ect van feedback verschilt tussen docenten die leren
dat ze beter of slechter presteren dan het gemiddelde van de docenten in hun team.
We vonden geen duidelijke relatie tussen het e¤ect van feedback en het verschil
tussen de eigen prestatie van een docent en de gemiddelde prestatie van het team.
Leren over prestaties in het verleden kan werknemers motiveren (bijvoorbeeld
als werknemers intrinsiek gemotiveerd zijn), maar is ook een manier om werknemers
te informeren over voorgaande prestaties. We hebben onderzocht of docenten die
feedback ontvangen hun zelfevaluatie aanpassen als zij van de feedback leren dat
studenten hen anders beoordelen dan docenten zichzelf beoordelen. We vonden dat
docenten hun zelfevaluatie verlagen na het ontvangen van feedback als zij leren dat
ze hun eigen prestatie positiever inschatten dan de studenten doen. Dit e¤ect is
echter niet langer signicant voor docenten die zichzelf veel positiever beoordelen.
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The motivations of public sector employees are important for the
performance of public organizations because production is highly
labor intensive and, more importantly, because the use of extrinsic 
incentives is relatively rare in the public sector. The first part of this
thesis examines the work motivations of public sector employees.
The empirical analysis studies differences in motivations between 
employees in the public sector and the private sector. In addition,
it investigates mission motivation as a source of motivation for
government employees. The last part of this thesis examines the
use of feedback as an incentive. The effect of students’ feedback on
the performance of teachers was investigated by conducting a field 
experiment at a large Dutch school for intermediate vocational
education. Both the effect of receiving feedback as well as the
relevance of the content of the feedback was investigated.
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